Manish Tewari | Five Ideas To Fix Our Broken Election Machine

On December 9, 2025, when I stood up in the Lok Sabha to open the debate on electoral reforms, I experienced both the gravitas of the moment and the responsibility it placed upon my shoulders. For democracy is not an ornament, it is a system of trust, rules and institutions that must be continuously defended and reinvigorated. Today, that trust has frayed. My remarks were not rhetorical flourishes but five concrete recommendations aimed at restoring confidence in our electoral machinery and protecting the sanctity of the vote cast by the sovereign who stands long hours in the sun and the rain to exercise his franchise.

Revamping the Election Commission's Leadership Selection: The Election Commission of India was only consecrated as a permanent, independent, neutral institution by the founding fathers of the Republic for they envisaged a continuous series of elections in the country after the first ten to fifteen years beginning 1952.

It was meant to be the impartial umpire of our democratic contests. Yet today, it must be stated with profound regret that many citizens and political parties have raised serious questions about whether this neutrality still exists. The 2023 amendment to the law governing the selection of the Chief Election Commissioner represented a significant departure from principles of institutional independence.

The current selection mechanism comprises only three members — the Prime Minister, the Leader of Opposition in the Lok Sabha and a Cabinet minister. This narrow composition creates the perception that the ruling establishment has undue influence over the selection process. I strongly advocated for the inclusion of two additional members: the Chief Justice of India and the Leader of Opposition in the Rajya Sabha. The Chief Justice represents the judicial authority standing outside the executive-legislative fray, while the LOP in the Rajya Sabha ensures broader parliamentary representation. With these two additional voices, the Election Commission would perhaps genuinely function as the impartial umpire our democracy desperately needs.

Stopping the Illegal Special Intensive Revision: One of the most troubling developments in recent electoral cycles has been the widespread conduct of Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls across 12 states and Union territories. I must state with absolute clarity: The Election Commission has no legal or constitutional basis to conduct SIRs on such a sweeping scale.

When I examined the Constitution of India and the Representation of the People Act, 1950, I found no provision granting the Election Commission authority to undertake comprehensive state-wide revision of electoral rolls. The Act clearly states that corrections can be made only at a constituency level only if something is found to be manifestly wrong, and reasons for such corrections must be recorded in writing, made public, and the whole process must be transparent and subject to scrutiny. What was designed as a scalpel is being used as a sledgehammer.

What is happening under the garb of SIR violates this principle fundamentally. The Election Commission is conducting blanket revisions across entire states without adequately publicising specific reasons for such an exercise. This is not electoral administration; this is institutional overreach. Without transparency and clear legal authority, these revisions become instruments of potential electoral manipulation rather than safeguards of electoral integrity.

Democracy Cannot Run on Black Boxes: For nearly two decades, I have raised questions about the trustworthiness of Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs). Today I return to this issue with renewed urgency: Can a machine be trusted more than paper? Isn’t democracy to precious to be left to the tender mercies of technology? Who possesses the EVM source code? Where is it stored? How is it audited? These are not academic questions; they go to the heart of democratic accountability. A machine can always be manipulated. This is a fundamental principle of information technology. No amount of procedural safeguards can overcome the basic vulnerability of a black-box system.

Even in technologically advanced nations like Germany, Japan, Netherlands, etc., there is recognition of the need for voter verification and paper trails. Paper ballots provide transparency; EVMs provide convenience, but convenience should never come at the cost of verifiability.

I, therefore, proposed two complementary solutions: Either we must mandate 100 per cent verification and counting of VVPAT (Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail) slips, or we must return to paper ballots entirely. The VVPAT was introduced as a safeguard against EVM manipulation, yet we conduct random verification of only a tiny percentage of these paper records. This defeats the entire purpose. If we cannot afford to verify all VVPAT slips, we should acknowledge that electronic voting has failed the test of democratic legitimacy and revert to paper ballots.

This is a call for prioritising democratic integrity over administrative convenience.

Pre-Election Cash Transfers and Fiscal Responsibility: As elections approach, governments transfer cash directly into voter bank accounts. This practice represents grave misuse of governmental power and systematic manipulation of national resources. It is not governance; it is bribery on a systemic scale.

The data is sobering. As of March 24, 2025, the combined liability of central and state governments stood at Rs 2.67 lakh crore. Eighteen out of twenty-eight states have debt-to-GDP ratios exceeding 30 percent. Some states take new loans merely to service interest on existing obligations. Yet governments use elections as occasions for massive cash transfers, further ballooning debt.

I proposed a new constitutional provision: Article 293A, that would prohibit governments with debt-to-GDP ratios exceeding 10 per cent (ideally) or 20 per cent (at minimum) from engaging in cash transfers to voters.

The rationale is clear: If government debt is already unsustainable, it has no moral or fiscal right to further burden the exchequer. When governments take new loans to fund cash transfers, they are not giving people their money; they are mortgaging their future. This is the anti-thesis of inter-generational equity. The grandchild of today's beneficiary will pay for it through higher taxes and reduced public services. This is in fact intergenerational theft conducted in the name of electoral politics.

Reforming the Anti-Defection Law: Finally, I addressed the Anti-Defection Law, which has inadvertently deepened political instability rather than curtailing it.

The law was conceived as a remedy for the 1960s “Aaya Ram Gaya Ram” era, yet it has evolved into an instrument of whip-driven tyranny that transforms elected representatives into mere voting machines, stripping them of the imperatives of constituency, conscience and common sense.

I have introduced a private member’s bill three times 2010, 2021 and now in 2025 proposing that MPs should incur loss of membership only when they violate party discipline on confidence motions, no-confidence motions, and financial matters. On all other bills, MPs should be free to vote according to their conscience and constituencies’ interests.

This reform would not destabilise government. Governments would remain stable on matters affecting their survival, while MPs would be free to vote as their judgment dictates. Furthermore, defection cases should be decided by judicial tribunals, not the Speaker, ensuring impartiality and time bound disposal.

These five reforms are fundamental to preserving our democratic republic. Our institutions are under strain, and public confidence is eroding. The time for incremental reform has passed. We need bold, comprehensive changes to restore the health of our electoral system and revitalise our democracy. These are ideas whose time has come.