Manish Tewari | Why Gulf, Middle East Can’t Stop Gaza Carnage

The strategic calculus of the Gulf monarchies presents a paradox of power — nations that host the pillars of US forward deployment — Al Udeid Air Base housing over 10,000 personnel, the Fifth Fleet, Prince Sultan Air Base, and command sovereign wealth fund assets exceeding $3.5 trillion, that underwrite American corporate and treasury debt — find their immense economic and strategic leverage curiously neutralised when confronted with the conflict in Gaza.

The Gulf monarchies possess every tangible asset — energy reserves, financial capital, and geographic indispensability — that should, in theory, translate into formidable political influence. Yet, their power is meticulously circumscribed in their efforts to alter Washington’s unwavering support for Israel’s Gaza operations. This inertia is not a failure of courage but a cold, strategic calculus where the Palestinian cause is perpetually subordinated to more existential imperatives — regime survival, the Iranian threat, and the preservation of an economic order that guarantees their prosperity.

The answer to the question of why this influence fails to translate into meaningful policy modification on the Palestinian issue lies in understanding that the Gulf’s apparent leverage exists within a carefully constructed dependency matrix that ultimately serves American hegemonic interests, not Arab strategic autonomy.

The foundational constraint is an integrated security umbrella provided by the United States, which is the primary bulwark against the Gulf’s paramount security concern: Tehran and its network of proxy forces.

This security partnership has evolved beyond arms deals into a complex interdependence. The Houthi attacks on UAE and Saudi infrastructure in recent years were not merely pinpricks; they were stark reminders of their vulnerability. The subsequent Israeli intelligence support to the UAE explains why Emirati officials favour a long-term relationship with Israel.

To genuinely threaten the US security guarantee over Gaza would be a strategic self-sabotage, potentially inviting the very aggression this umbrella is designed to deter. The Abraham Accords provide the most revealing insight into Gulf strategic calculations regarding Palestinian solidarity. Rather than representing genuine peace initiatives, the accords illustrate how Gulf states compartmentalised their Palestinian commitments within broader strategic priorities.

In the wake of an already strategically-restrained Middle East, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) remains fractured by competing strategic visions, preventing a cohesive front. Saudi Arabia and the UAE pursue divergent normalisation paths with Israel, while Qatar leverages its Hamas ties to position itself as an indispensable mediator. UAE ostensibly backs the exiled strongman and his adviser, Mohammed Dahlan, whom the Americans consider a possible contender for the Palestinian presidency. This competition for influence and favour with the US neuters collective action.

This fragmentation allows Washington to manage relationships bilaterally, exploiting divisions to avoid collective pressure. There was high level public confirmation about a Saudi-Israel rapprochement in the days leading up to the October 7, 2023, terror attack by Hamas.

The 2023 Saudi-Iran detente brokered by China further complicated the alignment, as Riyadh prioritises stabilising its security environment over challenging US policies. The GCC’s inability to form a unified response to Gaza underscores that its strategic interests are not monolithic but are filtered through national priorities.

While Gulf states have diversified partnerships with China and Russia to enhance strategic autonomy, these ties remain transactional and insufficient to replace the US security umbrella.

Riyadh’s ballistic missile cooperation with Beijing and the UAE’s foxtrot with Huawei were calibrated to extract concessions from Washington rather than sever ties. The Biden administration’s designation of the UAE as a “major defence partner” despite Abu Dhabi’s alleged negotiations with China for a base reveals the resilience of the US-Gulf partnership. Ultimately, Gulf rulers recognise that alternative partners cannot provide the same level of security assurance or technological access, forcing them to tolerate US policies that contradict their rhetorical stances.

The financial dimension of this dependency reveals equally constraining dynamics. Gulf sovereign wealth funds, while massive in aggregate value, operate within a dollar-denominated global financial architecture controlled by American institutions. The petrodollar recycling mechanism, established in the 1970s, created a symbiotic relationship in which Gulf oil revenues flowed back into US Treasury securities and American investments, generating mutual dependence that precluded genuine financial coercion. The Qatar Investment Authority’s $475 billion portfolio, the UAE’s $1.7 trillion in sovereign funds, and Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund cannot be weaponised against American policy.

Disrupting this system would jeopardise the very foundation of their modern-state projects, the ambitious Vision 2030-style diversification plans that are their ticket to long-term post-oil relevance. Furthermore, the Trump administration’s recent transactional “chip-lomacy,” by offering Riyadh and Abu Dhabi access to advanced US semiconductors in exchange for military contracts and tech investment pledges, creates new vested American interests. The choice for Gulf rulers becomes stark — jeopardise access to the critical technology underpinning their future economies for the sake of Gaza, or remain silent and reap the rewards.

Consequently, the gap between the Arab street and the ruling dispensations has widened. Yet, the regimes’ responses are meticulously calibrated to avoid crossing US red lines. Bahrain’s parliament briefly announced a cutting of economic ties only to walk it back — a telling episode that illustrates the limits of acceptable dissent.

The ultimate goal for states like Saudi Arabia is not to halt US support for Israel but to secure a grand bargain with Washington that includes a Nato-style security pact and civilian nuclear programme in exchange for normalisation, albeit now contingent on a credible pathway to Palestinian statehood. In this pursuit, Palestine is a variable to be managed, not a cause for damaging the US-Gulf strategic relationship. The Arab League founded in 1945 with 22 nation states in the Middle East as its members is a political construct that operates within the rules of the road set by the strategic imperatives of their influential member states who are diffident about leveraging their collective heft for the Palestinian cause in a cohesive and effective manner.

The structural constraints on Gulf policy autonomy, combined with American domestic politics prioritising Israeli security concerns, create decision-making environments where Palestinian interests remain subordinate to broader strategic calculations.

The Gulf states’ inaction qua Gaza is thus a calculated recognition that, in a volatile region, survival depends on pragmatic alliances, not moral stands. Gulf states made their position on Israeli strikes on Iran in June 2025 clear: “Not our war, not on our soil.” This principle seems to extend to the Gaza conflict as well — a tragedy they lament but will not risk their exaltation to halt.