K.C. Singh | Post-Trump India, World Must Rethink Key Policies

The year 2025 brought new challenges globally, triggered by US President Donald Trump’s disruptive policies. While the Gaza ceasefire agreement came in October, the Ukraine war still awaits a peace deal.

The Economist magazine writes that President Trump “turned domestic and international politics on its head”. India was surprised by President Trump jolting India-US relations by “Liberation Day” tariffs in April. It was speculated that America’s global priorities had changed. The US National Security Strategy (NSS), released on December 4-5, 2025, confirms it. Ironically on those dates Russian President Vladimir Putin was visiting India. A basic assumption, since India-US relations normalised, after disruption due to India’s 1998 nuclear tests, was a shared desire for China’s containment. This motivated the creation of the Quad, which consists of India, Australia, Japan and the United States. Unlike the 2017 NSS, China is no longer a listed threat, perhaps also as the April 2026 Sino-US presidential summit approaches.

The NSS document claims that besides saving the US from “catastrophe and disaster”, the Trump administration will restore “American strength at home and abroad, and bring peace and stability”. Previous super-power competition, it adds, is being replaced by “great power jockeying”. While conceding the loss of America’s dominant global role, it asserts that the “days of the United States propping up the entire world order like Atlas are over”.

The new US diplomatic and geostrategic priorities are thus presented. Nato-aligned Europe slips to third place. On top is the “Western Hemisphere”, or Latin America, resurrecting the 1823 Monroe Doctrine, which barred European meddling in that continent. Some call it the “Donroe Doctrine”.

At second place comes Asia. The sub-title states: “Asia: Win the Economic Future, Prevent Military Confrontation”. It bemoans China exploiting US markets while failing to conform to the “rules-based international order”. It perceives potential “key economic and geopolitical battlegrounds” in the Indo-Pacific. The Sino-US competition, it says, is between “near-peers”. This echoes President Trump dubbing his last summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping as a “G-2” meeting. India figures as an afterthought in the China-containment strategy.

Improved relations with India are seen as India contributing to Indo-Pacific security.

The Indian government’s diplomatic performance in 2025 must be seen against this backdrop. India, this century, focused on improving relations with the United States, handling all its unpredictable South Asian neighbours, expanding relations with the GCC and Asean countries, while engaging the European Union to enhance trade, technology transfer and finalise a free trade agreement. Canada, Australia and Japan were also seriously engaged. With Canada, relations are fast mending both due to shared difficulties in handling Donald Trump’s policies and with Prime Minister Mark Carney replacing Justin Trudeau. The problem areas have been the China-Pakistan axis and China’s attempts to enlarge its footprint in South Asia.

Popular protests by young people displaced governments in Nepal, Bangladesh and earlier in Sri Lanka. India has successfully handled the new Sri Lankan government of President Anura Kumara Dissanayake, who won promising broad reforms and change. Indian aid and economic assistance had facilitated closer relations. In Nepal, the interim government of Justice Sushila Karki has stabilised the political

situation, with elections likely on March 5. Poor performance by the Communist parties may diminish the Chinese influence in Nepal. The Agniveer recruitment scheme in the Indian Army affected the recruitment of Nepali Gurkhas, which traditionally created links at a mass level. Balen Shah, the popularly elected mayor of Kathmandu, is seen as a front-runner and a friendly new government may emerge following the election.

Bangladesh presents a serious problem. The rising anti-India sentiment is fed by popular anger against former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. India cannot extradite her, as she faces the death sentence. The popular uprising against her surprised India. New Delhi’s failure to foresee its buildup due to her autocratic rule has proved costly. The BJP revelled in her targeting of Islamic fundamentalism and the Pakistan-aligned Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI). A split in the student-created National Citizen Party (NCP) is being reported, over its alliance with JeI, betraying past links.

Tarique Rahman, the exiled son of late Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) chairman Begum Khaleda Zia, who passed away on December 30, 2025 after a long illness, is back in Bangladesh. It remains to be seen how the BNP, its old ally JeI and the NCP perform in the February elections. Unfortunately, elections are also due in West Bengal and Assam around that time. The anti-Hindu violence in Bangladesh is being played up in India by some groups due to those elections. Indian domestic politics and foreign policy can sometimes be in conflict.

A more serious challenge is Pakistan’s resurgence. It gets a foothold in Bangladesh due to its close ties to Jamaat. President Donald Trump enabled Pakistan to escape the Pahalgam terror attack responsibility and Operation Sindoor setback. By hosting Pakistan Army chief Field Marshal Asim Munir and endorsing Pakistan’s claims of downing Indian planes and stymieing a nuclear Armageddon, President Trump emboldened Pakistan. The messaging of Operation Sindoor was mismanaged and Mr Trump poorly handled. By comparison, Pakistan played its weaker hand more successfully.

Pakistan’s defence pact with Saudi Arabia and first-ever state visit to Pakistan by UAE President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed boosted Islamabad’s status. It negated past Indian outreach to the Gulf ruling families to sideline Pakistan. The BJP’s ideological empathy for Israel’s Zionist government had them assume that more Arab nations will sign the Abraham Accords. But in 2025, Gulf states are reverting to old alliances, like with Pakistan. They distrust the Trump-Netanyahu line on Arab issues like the future of Palestinians. Alongside this, Iran, which despite setbacks, is seen as unlikely to succumb to US-Israeli pressure.

The state of India-US relations has both distracted India and impacted India’s global standing. With much of South Asia facing popular uprisings, India has mostly reacted rather than anticipating and shaping the outcomes. Pakistan’s revival negates assumptions that abrogation of Article 370 and Jammu and Kashmir’s statehood sidelined the India-Pakistan dispute. As Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee used to say, friends can be chosen, but not neighbours.

Similarly, India’s outreach to the Asean bloc was hampered by Prime Minister Narendra Modi skipping the October Asean summit in Kuala Lumpur, to avoid encountering President Trump. India meanwhile has widened options.

Demonstrating that was Russian President Vladimir Putin’s Delhi visit and the trilateral, albeit contrived, handshake at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Tianjin of Mr Modi with Russia’s Vladimir Putin and China’s President Xi Jinping.

Thus, 2025 tested the diplomacy of all nations. Hence, many past assumptions stand reviewed, making new strategies and linkages inevitable.