John J. Kennedy | Tech Not Enough; For Effective Exam Reform, Strengthen Capacity of NTA
The public administration has always distinguished between good policy design and the organisational capacity needed to implement it. Governments often have well-designed policies but struggle to implement them because their institutions lack capacity
Public institutions do not usually fail because they lack expert advice. They often fail because they lack the capacity to turn that advice into consistent administrative performance. India’s examination system clearly demonstrates this problem. Despite several rounds of reform, stronger laws, and repeated expert reviews, controversies over public examinations keep recurring. The Union government has now set up a high-level task force under Nandan Nilekani to reform the system. At this crucial juncture, another question must also be asked: Has the debate focused too much on redesigning the system and too little on strengthening the organisation that runs it?
There has been no shortage of reform. Security protocols have been tightened. Parliament passed the Public Examinations (Prevention of Unfair Means) Act in 2024 to deter organised malpractice. After the 2024 Neet controversy, the K. Radhakrishnan Committee reviewed the National Testing Agency (NTA) and submitted 101 recommendations on governance, technology, examination processes, and organisational restructuring. A steering committee was set up to oversee their implementation. Now, in 2026, the law has been amended again to introduce stricter penalties for violations. Each major examination controversy has led to another round of procedural reforms, reflecting the belief that stricter rules and new safeguards are enough to restore public confidence.
The public administration has always distinguished between good policy design and the organisational capacity needed to implement it. Governments often have well-designed policies but struggle to implement them because their institutions lack capacity. When failures come from weak implementation rather than flawed design, more reforms alone will not produce better outcomes.
The NTA illustrates this problem. Since its establishment in 2018, it has become India’s primary testing agency, conducting hundreds of examinations for more than 6.6 crore candidates. According to a reply given in the Rajya Sabha on July 22, 2026, the NTA has filled only 24 of its 39 sanctioned permanent posts. The remaining 15 posts are vacant. The agency also relies on 73 contractual staff and 124 outsourced personnel. Staffing numbers alone do not explain examination failures. However, a ratio of 24 permanent employees to roughly 200 contractual and outsourced staff raises a real question about whether organisational capacity has kept pace with institutional responsibility.
Some critics argue that NTA’s failures stem less from staffing shortages and more from political interference in decisions such as centre allocation, or from corruption at specific points in the system. These factors do matter and should not be dismissed. However, they do not remove the staffing problem. An agency with a thin permanent core is more exposed to both interference and corruption, because it has fewer people with the institutional standing and job security to resist pressure or flag irregularities. The staffing gap and the integrity gap are connected, not separate explanations. The challenge, thus, is not only one of scale. It is one of organisational coherence. Examination policy is designed centrally, but execution depends on a wide network of agencies, state administrations, examination centres and service providers, each operating under different conditions. Maintaining uniform standards across this network is difficult. A public system is only as reliable as its weakest link. This applies across the entire examination supply chain: paper setters, printing facilities, secure storage, transport, digital systems, logistics partners and examination centres. Many reported paper leaks occur within this network, not at the policy level. Effective examination governance requires continuous oversight and accountability at every stage, not only secure procedures on paper. Other countries that run large-scale, high-stakes testing keep a stronger permanent core within their testing bodies, even when they use external vendors for specific tasks such as printing or logistics. This allows a stable group of people to be held accountable for standards across cycles, rather than relying mainly on rotating deputationists and short-term contracts.
Technology can strengthen examination security through artificial intelligence, encryption, biometric verification and digital surveillance. Continued investment in these tools is useful. But technology supports administration; it does not replace it. Secure systems still need competent supervision and clear accountability. Stronger laws provide an important deterrent, but their effect depends on timely detection of violations, impartial investigation and consistent enforcement.
Public examinations depend on trust. Students prepare for years because they believe that effort and merit will decide outcomes. Universities and employers accept examination results because they trust the authority that produces them. This trust cannot be created through official assurances. It builds gradually through repeated evidence of competence and fairness. Once weakened, it can only be restored through sustained administrative performance. The government has not been inactive since the Radhakrishnan Committee submitted its report. Several of its recommendations on governance, examination processes, and security are already being implemented. The Nilekani task force can add to this work rather than repeat it. However, the outcome of both efforts will depend on whether the NTA develops the capacity to absorb these reforms and apply them consistently. Two specific steps would help. First, a meaningful share of NTA's contractual roles should be converted into permanent, insulated positions with fixed tenure, so that institutional knowledge and accountability do not depend on staff who rotate out every few years. Second, an independent audit body, separate from NTA and with statutory powers, should review the examination process at each stage of the supply chain, not only after a controversy occurs.
Expert committees perform an important function. They gather evidence and recommend practical reforms. But they cannot create administrative capacity on their own. That requires stable leadership, professional staffing and continuous monitoring, built over time rather than assembled after each crisis.
The writer is former professor and dean, Christ University, Bengaluru
