Block obsolescence. Yes, every conscientious Indian needs to know it. Today, I say with all humility and conviction, based on credible open source information, that owing to the block obsolescence of its frontline fighters, the Indian Air Force is facing a “situation”, despite the recent signing of the contract for 36 readymade French Rafale multi-role combat aircraft. Why? Because 36 aircraft means only two squadrons, and these can’t be operational before 2019! It’s yet another case of “too little, too late”. Despite the deployment of these 36 advanced fighters three years from now, block obsolescence is unlikely to evaporate as a number of other obsolete aircraft, still in use with IAF squadrons, will definitely be retiring by then. One also has to take into account the normal wear and tear of flying machines and the inherently hazardous nature of the profession.
In short, therefore, the best of the IAF’s operational plans to prepare for a “war on two fronts” is likely to emerge as a theory; and in its worst form, perhaps as a bad dream. For this, as a conscientious citizen of India, I would like to hold successive rulers of our country culpable, for over the past two decades, for their inability to lead, give direction, take decisions, and look beyond horizon on what it takes a nation of 1.25 billion to be counted amongst the comity of nations. One look at the inventory of the IAF’s contemporary assets, gleaned from open source information, makes things clear. First, not a single fighter is made in India. Some, true, may be “produced” in India via “technology transfer” in various units of Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd, but there’s simply no indigenous product yet. The only India-produced light combat aircraft, Tejas, is still going through trials and tests.
Second, let’s do a reality check. Start with fighters; the first of over 750 MiG-21 “Fishbed” was first delivered 1973; at least 60 are still flying. Just imagine! 43 years on, it is still airborne? Thanks to the IAF’s professionalism. Again, 37 years ago, Anglo-French (deep penetration) Jaguar IS ground attack/strike aircraft were delivered. Over 110 are still in service. The first of 40-plus French Mirage-2000 interceptor and air defence planes came to India in 1985. After 31 years, they are still the backbone of the IAF’s offensive operations. Similarly, the first of over 150 Soviet-made MiG-27 ML (Flogger-J) fighters, despite mishaps, are still operating for ground attack and strike operations, ever since 1985. Over 80 Soviet-origin MiG-29 (Fulcrum-A) are still going strong, serving India since their first induction 30 years ago, in 1986.
The Indian Navy too got its first long-distance “maritime attack” capability 30 years ago, in 1986, with the introduction of Anglo-French Jaguar IM. This apart, various types of MiG-21 Bison and MiG-29 aircraft have also been upgraded from time to time. Amid such a variety of vintage aircraft, the only “modern” multi-role IAF fighter continues to be the Sukhoi-30 MKI, first delivered in 2002. This is virtually the sole “offensive” capable aerial platform with superior avionics, weapons system, communications, payload, range, speed and endurance. These are deployed all across the country. It must be remembered that the IAF is only an operator/user of the imported flying machines, and can’t be expected to produce or manufacture aircraft on its own. This is the duty of the Government of India, and if the IAF doesn’t have a single indigenously-produced combat aircraft yet, the responsibility falls fairly and squarely on the nation’s leadership, and on the civilian bureaucracy dealing with national defence, security and industrial activity.
The sole point of “pride” of India’s indigenous aviation enterprise could be HAL’s Avro 748-M, first inducted into the IAF way back in 1964. Around 52 years later, this rock-solid Indian transporter still flies through the air turbulence of varying intensity and unpredictable velocity at remote airports across India. In comparison to the IAF, one is well aware of the strength and fleet age of the Pakistan Air Force. However, the Chinese Air Force is less familiar to military watchers in India. Since a “two-front” situation could be more than a probability in the near future, it is more than necessary to delve into China’s air capability to understand its psyche. The Chinese too, of course, have an obsolete fleet in their inventory. Beijing’s 80-strong H-6 bomber fleet is 48 years old. The 250-plus Q-5 ground attack/strike fighters have been in use for 46 years, since 1970. Two squadrons of J-8B interceptor/air defence fighters are being operated for 28 years, since 1988. But unlike India, all these vintage aircraft are “Made in China”, and the rise of its Air Force fighters in the 21st century has been impressive, mainly owing to its continuous indigenisation enterprise.
In fact, the post-Tiananmen Western sanctions since 1989 appear to have been a blessing in disguise for China. Beijing was forced to transform from being an aircraft importer to an aircraft exporter. The transformation led to the Chinese induction of J-10A Meng Long multi-role fighters in 2001; J-7G and J-8F fighters in 2003; JH-7A ground attack/strike fighters in 2004 and J-10B multi-role fighters in 2009. More, however, are in the pipeline and newer models too are likely to be inducted. The Chinese example has been cited only to make a point on how successive rulers in India appear to have either ignored, or been ignorant of, the need to modernise and indigenise the assets of the Indian Air Force.
One simply cannot fathom why all the efforts and enterprise have failed to deliver a proper fighter aircraft power plant of 25,000-30,000-pound static thrust? It is well known worldwide that no single-engine modern fighter is likely to be a success in combat situations without a minimum 25,000-pound static thrust. That is the bottomline. A sustainable performance, and a fair-fight capability, needs at least a 30,000-pound static thrust engine. India will thus have to give top priority to the building of aircraft body (fuselage) and engines in its indigenisation programme to enhance the Air Force’s capabilities. Much time, money, energy and labour have already been wasted chasing and preferring imported material from the West, that in turn has stunted and blunted the potential growth of India’s military air technique and technology. It’s time to wake up and prepare to take on the Chinese by emulating their techniques. The Indian State must ensure the end of block obsolescence of its Air Force inventory and assets.
