Even nearly 54 years after its humiliating military defeat at the hands of China, India clearly is in no mood to risk another conflict. While defence experts point out that war between the two nuclear-armed Asian giants is not an option, the more realistic worry is a localised skirmish that could test the nerves of both sides. With a belligerent and hostile Pakistan Army on its western front, India will have to weigh the costs of opening another front on its east. The Indian security establishment has been grappling with the nightmarish possibility of a two-front war that India could face in future, a euphemism for a joint Sino-Pakistani military attack on India.
But even on its own, the 2.3 million-strong Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which enjoys a considerable numerical superiority, packs in quite a punch and India will clearly have to punch much above its weight if it is ever locked in a conflict situation with the Chinese dragon. The reasons are not far to seek. The 1.2 million-strong Indian Army has not acquired modern artillery guns for nearly three decades now, the last artillery acquisition being the Bofors guns in the late 1980s. Plans to acquire ultra-light howitzer (ULH) artillery guns, ideal for mountain warfare and to have been deployed in the eastern sector facing China, have yet to see the light of day. The Indian Army currently has about 6,400 battle tanks, far less than the 9,100 that China has. The Indian Navy is suffering from a critical shortage of submarines and has about 15 currently, at a time when China has 68 of these. The Indian Air Force (IAF) also desperately wants induction of modern fighter aircraft, especially the multi-role medium combat aircraft (MMRCA) to boost the number of its fighter squadrons. The IAF has about 650 fighter aircraft while the Chinese have about 1,200 of these. Plans to build border roads in the eastern sector have been delayed by years.
Establishment of a mountain strike corps of the Army in the eastern sector, already underway, will be completed only by 2021 amid reports that the process of its raising may be hit by a lack of adequate financial resources. The mountain strike corps was envisaged to give the Indian Army offensive capabilities vis-a-vis China for the very first time, considering that the Army has traditionally adopted a defensive posture on that sector following its defeat in 1962.
“Conflict is always a possibility if diplomacy fails. But there are always warnings and an escalatory ladder. Nothing happens overnight. The world is not going to let the escalatory ladder hit the pinnacle,” points out former Northern Army Commander Lt. Gen. (retd.) B.S. Jaswal who, as Northern Command chief, was refused a visa to visit China in 2010. “A possibility of a low-cost, high pay-off skirmish in eastern Ladakh cannot be ruled out in future,” he says. “For India, war is not an option, war-avoidance is. The Chinese have a distinct military advantage if there is a conflict, but it will not be a 1962-like situation. The military costs that India will impose on the aggressor will make it difficult for the Chinese. It will not be a cakewalk for them,” he believes. The former Northern Army Commander also points out that for India to adequately protect itself, there needs to be not just one but two mountain strike corps. While the current mountain strike corps being raised is primarily meant to bolster the eastern sector, he says, the other one should be positioned on the western sector. “We don’t have enough strike and offensive elements,” he concedes. Defence experts also caution against a lightning thrust and localised skirmish in J&K’s eastern Ladakh (the northern sector) by the Chinese to demoralise the Indian Army and test its nerves, saying the failures of 1962 must never be repeated.
A Parliamentary Defence Standing Committee report tabled last year had shockingly revealed, “The Committee is dismayed to note that in Tawang (Arunachal) area (the eastern sector) the situation is very critical in so far as connectivity is concerned. In case of war, the Army cannot reach there in a day. While our neighbouring countries (a clear reference to China) can reach the borders within two or three hours, our Army takes more than a day to reach there. This is a matter of great concern with regard to our Defence Preparedness.” About 90,000 sq km of Arunachal Pradesh is claimed by China as its own territory and the Chinese are almost certainly expected to mount a sharp attack on Tawang in case a conflict ever breaks out again.
In another major admission that caused much alarm, the IAF recently said it simply did not have adequate fighter aircraft to launch a full-fledged air campaign in case of a two-front war, a euphemism for the theoretical possibility of a simultaneous Sino-Pakistani attack on India. The sanctioned numerical strength of the IAF fighter aircraft squadrons should be 42 but currently it is only 33. IAF Vice-Chief Air Marshal B.S. Dhanoa — who is likely to be India's next IAF chief eventually — said, “Our numbers are not adequate to fully execute an air campaign in a two-front scenario... Are the numbers adequate? No. The squadrons are winding down. We have given our concerns to the government. The government is seized of this problem...”
When asked about the increasing Chinese Air Force (PLAAF) sorties over the Tibet region bordering India, IAF chief Air Chief Marshal Arup Raha too had admitted last year that the Chinese PLAAF presence in that area was increasing “exponentially”. No doubt, an indication of Chinese military preparedness that India has much to learn from.
A lot of China all around
China is widely seen to have adopted a “string of pearls strategy” to encircle India. Perhaps the two most important aspects of this policy at present are the country’s maritime capability in the Indian Ocean and its building of an economic corridor with Pakistan through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). Apart from its deep links with Myanmar, which has now distanced itself from Beijing to some extent, it attempted to woo Nepalese communist leaders, was close to the anti-India erstwhile Khaleda Zia regime in Bangladesh, wooed the former M. Rajapaksa regime in Sri Lanka and was suspected of having a hand in the earlier strain in ties between India and the Maldives. In short, the Chinese have constantly attempted to fish in troubled waters in the neighbourhood to India’s detriment. China is also understood to be interested in joining South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) to push its way further into the south Asian neighbourhood with ample Pakistani assistance. There have also been reports of
Chinese security personnel being involved in supply of arms to Northeast rebel groups based in Myanmar.
An internal defence thinktank report of the Indian government prepared earlier had revealed, “China’s recent strategic manoeuvres in and around the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) pose a threat to both India’s economic and security interests. China’s naval capabilities have significantly expanded over the past few years with induction of new submarines, like the Shang and Jin class boats. It is well entrenched even in public discourse through think tanks and other agencies that the Chinese naval capability is proving to be a major limiting factor to other regional navies, especially the Indian Navy (IN). Chinese interests in the IOR will demand attempts to begin deterrent patrolling as early as within the next three years. These extended patrols may fully overlap with IN’s current area of operation and subsurface activity.”
The report added, “Without adequate bilateral military linkages and transparency standards, the threat of a serious reduction in sea denial and anti access in the IOR is a reality.”
The presence of Chinese nuclear submarines in Sri Lankan waters had shaken New Delhi which had promptly taken up the matter with the then Rajapaksa regime in Colombo which was seen to be actively encouraging Beijing in its designs. The Chinese presence in development projects in the Maldives and its highly publicised rushing of civil supplies to Nepal during the Madhesi agitation also did not escape the attention of New Delhi.
What has worried New Delhi the most is the increasing presence of Chinese PLA troops in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) to monitor completion of infrastructure projects which are part of the US$ 46 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Chinese troops have also been reportedly spotted close to the LoC on the Pakistani side. Pakistan Army chief Gen. Raheel Sharif recently announced that his forces would ensure completion of the corridor.
Strategic affairs expert and director, Society for Policy Studies C. Uday Bhaskar says, “China is seeking to enhance its presence in the IOR by way of bilateral relations with Pakistan, Sri Lanka and the Maldives. India has to evolve a long-term strategy in response. While India can be involved in a close partnership with Sri Lanka and Maldives, Pakistan is an exception since it has a relationship with India that is predicated on an anti-India position.”
“The CPEC is going to be problematic. China wants to increase its access to the Gwadar port in (Pakistan’s) Balochistan province. But more worryingly, the Chinese military (through its presence in PoK) will be positioning itself between India and Pakistan,” points out JNU Professor in Chinese Studies Srikant Kondapalli. It’s a strategy that’s caught India in a bind.
India has options too, but those come with risks
China’s recent decision to block India’s move at the UN — on Pakistani prodding — to get terror outfit Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) banned seemed to have opened up a new strategy of raising the costs for Beijing. Soon after China blocked the move, there were three high-level Indian interactions with that country. External affairs minister Sushma Swaraj held discussions with her Chinese counterpart in Moscow followed by high-level visits by defence minister Manohar Parrikar and national security advisor Ajit Doval to Beijing. The trio tried to impress upon the Chinese leadership that there could not be a differentiation made between “good” and “bad” terrorists and that such an approach would be dangerous for the neighbourhood. But the pleas fell on deaf ears.
Immediately afterwards, in a curious move, India issued a tourist visa to leading Chinese dissident and Uyghur activist Dolkun Isa — a leader of the World Uyghur Congress (WUC) who lives in Germany — who wanted to participate in a conference in Dharamsala, the home of supreme Tibetan spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama. At one stroke, the unified voice of China’s oppressed minorities — the Tibetans and Uyghurs — seemed to have found global attention ahead of the conference that was to have been organised by a U.S.-based group to discuss democratic transformation in China. But it was not to be. After China retorted angrily, the ministry of home affairs cancelled the visa for the Uyghur activist on the grounds that it was a tourist e-visa and that such a visa could not be used to attend a conference. The episode, however, raised doubts on whether New Delhi, before backing off, had sent a subtle warning to Beijing that pressure could be applied, if necessary, on China’s vulnerable “pressure points” that include Tibet, Xinjiang (the Muslim Uyghur-dominated province also known as Chinese Turkestan), Taiwan and the South China Sea.
“We have put the Chinese on alert and have made it clear that our behaviour depends on reciprocity. There has been no sensitivity showed by China on Indian concerns, especially in the Masood Azhar case. New Delhi has found that Beijing is not really forthcoming on the issue of terrorism despite the fact that India had a decade ago accepted the Chinese concerns on the ‘three evils” that include separatism and extremism. India seems to have sent a clear message to China that if it does not behave, New Delhi is perfectly capable of issuing visas to prominent Chinese dissidents,” pointed out JNU professor in Chinese Studies, Srikant Kondappali.
“When the then Northern Army Commander Lt. Gen. B.S. Jaswal was denied a visa by the Chinese in 2010, India cancelled bilateral military engagements. Finally, they granted a visa (last year) to (the current) Northern Army Commander Lt. Gen. D.S. Hooda. It took the Chinese those many years to reverse their position,” Professor Kondapalli pointed out.
However, former Indian diplomat and China expert T.C.A. Rangachari points out that there are inherent risks in confronting China and adds that India should do a full cost-benefit analysis before taking such a stand. “You have to continue to talk to people. There has to be a process of dialogue. The Indian government has not yet reached breaking point. While we have serious differences of opinion on some issues with China, we should continue the dialogue along with attempts to persuade them on respecting our concerns. We have to be practical.” Mr Rangachari adds, “If you want to take it to a point of confrontation, you have to make a full calculation (of the risks). But it is not a position that I would take.”
Just recently, New Delhi had hosted US defense secretary Ashton Carter and had agreed to ink a defence logistics pact with the Americans that would permit the use of each other’s bases for refuelling and replenishments of defence platforms such as warships and fighter aircraft. Both sides once again emphasised the importance of freedom of navigation in international waters in the South China Sea, again seen to be one of China’s pressure points. This came amid an ongoing rebalance of US naval assets to the Asia-Pacific, an American move widely seen as a check on Chinese hegemony in the region.
Observers point out that any move by India in confronting China would have its risks. Army officers, speaking on condition of anonymity, say the situation at the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with China is peaceful and that there is none of the hostility associated with the Line of Control (LoC) facing Pakistan. It appears that the Modi government would like to keep it that way.
