Since the Oped page of The Asian Age allows for a democratic dialogue, I thought I would pen a rejoinder to Padma Rao Sundarji’s article, NSG: It’s no ‘failure’, published yesterday in the newspaper. The making of foreign policy is a continuum. It should not, normally, be the subject of partisan political divide where acrimony substitutes reasoned discussion and name-calling replaces rational debate. But democratic nations can, and must, analyse the direction and substance of the country’s foreign policy and provide more that one perspective to any initiative. Should India attempt to become a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group? The answer, to my mind, is a conditional “yes”. Was India’s recent bid to become a member the right way to pursue this goal? The answer, in my view, is a categorical “no”.
Why do I say so? If membership of the NSG was likely to come India’s way on the basis of an objective assessment preceded by hardnosed backroom diplomacy, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s frenetic trip around the world, pleading at the chancelleries of countries like Ireland, Mexico and Switzerland would have been worth the effort. But if such an outcome was ab initio substantially in doubt, what compelled our PM to act as though NSG membership was, at this juncture, a matter of utmost national prestige? After all, the NSG waiver provided to India in 2008 following the signing of the Civil Nuclear Agreement with the United States, allows us to participate in trade in civilian nuclear technology and equipment even though all our nuclear facilities are not under nuclear safeguards. A hurriedly planned bid, where success was far from ensured, has another flip side: Endangering the benefits already obtained under the earlier waiver by pushing NSG countries to revisit the criteria adopted to make this exception to India in 2008.
Considering how we went about the NSG merry-go-around, I have serious reservations on the timing, the assumptions, and the methodology. The timing was wrong because nothing indicated that China would play ball or sever its collusion with Pakistan. Whatever the velocity of the swinging jhoola on which Mr Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping enjoyed a view of the Sabarmati in Ahmedabad, in September 2014, our recent relations with China have been far from zingy. While Mr Xi was still our guest in India, we witnessed one of the biggest Chinese invasions into our territory. China still persists with stapled visas for people from Arunachal Pradesh. It blocks action at the UN against dreaded terrorists like Masood Azhar. And, it persists with its massive investments in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), both in infrastructure and in building the “one belt, one road” project through PoK to Gwadar port. Then why did we think that China would accede to India’s request for NSG membership when Pakistan was vociferously opposing such a move and wanted the same membership for itself?
The assumption that the US would swing the deal in our favour was equally flawed. During US President Barack Obama’s visit to India in January 2015, Mr Modi may have affectionately addressed him by his first name, “Barack”, a record 19 times during a half an hour interaction, but this should not have prevented our esteemed PM from realising that Mr Obama is in the last few months of his presidency. There are limitations to what a “lame duck” President can do, and it certainly does appear that Mr Obama’s exertions in our interest were far less than those of George W. Bush in 2008. Goodwill apart, smart nations make a coldly clinical assessment of the potency of a country’s intervention in their favour. Did Mr Modi’s exuberance about his so-called “personal rapport” with “Barack” influence our foreign office to believe what the US could do for us on NSG? The assumption that China will be isolated in its opposition to us was also wrong. As many as seven (nine according to China) countries of the 48-member group expressed reservations on our candidature, including countries like Switzerland that Mr Modi had just visited. The NSG is a club. It has its rules for membership, one of which is that a country must be a signatory to the discriminatory Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
Since there is no question of India signing it, our application required members to re-examine the criteria for membership and devise an exception for India that would keep Pakistan out. Achieving such an outcome required months of quiet backroom diplomacy. Did this precede our Prime Minister’s last minute and hurried summitry? From the evidence available, it would appear not. And, this brings me to the question of methodology. Judged by the number of visits he has made abroad, Mr Modi has shown unprecedented “activism” in foreign policy. But is mere activism a substitute for careful, calibrated strategic planning? However much the adulation our Prime Minister may have received abroad in NRI forums, ultimately, foreign policy cannot be an event management exercise and has to be judged by results, not the pageantry, pomp and frequency of visits abroad. In the specific case of the NSG imbroglio, no country would normally put its Prime Minister forward before ensuring that the outcome is commensurate with this exposure.
I do not believe that India needs to kow tow before China. Other countries respect those countries that respect themselves and if China resents our growing closeness to the US and Japan, calling us “spoiled… a golden boy in the eyes of the West… international ‘adulation’ of India makes the country a bit smug in international affairs” so be it. But if India wants to look China in the eye (aankh mein aankh dal kar baat karna, as Mr Modi put it in his first interview to a TV channel recently), then let us do it with better strategic planning and anticipation. At present, far from isolating China, we have isolated ourselves. More worryingly, we may have just opened up the way for Pakistan’s entry into the NSG. This was a risk we need not have invited since there was no immediate hurry for this unprepared bid for our own membership. And, finally, as Shyam Saran has warned, I do hope that what we have done now does not prompt NSG to revisit the terms and conditions of the India-specific 2008 waiver.
