K.C. Singh | Post-Balakot Deterrence: Did It Fail In Pahalgam?
It appears that Pakistan’s then Prime Minister Imran Khan may have obtained assurances from mediators, such as Saudi Arabia and the United States, that after the Indian elections, a constructive dialogue could be possible

Prime Minister Narendra Modi, having cut short his visit to Saudi Arabia, convened a meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Security to discuss the Pahalgam massacre, which led to 28 casualties. The hyper-nationalists and the so-called “Godi media” have demanded a final solution. They naturally ignored the fact that a full-scale war is unimaginable between two neighbours possessing nuclear weapons.
The Narendra Modi government’s conundrum is the high bar set after the Pulwama terror attack in 2019 by the Indian retaliatory attack on a suspected Lashkar-e-Tayyaba training camp at Balakot. Coincidentally, on May 6, 1831 at Balakot, Maharaja Ranjit Singh’s forces had eliminated Islamist radical Syed Ahmed Barelvi and his followers, who had declared jihad against the Sikhs.
Interestingly, in 2019 too, Donald Trump was the US President. While in East Asia, he worked to deescalate the situation. The BJP used the episode to sweep the Lok Sabha elections a couple of months later. The handing back of an Indian Air Force MIG-21 pilot almost immediately defied past experience. Pakistan would normally have paraded him and broadcast his confessions.
It appears that Pakistan’s then Prime Minister Imran Khan may have obtained assurances from mediators, such as Saudi Arabia and the United States, that after the Indian elections, a constructive dialogue could be possible. However, the Modi 2.0 government, within three months of victory, revoked a mostly non-functional Article 370, giving a special status to Jammu and Kashmir. It then split Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) into two Union territories. Since then, a policy of isolating and ignoring Pakistan has been followed, arguing that dialogue was fruitless unless Pakistan stopped sponsoring terror against India.
In the last seven years in J&K, local political leaders were detained until elections in April-May 2024. The restoration of normalcy and containment of terrorism was repeatedly proclaimed. Ostensibly, economic activities resumed and tourism picked up. The Union government bought its own propaganda, yet did not restore statehood.
Meanwhile, Pakistan’s economic and security situation continued to deteriorate. Tension brewed with the Taliban since the 2021 US withdrawal from Afghanistan. This was despite Pakistan’s help in its birth in 1996 and capture of power in Afghanistan next year. Behind the tension is the Taliban’s unwillingness or inability to control the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, a group opposing Pakistan’s security forces.
Additionally, insurgency in Balochistan has flared up, threatening projects under China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Pakistan saw Indian complicity in the March 2025 hijacking of the Quetta-Peshawar Jaffar Express, resulting in 26 deaths, including 15 soldiers. Is it a coincidence that in Pahalgam almost the same number of persons were cornered and killed?
Then last week Pakistan’s Army chief Gen. Syed Asif Munir delivered a vitriolic speech. He reiterated the two-nation theory despite its failure when Bangladesh was formed after the 1971 India-Pakistan war. He referred further to Kashmir as Pakistan’s “jugular vein”. Finally, he reaffirmed Pakistani support for so-called India-exploited Kashmiris. When the military leader of Pakistan so rants, it implies that the ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence) has already been given the green light to target India.
Government sources maintain that monitoring the movement of militants is difficult as they intrude through forests, avoiding use of electronic gadgets.
However, not monitoring isolated spots like at Pahalgam, where tourists converge in large numbers, is a serious security lapse.
Any assessment of Pakistan’s internal politics would have shown Imran Khan as a victim of a conspiracy, by the Sharif-Bhutto dynasties and Gen. Munir. The aim was to block him from regaining power. Imran Khan’s ouster on flimsy grounds in 2021 and his detention despite winning the popular vote in the February 2024 parliamentary election demonstrated this. His nationalist-Islamist populism and past cricket exploits awards him pan-Pakistan popularity. Like Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, this makes him a threat to the military’s dominance. This skulduggery has even created fissures in the military, which Gen. Munir has also tried to overcome by resurrecting the Kashmir issue.
The Balakot precedent of military retaliation puts the government in a dilemma. The CCS chose intermediate non-military steps to punish Pakistan. Suspending the Indus Waters Treaty threatens life and livelihoods in Pakistan, as the Indus is the lifeline of agriculture and human subsistence. The problem is how to control the water flow. Pakistan has threatened to blow up any construction to impede the flow. In any case, such structures take years to plan and build. There is also the question of the treaty having been negotiated under the World Bank’s tutelage. Pakistan will thus try to internationalise the issue.
Reducing the size of diplomatic missions is more symbolic than actual chastisement. The Attari border post being shut punishes people in both countries.
The question remains whether a Balakot 2.0 is likely. Cynics claim that this may happen closer to the Bihar Assembly elections for electoral gain. Meanwhile, the claimed Indian post-Balakot deterrence stands negated by the latest terror outrage.
Global instability and turbulence caused by US President Donald Trump’s illogical tariff war provides an opportunity to inflict stiffer punishment without the fear of Chinese intervention. But India needs to be able to do that without getting, like last time, an antiquated MiG-21 shot down.
However the most important lesson is that historical disputes with other nations do not vanish simply by ignoring them. A total boycott of Pakistan created a diplomatic vacuum. India needed to encourage and support anti-Army political forces in Pakistan. Imran Khan is one such leader whose incarceration India has ignored. In the past, engaging the Sharifs and Bhuttos begot little success as they failed to get a handle on the Pakistan Army. Gen. Pervez Musharraf represented the best opportunity, as he wielded military and political power. But he also let the ISI play a double game, although on a more constricted basis. His popularity floundered after his standoff with the judiciary in March 2007. A month later, he attacked the Lal Masjid militants. That is when the ISI began planning the 26/11 attacks in Mumbai, confident that Gen. Musharraf was finished.
Despite the sordid history of past betrayals by Pakistan, building walls based on false assumptions is unworkable. The Modi government is at a fork. It can press ahead with the already announced steps accompanied by back-channel dialogue. Tahawwur Rana in Indian hands provides a pressure point.
Alternatively, the BJP’s domestic anti-Islam agenda can lead to a limited war, with the risk of a nuclear holocaust.