Syed Ata Hasnain | Power Reset In Pak And Its Global Consequences

Pakistan today stands at a juncture that is neither merely political nor exclusively military; it is embedded in state architecture, shaped by ideology, and now intersecting with global security concerns. What has long been India’s security challenge is now transforming into a global question. How should the international community respond when a nuclear-capable state, with a history of proxy warfare, gradually slips into militarised governance, constitutional manipulation, and public justification of violent extremism?

Recent tremors surrounding Imran Khan’s uncertain fate, constitutional experimentation through the 27th Amendment, and Asim Munir’s ascent as a potential supra-institutional authority together mark a significant internal shift. It may be Pakistan’s internal matter, yet it carries implications across law, diplomacy, counter-terrorism and regional stability.

The changes underway in Pakistan are not merely political developments; they risk altering the very architecture of state behaviour in South Asia. When constitutional amendments begin to blur the separation of powers, when non-democratic institutions are equipped with lifetime indemnity, and when public figures begin framing terror acts as “revenge”, the issue ceases to be domestic. It becomes global — because such behaviour challenges the international norms of state responsibility.

Pakistan’s history contains a haunting precedent. In 1979, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto -- elected and recognised -- was executed under the shadow of Gen. Zia-ul Haq’s martial law. The world watched, expressed concern, and soon moved on. Today, as whispers intensify around Imran Khan’s safety and silence grows over his erasure from the political space, that history starts to echo again. Imran Khan is no Bhutto, and their political ideologies were vastly different. Yet both at some point posed a challenge to military centrality -- and both became vulnerable once they appeared larger than the institutions around them. When a state repeatedly eliminates civilian authority rather than negotiate with it, it signals a systemic intolerance of alternate legitimacy. The question is no longer whether Imran Khan survives politically -- it is whether the world will once again watch silently as Pakistan neutralises dissent through opacity and coercion. Imran Khan is certainly not India’s ally. Yet his safety, and the manner in which Pakistan handles internal dissent, should influence how the world sees Pakistan -- as a state where political survival is decided not by ballots, courts or dialogue, but by institutional fate.

In earlier years, Pakistan typically denied involvement in terror attacks. Today, a former “prime minister” of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, Chaudhry Anwarul Haq, has openly claimed that the Red Fort car blast in Delhi was a Jaish-e-Mohammed operation “to avenge Balochistan”. This is not mere provocation; it is a deliberate attempt to recast terrorism as retaliation, not aggression -- grievance, not crime -- thereby normalising violence as political messaging. When a public representative endorses a UN-proscribed terrorist outfit as acting in the national interest, it signals narrative sanction for terror. It also reflects Pakistan’s belief in proxy warfare and psychological disruption as tools to keep India strategically off-balance. India’s response must therefore expand beyond internal security to diplomatic, informational and normative domains.

This is not merely reprehensible rhetoric -- it is morally corrosive and strategically dangerous. It attempts to shift blame while retaining deniability. And if such rhetoric goes unchallenged, it risks normalising the political justification of terrorism. India’s key challenge is not to condemn Pakistan more strongly -- but to articulate its evolution more clearly. Rather than repeating the bilateral story, India now has an opportunity to craft the Pakistan-world narrative -- showing how recurring institutions, ideologically-aligned proxies and constitutional engineering are converging into a model that incentivises instability.

India’s diplomatic outreach must now go beyond reactive rebuttal and instead begin shaping a new global conversation. It must firmly establish that modern terrorism does not emerge from isolated extremist pockets, but is often incubated within militarised political structures that provide protection, resources and ideological backing. It must emphasise that proxy warfare is not merely a regional nuisance but an international multiplier of instability, capable of spilling across borders, influencing fragile regions, and undermining norms of state responsibility. And when public representatives or state-linked figures openly justify acts of terror, it is not simply a matter of narrative combat -- it becomes an issue of international accountability and global counterterrorism ethics.

Pakistan’s shift -- from covert denial of terror to public rationalisation -- has created an opportunity India must use with precision. International platforms such as FATF, Interpol and counter-terrorism partnerships should be engaged not with accusation alone, but with evidence and structured exposure. India’s advantage lies in its difference -- it must present itself not as an adversary, but as a responsible democracy upholding a rules-based order. The world responds not to outrage, but to coherence and consistency. India must show that Pakistan’s instability is no longer a bilateral irritant, but a global risk -- where a nuclear-capable state increasingly rationalises violence and marginalises civilian authority.

Key to this is working with those who have stakes in stability: Saudi Arabia, the UAE, the United States, Britain, the EU and Indonesia. Strategic partnerships must now include not just trade and defence, but co-understanding of emerging terror-state dynamics.

A Pakistan where generals write constitutions, elected leaders disappear in silence, and terrorism is rationalised as “revenge” is not just a regional irritant, it is a warning. The last time the world ignored these signals, Al-Qaeda grew in Afghanistan, only to reach Manhattan. The lesson remains unchanged -- terror nurtured in silence eventually seeks a global stage.

India’s task, therefore, is clear -- not to shout louder, but to illuminate better. Pakistan’s narrative is shifting; India’s must sharpen. The world does not respond to outrage; it responds to evidence, structure, and foresight.

The moment demands that India communicate with clarity and composure. Proxy terrorism is not merely India’s problem; it is Pakistan’s externalised model of strategic influence. Militarised governance in Pakistan is not a passing constitutional anomaly, but the gradual evolution of a system where uniform supersedes institution. And the silencing of civilian authority is not an internal political issue, but a regional risk with global implications. India cannot and should not attempt to manage Pakistan’s internal flux. But it must ensure that the world understands what that flux signifies. Because the Pakistan question today is no longer regional -- it is structural, ideological and international. And the message from New Delhi to the world must be clear; that the question now is seriously much more about global security.

The writer, a retired lieutenant-general, is a former GOC of the Srinagar-based 15 (“Chinar”) Corps