On October 26, 2014, the Stars and Stripes fluttered for the last time over Camp Leatherneck, and the Union Jack over Camp Bastion, the two main Nato bases in Afghanistan, as the final phases of the drawdown of Nato forces got underway and the Afghan National Army (ANA) officially assumed responsibility for ongoing operations against the Taliban. The American withdrawal demonstrated once again the truth of the adage about Afghanistan being the “Graveyard of Empires”, built over a long timeline, from Alexander the Great in 330 BC to the US Marines in 2014.
However, even after the departure of the US Marines, the proxy war between the Taliban and the “democratic” Afghan state, with the covert support of the Pakistan military, still smoulders on as part of Pakistan’s extended “Great Game” to preserve its control over what it considers to be its region of strategic depth on the subcontinent.
India on its part has no military presence in Afghanistan. However, it is the fifth largest provider of economic aid to that country, with an initial tranche of $8 billion, further enhanced by $2 billion by the new government which has recently taken office, and all without any pre-conditions. The newly elected Afghan President, Ashraf Ghani, is only too aware of the severe internal stresses and strains on his country and its economy from traditional ethnic and political animosities which are part of the country’s history and social culture, and which will tear the country apart again unless it’s checked and resolved. He is impatient for the process of reconciliation to take root, as reflected in his choices of Rashid Dostum, an Uzbeg warlord as vice-president, Abdullah Abdullah, a Tajik, as his CEO or Prime Minister, with a number of key political berths going to Mohammad Mohaqiq from the Hazara tribe, who have traditionally been considered social inferiors by the ethnic Pashtun majority.
The Indian government is aware that speedy decision making and prompt execution in its programmes of economic assistance is vital if it wants to win in Afghanistan, and the courtesy visit to Afghanistan by the new Indian foreign minister to stress fraternal ties is a matter of satisfaction in this regard. Afghanistan is faced with multiple Herculean tasks — to put its war-ravaged house in order, while simultaneously ensuring the safety and security of the population. In all this, one aspect is abundantly clear — if the wobbly fledgling of democracy in Afghanistan is to survive, it can only do so under the protective shield of strong and well-trained and well-equipped Afghan armed forces. It is understood in this context that India has recently offered to finance repairs and overhaul of the large quantities of Russian military equipment lying unserviceable with the Afghan military which can considerably boost their military capabilities. It is a project in which Indian industry, both private as well as the public sector, can participate, though the potential threat of violence might deter many from venturing into Afghanistan. It cannot be emphasised enough that Indian commercial undertakings which venture into Afghanistan will be specially targeted by Pakistani proxies. Security cover for Indian civilian projects will, therefore, assume great importance, and call for the services of Indian equivalents of American multinational private security corporations, like Blackwater and Xie, to prevent egregious human rights excesses which the American companies have been held guilty of.
India has so far opted not to maintain even a minimal military presence in Afghanistan, a policy which has had overall beneficial political effects, because Afghans resent the presence of foreign troops of any persuasion in their country, even those from the friendliest of foreign friends. But India has also repeatedly turned down pleas for military assistance by beleaguered Afghan governments, including urgent personal appeals from Afghan heads of state, which lost this country much goodwill in Afghanistan.
But now, with the departure of Nato, the chips are down. Large tracts of strategic space within the country have been left uncovered, a tempting target for takeover by Pakistan through its Afghan proxies. The Afghan government will require to meet the challenge with forces of its own, like the Afghan National Army and the Afghan police forces. The historical narrative in Afghanistan has moved on. India has to reorient its own policies and perspectives and provide comprehensive military aid comprising weapons, equipment, logistics support and training, including “advisers” and “training teams” where necessary. The latter would have to operate with their Afghan counterparts, including accompanying them into combat in a “boots on the ground” mode, with all its attendant risks.
Meanwhile, Taliban offensives have picked up momentum, as they rush to occupy the Helmand Valley with its rich “cash crop” of opium. The region was recently vacated by British and American troops, and would be an easy target for everyone in the fray, including the ISIS. The Afghan Taliban are unlikely to welcome such intrusions into their homeland territory by what are after all foreign interlopers, and there are possibilities of violent internecine “opium wars” between the two factions, in which government forces will have to intervene.
Back at Leatherneck and Bastion, the horizontally tricoloured flag of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, black, red and green, now flies over both these deserted camps. The colours of the Afghan flag signify the country’s chequered history, black for its turbulent past, red for the sacrifice and bloodshed that it entailed, and green for hope of a prosperous and happier future. The dice has been thrown for the newly raised Afghan National Army as it steps into its onerous responsibility as the sole defender of its watan. India wishes them well.
The writer is a former Chief of Army Staff and a former member of Parliament
