UPA govt mulled surgical strikes on Pak LeT camps after 26/11: former NSA

New Delhi: Following the 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks, former foreign secretary Shivshankar Menon, who later became National Security Adviser (NSA) to the UPA government, had pressed for ‘immediate military action either against the LeT in Muridke, in Pakistan’s Punjab province, or their camps in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, or against the ISI’.

According to a report in the Indian Express, Menon believed that a military retaliation would have “gone a long way in erasing the shame of incompetence that India’s police and security agencies displayed in the glare of the world’s television lights for full three days”.

But in his book, Menon writes that in hindsight, ‘the decision not to retaliate militarily and to concentrate on diplomatic, covert, and other means was the right one for that time and place.’

The ‘decision-makers at the highest level’ concluded after examining all options that there was more to be gained from not attacking Pakistan than from doing so, Menon says in his book.

His rationale is that an Indian attack on Pakistan would have united the country behind the country’s military and weakened the civilian government. Moreover, a limited strike on selected terrorist targets like LeT camps in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) would have limited practical utility and hardly any effect on the organization, says Menon.

Menon notes that there were other attacks in India before 26/11, but ‘nothing matched the level of organization, the sheer savagery, and the television-style spectacle’ of the Mumbai attack.

But the former NSA argues that one military confrontation will not end the conflict, which has no solution – and is destined to be long and protracted. Indians must come to terms with this reality, he claims. He also debunks the theory that the Israeli style of confrontation - short responses against non-state actors, not their state sponsors – is suitable to India.

Menon laments the failure of peace efforts during 2004-07 between Manmohan Singh and Pervez Musharraf which were stymied in 2007 by Pakistani domestic politics. He singles out the joint statement between Singh and Yousaf Raza Gillani in July 2009 at Sharm El-Sheikh, which he says was ‘another opportunity squandered in the long list of missed half chances in India-Pakistan relations’.

However, Menon states that despite Pakistan’s efforts, India has not really been affected by radical groups like the ISIS or Daesh, because of its strong social fabric.