Pradeep C. Nair | The Significance And Implications As Key Elections Loom In Myanmar

Elections in Myanmar are due to be held soon, with the first phase being held on December 28, 2025, and the subsequent phases in January 2026. Many in the Western media have written off these elections as yet another farce by the military junta and an attempt to not just ward off the large-scale condemnation that the regime faces, but also to give a fig leaf of democratic intent by the junta. In the six-decade domination by the military, the December-January elections may turn out to be a defining moment, not just for Myanmar, but also for India, China and all other stakeholders in the region.

The elections will see 57 parties with a total of 4,963 candidates in the fray. Six “union-level” (nationwide) parties would contest across the country, while 51 parties would contest only within one state or region. Besides, some Independents are also likely to participate. The six nationwide parties include the Union Solidarity and Development Party (military backed), with 1,018 candidates, followed by the National Unity Party (NUP), with 694, the People’s Pioneer Party (PPP), with 672, the Myanmar Farmers Development Party, with 428, the Shan Nationalities Democratic Party (White Tiger Party), with 584, and the People’s Party, with 512 candidates respectively. The largest and historically the most popular party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), which won massive landslide victories in 2015 and 2020, has been dissolved by the junta for refusing to re-register under a new electoral law. Moreover, voting will occur only in 274 out of 330 townships.

Many Opposition and pro-democracy actors -- including the ousted leadership of the NLD, the shadow National Unity Government (NUG), and multiple ethnic-armed and resistance groups -- have rejected the election as a sham and are calling for a boycott.

The junta sees itself as the only unifying force in the country, with the 135 different ethnic groups of the country pulling in different directions for greater autonomy, and many, even for secession. This has been the unfortunate truth in Myanmar ever since it gained its independence in 1948. The last five years have seen thousands killed and displaced in an orgy of violence that has swept across the country. Amidst large-scale condemnation and sanctions, these elections are a last-ditch effort to not just gain a shred of legitimacy but also to bring down the violence levels and restore normalcy at the earliest.

There are three likely scenarios in these elections. In the first, the violence could be minimal, with a smooth transition to democracy, in which the junta would relax certain restrictions and ensure partial inclusivity after due consultations with a few Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs). In the second scenario, we could expect large-scale violence and disruption by the EAOs and the Peoples’ Democratic Force (PDF), resulting in reduced participation and punitive operations by the “Tatmadav” (the armed forces). In the third, we could expect the Junta carrying out elections under its own terms, which would see intermittent conflict that leads to a government with very little credibility. The first option is the most desirable, the second the most dangerous, and the third the most likely. In all the three options, the power would be retained by the junta, after the elections, yet showing some form of legitimate democracy. Given the lifting of sanctions by the Donald Trump administration (which had been imposed earlier by the Biden administration) on several allies of Myanmar’s ruling generals in July this year, it may well be a sign of the US now wanting to engage more proactively and positively with Myanmar. President Trump’s presence at the Asean summit in Malaysia in October this year further shows the increasing US interest in the region. This US interest is also visible in the recently released US Security Strategy of 2025, where the US is looking forward to step up defence cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region.

For India, these elections in Myanmar are very important. With four bordering states of Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur and Mizoram sharing 1,643 km of border, the possibility of restoration of near normalcy (no matter how thin the chances may seem) is extremely important. These border states have witnessed large-scale influx of refugees, trans-border movement of insurgents, weapons, ammunition and contraband (largely drugs). The border guarding force, the Assam Rifles, has confiscated drugs worth Rs 2,396 crores till November 2025. In 2024, it was Rs 1,949 crores and in 2023 it was Rs 1,725 crores.

India’s Act East Policy largely hinges on normalcy in Myanmar. Towards that end, the Kaladan Multi Modal Trade and Transit Project, as well as the Trilateral Highway; our two flagship projects, can become operational only when the elections restore a sense of normalcy in Myanmar.

To assuage the multiple EAOs that have been in a state of conflict with the Myanmar military over the decades, it is reported that the junta is also seriously considering greater federalism between Naypyidaw (the country’s capital) and the states and regions after the elections.

Some positive changes in the Myanmar Constitution of 2008 may well be expected. Towards that end, many Western democracies and Constitutions are being studied by the junta.

India must impress upon Myanmar that it is the Indian Constitution and form of federalism that would serve Myanmar’s interests best, given the similarities in culture and diversity of people. India must do everything it can to help Myanmar in its baby steps towards democracy, the first step for which is the impending elections. China, whose engagements are not liked in Myanmar, officially supports the elections, viewing them as a practical opportunity to secure its interests, rather than a move toward genuine democracy.

The writer is a retired lieutenant-general who is a former director-general of the Assam Rifles. He is currently vice-chancellor of St. Mary’s Rehabilitation University, Hyderabad.