HC To Examine Family Court’s Power Under Muslim Law

The petitioner was challenging the maintainability of the divorce proceedings initiated by her husband before the Family Court. The petitioner questioned the jurisdiction of the Principal Family Court, Charminar, Hyderabad, in entertaining a divorce petition filed by her husband seeking dissolution of the marriage.

It was contended that under Muslim Personal Law, a husband has the option to dissolve marriage through recognised forms of talaq, but there is no statutory enactment enabling him to approach a court of law seeking divorce on specified grounds.

According to the petitioner, while Muslim women are expressly conferred a statutory right to seek dissolution of marriage under Section 2 of the Muslim Women (Dissolution of Muslim Marriages) Act, 1939, there was no corresponding law conferring such a right on Muslim men. In the absence of any statutory backing, the petitioner argued that the Family Court cannot assume jurisdiction merely on the basis of the provisions of the Family Courts Act.

The petitioner further contended that the Family Courts Act only enables Family Courts to exercise jurisdiction in matrimonial matters where such jurisdiction flows from an existing law. The Act, it was argued, does not create substantive rights nor does it empower Family Courts to entertain petitions where no statute provides grounds or a cause of action.

The petitioner also relied on the Family Court Rules to contend that only proceedings traceable to specific matrimonial statutes or recognised personal laws can be instituted before a Family Court, and that a divorce petition by a Muslim husband without statutory sanction falls outside this framework. On the issue of maintainability, counsel for the petitioner, Mohammed Adnan, relied on the Supreme Court ruling wherein the scope of a writ of prohibition, contending that where there is an inherent lack of jurisdiction, the existence of an alternative remedy is no bar to the exercise of writ jurisdiction.

It was argued that questions of inherent lack of jurisdiction cannot be addressed under the provisions of the CPC and can be decided only by a writ court.

Taking note of these submissions, the judge overruled the objection of the Registry and ordered notice to the respondent-husband, setting the stage for an authoritative pronouncement on the power of Family Courts to entertain divorce petitions filed by Muslim husbands in the absence of statutory grounds.

HC orders review of lecturer’s promotion

The Telangana High Court directed the government to consider promotion of a junior lecturer for the post of Principal in Government Junior Colleges. Justice Pulla Karthik was dealing with a writ plea filed by G. Srilatha, a junior lecturer in chemistry. The petitioner contended that she was appointed in 2002 and that her name figured in the Departmental Promotion Committee (DPC) recommended list of 98 eligible candidates for promotion to the post of principal for the panel year 2024-25. Though 81 candidates were promoted, the respondents did not consider candidates from Serial No. 82 onwards, citing an interim order passed by the High Court in another writ petition restraining further posting orders being issued. The petitioner argued that the said interim order ceased to operate after the filing of the counter affidavit along with a petition to vacate the interim stay. Taking note of the submissions and the fact that the response was filed in the earlier writ plea, the judge directed the State Government and the commissioner and director of Intermediate Education to consider the case of the petitioner for promotion against the available vacancies, strictly in accordance with law, pending disposal of the main writ plea.

Mutt Moves HC Alleging Interference

The management of Sri Krishna Brahmendrula Swamy Mutt in Pagidiyal village of Mahbubnagar district moved the Telangana High Court alleging interference in its religious activities. Justice K. Sarath was dealing with a writ plea filed by Kammari Rama Mohan, president of the Krishna Brahmendrula Swamy Mutt.

The petitioner sought to declare that the action of the authorities in allowing private individuals to interfere with the management and puja path (ritual worship) of the Mutt was illegal and in violation of the Constitution.

The petitioner alleged that the respondents interfered with the administration of the Mutt and the conduct of the annual Aradhana festival, traditionally organised by the committee of the petitioner. He sought directions restraining the alleged interference, particularly during the upcoming festival scheduled from January 23 to January 25, 2026. During the hearing, the assistant government pleader for endowments contended that the representation of the petitioner would be examined and decided by the competent authority.

The judge directed the State Endowments Department to consider and dispose of a representation concerning a dispute over the management and performance of religious rituals at the Mutt without entering into the merits of the dispute.