Wasbir Hussain | Time For Diplomatic Reset In Delhi’s Ties With Dhaka

Diplomacy is often conducted through symbolism. A handshake, an invitation, or even the choice of an ambassador can reveal more than official communiqués. Today, India and Bangladesh appear to be communicating through such signals.

New Delhi has chosen veteran politician Dinesh Trivedi, not a career diplomat, as high commissioner to Dhaka, conferring Cabinet rank. Bangladesh, in turn, named serving foreign secretary Asad Alam Siam as envoy to India. These aren’t routine appointments. Both capitals seem to recognise that the relationship has entered dangerous territory and political intervention is urgently needed. And Prime Minister Narendra Modi has invited Bangladesh PM Tarique Rahman to the Brics summit in New Delhi in September, which can provide the right platform to discuss contentious issues.

The slide in bilateral ties began after the dramatic political transition in Bangladesh in August 2024. Since then, mistrust has steadily replaced the warmth of the Sheikh Hasina era. Even after Bangladesh elected a new government under Tarique Rahman, the anticipated reset has remained elusive.

Mr Rahman’s first major diplomatic choices reinforced India’s concerns. By choosing Malaysia for his first foreign trip and China next, while keeping India waiting, Dhaka departed from an established convention of visiting New Delhi early. Every Bangladeshi leader understands such departures are read not merely as scheduling decisions but as strategic messaging.

The message was unmistakable: Bangladesh intends to broaden its strategic options and is no longer ready to be seen operating within India’s political orbit.

And China hardly needs a second invitation. Beijing spent the past decade patiently building influence across South Asia: not through military alliances but through ports, highways, railways, industrial parks, energy projects and generous financing. Bangladesh occupies a pivotal place in this strategy. Sitting astride the Bay of Bengal, bordering India’s vulnerable Northeast, it’s one of the region’s most valuable geopolitical prizes.

For India, the issue extends far beyond bilateral diplomacy. It’s about strategic geography: Nearly every ambitious Northeast connectivity initiative depends on a cooperative Bangladesh. Access to Chittagong and Mongla ports, multimodal transport corridors, rail connectivity, inland waterways and road links can dramatically reduce transport costs for the eight Northeast states. Bangladesh isn’t simply India’s neighbour; it’s the Northeast’s natural gateway to the sea.

If political relations deteriorate, India’s Act East Policy risks becoming an expensive slogan rather than a transformative strategy. One must remember that Prime Minister Modi is bent on making the Act East policy work and succeed.

There are security implications. China has steadily expanded its strategic footprint around India’s periphery: from Pakistan and Sri Lanka to Nepal and Myanmar. Should Bangladesh drift substantially into Beijing’s strategic embrace, India will face a far more complex security environment along its entire eastern frontier.

It’s not that Bangladesh will become a Chinese military ally overnight. Rather, the cumulative effect of deeper Chinese infrastructure investment, digital penetration, telecommunications partnerships, surveillance technologies and defence cooperation could gradually erode India’s traditional strategic advantage in its own neighbourhood.

For the Northeast, this matters enormously. The region already faces challenges due to insurgency, illegal migration, narcotics trafficking, arms smuggling and instability spilling over from Myanmar. Any weakening of India’s strategic understanding with Bangladesh complicates border management and intelligence cooperation while giving external powers greater room to influence developments around one of India’s most sensitive regions.

The Siliguri Corridor (Chicken’s Neck), which links mainland India with the Northeast, is one of India’s most vulnerable choke poimts. A Bangladesh that maintains strategic balance contributes to regional stability. A Bangladesh increasingly aligned with China inevitably raises uncomfortable questions for Indian planners.

This is why New Delhi’s move to send Dinesh Trivedi carries significance. Political relationships can’t always be repaired through diplomatic notes. They require trust, direct access and political credibility. By appointing a senior political figure instead of a career diplomat, India appears to acknowledge that rebuilding confidence with Dhaka is now a political mission.

Bangladesh’s decision to send its serving foreign secretary to New Delhi suggests a similar assessment. Both governments understand that allowing relations to drift further helps neither country.

One obstacle continues to cast a long shadow over bilateral ties: Sheikh Hasina. Her continued presence in India is politically sensitive inside Bangladesh. Whether justified or not, many in the new political establishment see it as as evidence that New Delhi has never fully accepted Dhaka’s political transition.

Diplomacy depends as much on perception as reality. Every attempt to deepen India-Bangladesh engagement runs into the same question: what next for Sheikh Hasina?

Reports that she wishes to return to Bangladesh add another layer of complexity. If this takes place voluntarily, with credible assurances on her safety and legal rights, it could remove one key psychological barrier to improved relations.

It will be premature to conclude India is quietly encouraging her departure merely to appease Dhaka. This would carry profound legal, political and humanitarian implications. New Delhi has historically avoided appearing to sacrifice long-term principles for short-term diplomatic gains.

The Hasina issue, while important, shouldn’t be the sole prism through which bilateral ties are seen. India and Bangladesh have far bigger strategic interests at stake.

Trade still expands. Energy cooperation are mutually beneficial. Counter-terrorism coordination has saved lives in both nations. Water-sharing, connectivity and power transmission remain areas where cooperation produces measurable gains.

Neither country benefits from allowing China to become the principal beneficiary of their mistrust.

India must recognise Bangladesh seeks strategic autonomy rather than strategic dependence. Attempts to view every Bangladeshi engagement with China through a zero-sum lens could prove counterproductive.

At the same time, Dhaka can’t ignore geography. No amount of Chinese investment can replace the reality that Bangladesh shares its longest border, deepest economic integration and most immediate security challenges with India.

The appointments of Dinesh Trivedi and Asad Alam Siam must be seen for what they are: not solutions, but opportunities.

The real test lies ahead. Can both governments move beyond the bitterness of the post-2024 transition? Can India reassure Bangladesh that it respects its people’s democratic choices? Can Bangladesh demonstrate that stronger ties with Beijing won’t come at India’s strategic expense?

The answers will shape not just bilateral relations but the future strategic architecture of South Asia’s east. For India, the stakes are especially high. Lose Bangladesh, and the Northeast becomes strategically more isolated. Retain Bangladesh as a trusted partner, and the Northeast transforms into India’s gateway to Southeast Asia, Bay of Bengal and the Indo-Pacific.

This moment should be seen not as a routine diplomatic adjustment but as a geopolitical inflection point. New Delhi and Dhaka have exchanged powerful diplomatic signals. The question now is whether they possess the political courage to convert symbolism into strategy: before Beijing does it for them.

Wasbir Hussain, author and political commentator, is editor-in-chief of Northeast Live, Northeast India’s only satellite English and Hindi news channel. The views expressed here are personal.