Reflections | Amid US Threats, Tehran Burns: Is There Way Out? | Sunanda K. Datta-Ray
Protests are nothing new in Iran. Ever since the 1979 Islamic revolution, some 93 million Iranians have battled a plethora of political, systemic, ideological, economic and institutional challenges culminating in the supreme question of who will take over if the Islamic Republic collapses
A sprinkling of European soldiers flaunting Nato insignia landed in Greenland over the weekend as Donald Trump sent F-35s and bombers to the Middle East vowing to help Iranian protesters if the killings continued. What many in the West wondered was when would he make a decisive move. People in the East would be less anxious to plunge the world into the horrors of a fratricidal civil war that rents society apart, turns clan against clan and family against family. It was how the West manipulated what was called the Arab Spring.
Protests are nothing new in Iran. Ever since the 1979 Islamic revolution, some 93 million Iranians have battled a plethora of political, systemic, ideological, economic and institutional challenges culminating in the supreme question of who will take over if the Islamic Republic collapses. The Pahlavi dynasty had a ready successor waiting in Ayatollah Khomeini. But what started on December 28 with shopkeepers protesting at Tehran’s Grand Bazar over the Iranian currency’s savage loss of value was not an organised regime-ousting campaign. It was a spontaneous expression of popular grievances that quickly morphed into nationwide demonstrations expressing dissatisfaction with almost all aspects of the ruling establishment, especially with the ferocity with which it inflicts the rigours of bigotry on people who were getting used to the relaxed social climate under the Shah.
The last Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, did try to instil in his subjects a sense of national pride and continuity, quite distinct from the religious zeal that holds together most other Muslim nations. The exercise couldn’t claim much historical accuracy, but the Shah’s constant secular invocations of 2,500 years of Persian monarchy, which he linked to ancient empires like those of Cyrus the Great and not with Quranic teachings, were not without impact. Of course, the Pahlavi dynasty (1925-1979) was a parvenu affair that did not long survive the lavish Persepolis ceremony to showcase imperial splendour. Matters might have turned out differently if only this propaganda fuelled by petrodollars and Pahlavi pride had also embraced political and economic reforms.
The monarchy’s collapse in 1979 and the consequent Western disapproval, boycotts and sanctions was compounded by a potent mix of mounting domestic pressure and aggressive American threats, leaving Iran’s leaders with few options on coping with catastrophe. The record slump in the Iranian rial’s value was just the latest in a long series of crises.
The reimposition of punishing US sanctions in 2018 made daily life harder for millions of Iranians, with many losing confidence in the government’s ability to improve the economy and crack down on mismanagement and corruption. What made things worse was President Donald Trump’s June air attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities, following it up by loudly threatening to attack Iran again, claiming that his aim is to “help” the protesters.
Ordinary Iranians could not comprehend how the abrupt cancellation of American officials’ talks with their Iranian counterparts and nuclear mayhem promoted the Trump administration’s alleged MIGA (Make Iran Great Again) goal, especially when the US kept urging the protesters to keep demonstrating in the streets and attack government buildings and installations.
Initially, the government did attempt to address grievances by rolling out a series of economic reforms. The changes included replacing the central bank governor and scrapping a preferential exchange rate for imports of certain basic goods, making a $7 monthly cash transfer instead. But the moves fell flat. And as the protests widened, the security forces’ response entered a new, more violent phase. Since January 8, the authorities have imposed a near-total communications blackout, while thousands of people were arrested. Iran has released no official toll figure, but it is revealing that the authorities admit that more than 100 security forces have been killed. Opposition activists say the death toll is much higher and that it includes hundreds — if not thousands — of protesters. Tehran’s defiant official mood was summed up by the Iranian foreign minister, Seyed Abbas Araghchi, telling Al Jazeera, as a message for the Americans: “We are ready for war”. That was when President Trump was advising Iranian protesters that “help is on the way”.
This is not the first time the government has resorted to harsh tactics. The difference, according to observers familiar with Iranian politics, is that the ayatollahs seem unable to find a path forward, even if they succeed in quelling the current round of dissent. “I can’t do anything,” President Masoud Pezeskhian admitted on the eve of the protests, referring to his country’s economic difficulties.
As a member of the Majlis (2008-24), he criticised the government for the death of Jina Mahsa Amini, a 22-year-old Kurdish-Iranian woman arrested for allegedly not wearing the hijab in accordance with government regulations, and the law enforcement department’s brutal reaction to popular protests beginning in 2009. Mr Pezeskhian is the most reform-oriented President since Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005), under whom he served as minister of health (2001-05). But he is also considered loyal to the hard-line supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and is also restrained by a historically conservative Majlis.
Past upheavals have resulted in the government providing some benefits to the public. After mass protests in 2009, Iran showed flexibility by negotiating a nuclear deal with the West. Following protests driven by the economic hardships of 2019, the authorities handed out subsidies from the state’s coffers.
And after the women-led mass protests in 2022, they loosened some social restrictions. But the options may be more limited now, as the regime is isolated and out of touch when it comes to tackling daunting economic problems that have been neglected for far too long. Iran is not only facing pressure from within but its network of supporters abroad has been greatly weakened since Israel’s multi-front regional wars in 2023. A 12-day war with Israel left the country’s defence capabilities in a sadly diminished state.
With the shadow of potential US military intervention looming large, the ayatollahs see the protests as more than just an internal matter. They cannot afford any longer to ignore Mr Trump’s oblique warning: “The problem is there’s not a thing that Denmark can do about it if Russia or China wants to occupy Greenland, but there’s everything we can do. You found that out last week with Venezuela.” No wonder the protests are simmering down. Iran must be relieved.
The writer is a senior journalist, columnist and author