As the catalogue of a variegated dialogue opens up between the Centre and Jammu and Kashmir once again, with Prime Minister Narendra Modi stressing that a permanent solution must be found within the four walls of the Indian Constitution, it is clear the “Kashmir” problem once again dominates our mindscape. With despair and idleness being dangerous companions, Mr Modi himself knows there is no fix-all boilerplate for J&K. With three geographical zones — Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh — forming the state’s contours, it’s 135-km-long and 32-km-wide Sunni-dominated Valley that is holding India hostage. The kernel of the Valley’s problem is that toxic ideological radicalism has prospered due to the rising gap between growing expectations and fewer opportunities. The damage caused by the pellet gun has been seen as the brutal instrumentality of oppression virulently opposed by the populace. Somewhere in this volatile mix, they forgot that picking up stones and arms and waging war against the State won’t be accepted by any sovereign authority.
The solution for J&K comes with an inbuilt complexity, for the rest of the state inhabited by other ethnicities — Hindus, Shias, Dogras, Sikhs, Ladakhis, Gujjars, Pahadis and Bakarwals — have no interest in independence or azadi. In such a scenario, should autonomy be given to the state where only around 33 per cent of people speak Kashmiri or to the Kashmir Valley? The solution has to be within the framework of Article 370 and the 1952 Delhi Agreement. Whatever needs to be done to alleviate woes has to be done for the entire state. There is no silver bullet or other panacea available. One size fits all is not the option. Various solutions, including a plebiscite, have been suggested in the past, but with two large parts of the original five — Northern Areas and Aksai Chin — no longer part of the original J&K state, that is completely unacceptable.
Pertinently, even when Kashmir was needlessly internationalised by India at the behest of Lord Mountbatten, the United Nations was obsessed with military men to solve the problem. When the ceasefire was instituted on January 1, 1949, after a prolonged war, the UN chose a Belgian, Gen. Maurice Delvoie, as military adviser for the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP). By February, UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie sent 36 military observers — 17 from the US, six from Mexico, five from Belgium, four from Canada and four from Norway. In between there was Security Council president Gen. Andrew McNaughton, a Canadian, who dabbled in Kashmir affairs. The original choice for chief plebiscite administrator was Gen. Walter Bedell Smith who fell ill and was replaced by Fleet Adm. Chester W. Nimitz. Incidentally, Gen. Smith was to later become director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
At one point, even Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower was in the hunt for the mediator’s position, a position which was finally taken up by Senator Frank Graham. The US always subliminally had an interest in Kashmir. Robert Trumbull, writing as far back as October 28, 1947 in the New York Times, had said: “There is sentiment in Ladakh for independence and that such fragmentation of Kashmir is what India wishes to avoid in this strategic state next door to the Soviet Union.” The following day Trumbull wrote something even more damaging: “Indian officials frankly believe that possession of Kashmir is vital to the security of India. Some high government sources interviewed today were thinking about the Soviet Union, which touches Kashmir at Gilgit, at the state’s northwest tip.”
Geostrategically, Kash-mir’s importance is not lost on anyone. While Ameri-can interest died down after the winding down of the issue at the UN, at the very height of the Cold War it surfaced in its most “vile and obnoxious” form (written noting by top Indian government official on file). With the 1965 India-Pakistan conflict already a page in history, a fresh American initiative was launched for the state. US state department troubleshooters were trying to orchestrate a new campaign to test the fertile waters of Kashmir. Known as the Puerto Rican Formula, the state department began to peddle it as the new elixir.
The US state department’s pointman in New Delhi was Edwin J. Peachaus, second secretary in the US embassy, who sent feelers to top Indian officials between December 1965 and March 1966 about a Puerto Rico type of Commonwealth status for Kashmir to resolve the dispute. His contention was that if the “US could maintain control over Puerto Rico, why shouldn’t India follow the same example in Kashmir?”
Ratcheting up the volume, around the same time, a Washington Daily News correspondent, Richard H. Boyce, filed a Srinagar-datelined story on June 9, 1966: “...And despite the Tashkent Agreement of last December to settle their differences peacefully, no real progress has been made towards Kashmir peace. Technically India was the aggressor last year. Although Pakistan troops crossed the ceasefire line, Indian troops crossed the international border into Pakistan. Indians think they dare not make any concessions on Kashmir for political reasons at home. The same motivation hardens Pakistan’s resolve not to give in. Both governments wrongly tell their voters they won last year’s war. Privately, high-level Indian officials confide that they discussed a Puerto Rico-type associate state status for Kashmir — not fully an Indian state, but with some degree of internal self-government though still belonging to India. The hard fact remains that India possesses more than two-thirds of Kashmir and is unwilling to talk to Pakistan about it. India figures neither the US nor Russia will force her to give some of Kashmir to Pakistan. Pakistan is not strong enough to take it by force. But Red China’s help could make a difference. China would like Kashmir and it has already infiltrated some of it along the Northeast and Northwest edges. And pro-Peking Indian Communists and Chinese Communists have circulated in disputed areas for months. India resists an internationalisation of Kashmir fearing this would only let China gobble up all of it.”
This viewpoint was found distasteful by a powerful section of the Indian government as Kashmir was and is an integral part of India. However, it is still interesting to recount the Puerto Rico story here. Over the years, it has retained its unique status as a commonwealth voluntarily associated with the United States. The US-Puerto Rico Commission of 1966 conferred upon the people of Puerto Rico equal dignity with equality of status and of national citizenship. The island lodged like a jewel — 161 km-long and 56 km-wide — is wedged between the Atlantic Ocean and the Caribbean Sea. Puerto Rico remained a Spanish colony till 1898, when it was ceded to the US after the Spanish-American War. Puerto Ricans were granted American citizenship in 1917 and were given the right to elect the Puerto Rican Legislative Assembly. In 1947, the islanders were authorised to elect their own governor by popular vote. In 1952, the US Congress granted Puerto Ricans the right to their own constitution, elevating the island to the unique status of a self-governing free commonwealth associated with the US.
But despite the economic miracle, the question of identity remains. As long as Puerto Ricans live on the island, they cannot vote in US presidential and congressional elections. Concurrently, they have the advantage of being exempt from US federal taxes, but local taxes levied on them are higher. Four plebiscites have been held since the late 20th century to resolve the political status. The most recent, in 2012, showed a majority (54 per cent) in favour of a change in status, with full statehood the preferred option, but it was highly controversial as many ballots were left blank and the results criticised by many parties. Prime Minister Modi has a unique opportunity to leave his mark on history. Kashmir is in a fragile condition, and in need of careful handling.
