At the July 2015 Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit at Ufa, it was decided to upgrade two “observers” — India and Pakistan — to full membership. The aspirations of another observer, Iran, were, however, kept on hold. This process is likely to be completed at the coming SCO summit in Tashkent on June 23-24. For SCO, this decision was a sign of increasing maturity and expression of a desire to play a larger role by reaching out to South Asia, that has been historically linked to Central Asia for at least two millennia. For India, the SCO decision adds to its consistent post-USSR policy of close political, economic and strategic ties with Central Asia.
Many analysts believe SCO is a political, military and economic alliance. Its foundations rest on China’s move to settle its borders after the Soviet Union’s collapse: the “Agreement on Strengthening Confidence in the Military Field in Border Areas” in 1996 between China and the new nations that shared its border: Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan. This was followed in 1997 with the “Agreement on Mutual Reduction of Armed Forces in Border Areas”. Later Uzbekistan, that doesn’t have a border with China, was also inducted and the six countries adopted a “Declaration of Creation of SCO” in June 2001.
The goals, tasks and activities of SCO are thus primarily related to peace, security and stability. Regional economic and social cooperation is a secondary objective. In the SCO Charter, its first three “goals and tasks” are defined as: to strengthen mutual trust, friendship and good neighbourliness; to consolidate multi-disciplinary cooperation in maintenance and strengthening of peace, security and stability in the region; and to jointly counteract terrorism, separatism and extremism in all their manifestations. Article 10 of its charter is devoted to the establishment of a Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure, based in Tashkent.
The SCO has also held large-scale military exercises since 2003. In 2007, the exercises in Russia were witnessed by Presidents Vladimir Putin and Hu Jintao. It is therefore evident that SCO is primarily a security and stability-related entity, but not a conventional defence alliance as it has no reference to collective security or to mutual assistance in the face of any external or internal threat. How membership of this quasi-defence alliance sits with India’s well-established policy of staying clear of any military alliances must be critically analysed by strategic experts.
In contrast, Saarc, the only other regional organisation of which India is a member, steers clear of any security activity or function. Its seven objectives enshrined in Article 1 of the charter adopted in 1985 don’t even refer to security, peace or stability! The SCO’s six founding members aren’t members of the nonaligned movement. The anti-West and anti-US bent of its two key members, China and Russia, is well known. India has to steer its interaction within SCO carefully so that SCO decisions don’t adversely affect our friendly ties with other major powers.
Another important factor needs clarity. SCO was so far seen as an outfit focusing Central Asia. If two key South Asian countries are included, does SCO’s core area expand to include South Asia too? Or will the inclusion of India and Pakistan only advance the legitimacy of their own interests and activities in Central Asia? Our preferred interpretation should be the latter, and SCO’s focus should remain on Central Asia and Afghanistan, which is a bridge between Central and South Asia. Regarding Afghanistan’s security and stability, the SCO has done little beyond issuing strong statements, this despite the establishment of a SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group way back in 2005.
A question was raised on why China agreed to India’s inclusion. Russia has been a longtime advocate of India’s admission and as host country at Ufa it perhaps overrode any Chinese reservations. The Chinese consolation prize is the simultaneous membership of its “all weather” friend, Pakistan. There are two issues where developments will be keenly watched. One hopes there is no quid pro quo, and China will not push for membership of Saarc. India’s SCO membership will not in any way dilute the predominance of China and Russia in Eurasia due to their geographical proximity, economic strength and strategic heft. But China in Saarc would drastically dilute Indian influence in the South Asian body, and would have long-term adverse consequen-ces for us.
The second issue is Pakistan’s participation in RATS, in which members are expected to contribute to and share a database of terrorists and terrorist outfits. It is well known that the leadership and operatives of Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and East Turkistan Islamic Movement have got sanctuary in the tribal areas of Pakistan. There’s a real possibility of information of operational value leaking to the terrorists through Pakistan. After all, the United States had deliberately shut Pakistan out from its operations against Osama bin Laden and Mullah Mansour for a reason. It is well known that Uzbek and Tajik intelligence agencies are wary of Pakistan, and have little confidence in Pakistan’s anti-terror protestations.
India’s membership of SCO will be charting a new course by both Indian diplomacy and anti-terror outfits. This will supplement India’s other initiatives to reach out to Central Asia through Chabahar port in Iran and the North-South Economic Corridor. For the SCO, membership of the largest democratic country as a member would enhance its credibility and recognition as an important player to push peace, security and stability in Central Asia.
