Damning Findings in Ghose Panel Report: Full Details Here

Uttam Kumar Reddy said the Ghose commission “clearly says KCR acted not as chief minister but as an administrative head issuing direct orders that went against institutional processes.”

Update: 2025-08-04 11:17 GMT
Uttam Kumar Reddy said the “commission held that there is rank irregularity from the conceptualization stage of the project till the administrative approvals on March 1, 2016. These decisions were not those of the government, but of individuals.” (Image: DC)

Hyderabad: A long list of damning findings, and a barrage of likely problems for political leaders during the BRS rule led by the then-Chief Minister K. Chandrashekar Rao, and a slew of serving and retired government officials, with some currently holding key positions remaining unnamed.

All this and more a detailed presentation by irrigation minister N. Uttam Kumar Reddy on Monday on the findings of the Justice P.C. Ghose commission of inquiry into various aspects of the Kaleshwaram project’s three barrages.

Addressing a press conference at the Secretariat along with Chief Minister A. Revanth Reddy, Deputy Chief Minister Mallu Bhatti Vikramarka and flanked by the rest of the Cabinet members, Uttam Kumar Reddy unveiled the judicial commission’s findings that directly blaming Chandrashekar Rao for bypassing rules, ignoring experts warnings, and saddling the state with `84,000 crore of high-interest debt.

Quoting from the commission’s report, Uttam Kunar Reddy said: “the Kaleshwaram project, intended as a lifeline for Telangana, became a colossal waste of public money due to a profound failure of governance, planning, technical oversight, and financial discipline, driven by the individual decisions and undue influence of political leadership.”

He said the Ghose commission “clearly says KCR acted not as chief minister but as an administrative head issuing direct orders that went against institutional processes.”

Uttam Kumar Reddy said the “commission held that there is rank irregularity from the conceptualization stage of the project till the administrative approvals on March 1, 2016. These decisions were not those of the government, but of individuals.”

The decision to shift the barrage from Tummidihatti to Medigadda was made solely by Chandrashekar Rao under the false pretext of lack of water availability. “The report says the reason for abandoning Tummidihatti does not appear sincere or honest,” he said.

Though the then-Union minister Uma Bharti confirmed water availability at Tummidihatti, and the Central Water Commission (CWC) approved the hydrology of the Pranahita-Chevella project in October 2014, the “KCR government wrote to the Centre saying there was no water, and that misrepresentation was found to be malicious by the commission.”

Though an expert committee constituted by the BRS government in January 2015 declared that a barrage at Medigadda was unviable and not economical, and that instead a barrage can be planned at Vemanapally. “The commission observed that this report’s suppression was intentional to allow the then CM and irrigation minister to go ahead with Medigadda against all expert advice,” he said.

The commission, Uttam Kumar Reddy said, endorsed the National Dam Safety Authority’s findings that the barrages had serious planning and design flaws. “The Medigadda barrage was built on a permeable foundation, unsuitable for a storage structure,” he added.

He also said that as per the commission, administrative sanctions for the three barrages issued through GO Rt. No.s 231, 232 and 233, on March 1, 2016, were never placed before the Cabinet. “The commission says clearly that such approvals, bypassing the cabinet, are a violation of business rules,” he said.

“These were massive financial decisions. But contracts were issued orally based on the then CM’s instructions. Even the then irrigation minister’s approval was found legally invalid,” he said. Works worth `369 crore were added without detailed project reports, which the commission flagged as “clinching evidence of malicious intent to benefit the agencies, he said.

As per the report, Uttam Kumar Reddy said, “KIPCL borrowed `87,449 crore with state guarantees, purely through off-budget borrowings. As of September 2024, `29,737 crore has been paid. The remaining principal is `64,212 crore, and we owe another `41,638 crore in interest. An additional Rs.1,342 crore was paid due to price escalation clauses inserted after tenders, and another `612 crore was paid as inflated or unjustified contractor benefits.”

Terms of reference of judicial commission – Findings

1. Terms of reference: To enquire into negligence, irregularities, and lacunae in planning, designing, and construction of Medigadda, Annaram, Sundilla barrages

Findings: Location of barrages was “sole and individual decision of minister (irrigation) (T. Harish Rao) and the Chief Minister (K. Chandrashekar Rao). There was no formal “decision of the government” in this regard.

An expert committee set up on 21.5.2015 rejected plans for barrage at Medigadda as “prohibitive” in cost and “time consumption.” It was intentionally kept in cold storage.

Claim of no availability of water at Tummidihatti, site of the previously proposed Pranahitha-Chevella project, “does not appear to be sincere and honest”.

Administrative approvals for the three barrages not placed before Cabinet, consequently not approved by Cabinet, but approved by minister of irrigation and Chief Minister.

Works awarded and commenced before detailed project report was finalised, or vetted by Central Water Commission.

CWC noted in May 2018 that project’s cost estimate was being examined, two years after administrative approvals were given in March 2016.

Wapcos gives final detailed project report on 27.3.2016; administrative approvals granted before that on 1.3.2016.

KIPCL did not play its role to “plan, appraise, approve, release funds, implement, manage, operate, monitor and evaluate the project” and seek financial support. It only raised loans and issued cheques.

2. Terms of Reference: Inquire manner of award and execution of contracts.

Findings: Despite CWC advising “turnkey basis” for construction and maintenance, contracts awarded on a lump sum basis.

Unjustified revised administrative approvals; locations of Annaram, Sundilla barrages changed after contracts were concluded “without consulting Wapcos”.

The changes led to cost escalation due to various factors.

Contract conditions relaxed, revisions made with “malicious intention to unduly favour the agencies… wrongfully siphoning amounts from public exchequer”.

3.Terms of Reference: Inquire into negligence and lacunae in operations & maintenance (O&M) of barrages

Findings: Absolutely no O&M activity, no agreed O&M manual, observed damages and defects (post completion certificate).

Irrigation department issued false completion certificates and release of bank guarantees.

State Dam Safety Organisation’s failed or did not perform its role.

Contractors L&T (Medigadda), Afcons (Annaram), Navayuga (Sundilla) pointed to continuous impounding of water; the barrages were used as reservoirs and not as diversion structures as planned.

O&M agreements lacking detailed tasks and payments.

Agency requests for water depletion not considered.

4. Terms of Reference: Inquire into quality control (QC) & monitoring aspects

Findings: QC inadequate for secant pile integrity/verticality, only 7,498 concrete quality tests held at Medigadda against the required 37,228.

Plinth slab not constructed as designed. PVC water stops discontinuous, joints at vents instead of piers;

No compliance reports for sand densification and clay removal at foundation level;

Seismic checks and liquefaction reports not furnished;

Defects reports shortly after inauguration in 2019;

Defects not addressed properly

5.Terms of Reference: Fix responsibilities for authority/official who extended undue favours

Findings: Wrongful issue of completion certificates.

Time extensions given in casual manner without penalties on agencies.

Premature release of bank guarantees.

Relaxation of contract conditions

6.Terms of Reference: Fix responsibilities for lapses

Findings: Then CM Chandrashekar Rao acted as sole decision maker, directed impounding of water at barrages’ peril, liable for irregularities and illegalities.

Then irrigation minister Harish Rao “allowed CM to fulfil desires”, and is liable for irregularities.

Then finance minister Etala Rajendar (now BJP MP) a tacit perpetrator, oblivious/ignorant of financial implications, rules, lacked commitment and integrity in safeguarding state finances.

Evidence that barrage construction commenced after Cabinet sub-committee recommendation was accepted by Cabinet is patently wrong

IAS officers held responsible.

Then special chief secretary irrigation S.K. Joshi, then chief secretary, chairman KIPCL played improper role in re-engineering, approvals, failed to ensure KIPCL projects were taken up as turnkey, participated in financial & technical decisions, and violated business rules.

Then CM’s secretary Smitha Sabharwal not diligent, negligent and irresponsible in discharge of her duties, failed to ensure business rules were complied with on Cabinet approvals.

Not named were then additional secretary finance, then finance secretary, then irrigation secretary liable for issuing GOs without cabinet approvals, violated business rules.

KIPCL board (at all relevant times) collectively responsible for financial decisions.

Former and current irrigation engineers/officials individually and collectively liable for dishonest suppression and overreach of authority, malicious intent in approving revised estimates, gross irregularities and facilitating illegal decisions.

Agencies/Contractors

All hand in glove with project authorities, acted with malicious intent for undue benefit, responsible for rectifying defects at their own cost.

L&T (Medigadda): Not entitled to substantial completion certificate, of work completion as it held works have not been completed.

If L&T fails to complete all pending works, repairs, correct defects at its cost, then the project authorities shall get the works done and recover the cost from the agency.

Claim by L&T that it executed works as per design given unacceptable since there is email correspondence showing that it was involved in finalising design with CDO officials.

Agencies for Annaram, Sundilla liable for repairs/defect rectifications at their own cost as they did not attend to them during defect liability period.

Kaleshwaram project/barrage disasters/judicial commission probe timeline

Aug. 28, 2016: Concluding agreement of Medigadda barrage.

June 21, 2019: Inauguration of Kaleshwaram project.

2023

Oct. 21: Block 7 of Medigadda barrage damaged, a portion of it sinks.

Oct. 25: NDSA team examines damage, meets contractor L&T.

Nov. 1: NDSA communicates reasons for sinking of piers at Medigadda barrage.

Nov. 30: Assembly elections held

2024

Feb. 13: Government asks NDSA for thorough inspection, to study designs for Medigadda, Annaram, Sundilla barrages

March 2: NDSA sets up committee of experts for inspections, study of barrages

March 14: Government appoints Justice Pinaki Chandra Ghose, Supreme Court former judge, to head judicial commission of inquiry on certain allegations of irregularities with respect to Kaleshwaram barrages

July 31, 2025: Justice Ghose submits three-volume, 660-page report to government

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