Syed Ata Hasnain | Halting ‘Rising Lion’: The Limits of US Involvement

When “Operation Rising Lion” -- Israel’s ambitious operation against Iran -- was launched, it appeared to many observers that history might repeat itself. Just as the United States decimated the war machine of Iraq’s Saddam Hussein’s in 2003, there was talk of US-Israel synergy towards dismantling the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) of Iran. The IRGC is the keeper of Iran’s revolutionary ideology and the sponsor of its strategic operations. It would mean erasing the arch-enemy of both countries in one powerful joint stroke. After all, Israel had already achieved significant battlefield dominance against the proxies -- first Hamas in Gaza and then against Hezbollah on its northern front. Strategically, it seemed like an opportune moment to land the final blow.

Yet, the operation was abruptly halted after the massive direct American strike. Not just by Israel’s own calculations, but reportedly at the strong urging of the United States. Why did Washington decide to apply the brakes? Why would it let Iran off the hook when its vulnerability was so exposed? The answers lie in a blend of strategic prudence, military foresight, and geopolitical balance-of-power considerations -- layers often missed in the public discourse but familiar terrain for most seasoned military minds.

The idea that the destruction of Iran’s war machine could ensure Israeli security for decades is compelling, but dangerously simplistic. True, Iran’s proxies -- Hamas and Hezbollah -- have borne the brunt of Israeli fury, and Iran itself was briefly exposed and rattled. However, proxy warfare is not one-dimensional; it’s actually hydra-headed. Its resilience lies in ideology, not infrastructure. Hamas can be uprooted from Gaza’s tunnels, but not from the minds of its sympathisers. Hezbollah’s arsenal can be degraded, but the political vacuum in southern Lebanon can regenerate new threats.

Israel’s battlefield victories are real but also pyrrhic. The Gaza Strip has been reduced to rubble, and the Hamas leadership is reeling. But in the shadows of these “wins”, resentment smoulders. Resistance in one form or another is almost inevitable. A full-scale decimation of Iran could paradoxically catalyse a more diffused and unpredictable insurgency across the Middle East -- just as the fall of Saddam Hussein laid the foundations of the Islamic State, or ISIS.

The United States knows this script well. When American forces toppled the Ba’athist regime in Iraq, they destroyed the institutional backbone of the Iraqi state. The Republican Guard was wiped out, but in its place emerged sectarian chaos, a power vacuum, and ultimately, the monstrous rise of ISIS. Iran is no less complex. It is not merely a military adversary -- it is a civilisational state, with an ideological narrative that transcends borders.

A total defeat of Iran would not be a clean surgical affair. It would unleash asymmetric chaos -- reprisals, cyberattacks, terrorism in the diaspora, and oil economy disruptions. And crucially, the US would be drawn in -- not just in airstrikes and logistics -- but in post-conflict management, civil reconstruction and political pacification. That is a long game that the US is unwilling to play again.

The US apparently has no appetite to entangle itself in another Middle Eastern quagmire. Washington’s focus should firmly be on the Indo-Pacific and the challenge posed by China’s rise. Every US aircraft-carrier, Patriot missile battery, or ISR satellite diverted to the Middle East is a resource not available in the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea. It becomes a costly distraction.

President Donald Trump, too, would have had strong political reasons to discourage escalation. His presidency was built, in part, on the promise of “ending the endless wars”. The US having got out of Afghanistan and kept a hands-off stance in Ukraine, a third front -- ignited on his watch -- would erode that narrative. The global economic community, already reeling from energy shocks and inflationary pressure, would consider a wider Middle East war as disastrous. Mr Trump, despite his hawkish rhetoric, would not have wanted to be the villain of the peace.

Another crucial factor is Israel’s own war sustainability. Having fought two back-to-back high-intensity conflicts -- in Gaza and Lebanon -- Israel’s munitions stockpiles are depleted. The Iron Dome system, so vital in defending urban centres from rocket fire, requires constant replenishment of interceptors. Even basic artillery shells and precision-guided munitions are in short supply. Any extended campaign inside Iran would necessitate massive American logistical support, much like in the 1973 Yom Kippur war.

Such support, moreover, is not merely military. It includes diplomatic cover at the United Nations, the management of oil price volatility, protection of global shipping lanes, and assurance of regional stability. These are burdens that the US is increasingly reluctant to bear unless its own national interest is directly at stake.

Another unspoken but real concern in Washington is the regional power balance. A weakened Iran shifts the axis of power toward the Sunni Arab world -- particularly Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and potentially even the Muslim Brotherhood in its various avatars. Unlike Shia Iran, whose ideological ambitions are largely regional, Sunni political Islam has a more global -- and at times -- radical outlook. The post-Arab Spring world is still uneasy with the resurrection of pan-Islamist visions of governance.

By restraining Israel, the US may have sought to avoid opening the gates for Sunni triumphalism, which could invite its own set of extremist permutations. From ISIS 2.0 to radicalised militias in North Africa, the consequences of such imbalance could spiral quickly. Washington, it appears, opted for a managed containment of Iran over a destabilising victory.

To the casual observer, Washington’s intervention to halt Operation Rising Lion might appear as betrayal or weakness. To Israel’s right-wing political circles, it may even seem like a missed historic opportunity. But seen through the lens of military realism and strategic foresight, it reflects moderation rooted in experience. The Middle East is a chessboard of competing situations. Victory is rarely total; and peace is always fragile, especially post a high-intensity quasi-conventional war.

The halt of Operation Rising Lion is not the end of the story -- it may, in fact, be the start of a new phase. Iran has definitely been badly bruised but not broken. Israel has demonstrated resolve but also limits. The US stepped in and out because it did not want to be drawn into another long conflict with no clear end after extending strategic assistance. For Israel, the message is unambiguous -- all future conflicts will need to be managed without relying on sustained American involvement.

The writer, a retired lieutenant-general, is a former GOC of the Srinagar-based 15 (“Chinar”) Corps