What are the hostages of terrorist groups to do when their “powerful” governments are unable to take measures to protect? This is the dilemma of abducted families as highlighted by the September 11 interview of Diane Foley, mother of executed US journalist James Foley, who said that her son’s case was an “annoyance” to the government of the United States of America.
Read with President Barack Obama’s speech on September 10, on his government’s future strategy on the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS), (ISIL as he called it), this paradox becomes sharper. Ms Foley said that her son believed that his country would come to the aid of hostages. Instead, she was told that neither would any swapping of prisoners take place, nor would any military action be taken to free her son. Three days later, the ISIS decapitated British aid worker David Haines, their third such victim, even as his family was trying to contact the terrorist group.
In 1961, a French psychiatric named Franz Fannon wrote a book, The Wretched of the Earth, justifying violence by colonies against occupation forces. His treatise was meant to justify the armed Algerian independence struggle against the French. He wrote: “At the level of individuals, violence is a cleansing force. It frees the native from his inferiority complex and from his despair and inaction; it makes him fearless and restores his self-respect.” Noted French philosopher Jean Paul Satre wrote an unusually long 31-page preface recommending Fannon’s theory. Since then most terrorist groups have used Fannon’s treatise to justify mindless violence. What is different now is that terrorist groups like the ISIS have added religious overtones to their interpretation of the treatise.
On the other hand, such violence exposes the chinks in the security strategy of leading world powers who conduct warfare on internationally accepted norms. Some of them, like America, are also prisoners of their avowed policy of not negotiating with terrorists. Their helplessness becomes conspicuous while facing enemies who have no legal or moral compulsions.
During 1982-1992, major powers that had interest in Lebanon were rendered helpless when a record number of hostages (96 in all) were abducted by insurgent groups like the Islamic Jihad, Organisation for the Oppressed of the Earth, Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine and the Amal militia. Majority of the hostages were Americans —many officials, clergymen and educationists were among the victims, including a professor of Indian origin. Though few abductions were for specific reasons, almost all the hostages were treated badly. The bodies of CIA station chief William Buckley and US marine’s Col. Higgins were found dumped on the streets of Beirut in 1991.
During that era there was no coordinated action or coalition politics by the big powers to tackle the crisis like is being arranged now. Each country tried to follow its own policy. However, their regional prejudices were less evident then. They had no problem in seeking the help of even “unfriendly” or “hostile” states in getting their hostages freed. Saving innocent lives was top priority, not regional politics.
President Ronald Reagan, for example, had no objection in seeking covert help from Iran to restrain the Hezbollah although the Khomeini regime had taken 52 employees of the American embassy hostage in November 1979 and kept them till January 1981. The “Iran-Contra” scandal (1985-87), which marred his reputation, was to secure the release of some American hostages held by Hezbollah or allies through a convoluted covert operation that involved selling arms through Israel to Iran, which controlled the Hezbollah.
In 1987, Syria indirectly helped major Western powers by putting pressure on the Hezbollah by killing 20 of them in Beirut. After this, there was some check on abductions. The US’ diplomatic relations with Syria were not friendly, as it was considered to be a Soviet proxy. But American intelligence knew that President Hafez Assad was no pushover. The Soviets could not get Assad’s support to the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), nor could they stop his “repression” of the Syrian Communist Party. That type of realistic policy is missing today, as is evident from President Obama’s speech of building a “global coalition” in fighting the ISIS (or ISIL). He has categorically ruled out seeking the help of the Assad regime’s help because, he said, it “terrorises its own people”.
Strangely, it’s the same Mr Obama who had said, in 2007, before his first election as President, that he would meet the leaders of Iran and Syria to “resolve differences”. One can understand why Mr Obama is hesitant to take Iran’s help in crushing the ISIS — he does not want to further widen the Shia-Sunni divide. But Syria was part of the US-led coalition in the first Iraq War in 1990. In fact, former secretary of state Colin Powell has said that Syria was providing “actionable information on Al Qaeda and terrorists that helped save American lives after 9/11”.
Bashar al-Assad’s critics say that Syrian cooperation with the US is not wholehearted, and that and it does not extend to peace with Israel. But is it necessary to have total convergence on foreign policy issues when it comes to saving innocent lives? The other charge is that Syria gives shelter to insurgent groups like the Hamas and the Palestinian Jihad. But these groups are not known to be working against the US or Britain. If the US has no problem in working with Pakistan, a country that has not only given shelter to several terrorist groups, some of them working against the US-led coalition in Afghanistan, but also to Osama Bin Laden, what would be the objection in reaching out to Bashar al-Assad for saving the lives of innocent Americans?
The writer is a former special secretary, Cabinet Secretariat, and member of the two-man 26/11 enquiry committee
