Manish Tewari | Taliban Ties Beneficial, But Need Skilled Diplomacy

The visit of Taliban foreign minister Amir Khan Muttaqi to New Delhi on October 9-16 represents an interesting inflection point South Asian geopolitics. It was the first visit by a senior Taliban official to India post the Taliban’s return to power in 2021.

This diplomatic engagement was noteworthy as it occurred in the same timeframe as India’s unique alignment with China and Russia at the 7th Moscow Format Consultations opposing US President Donald Trump’s demand for access to the Bagram airbase in Afghanistan.

Mr Muttaqi’s visit upends India’s oft-repeated assertion that any substantive engagement with Taliban was contingent upon the latter committing to governing inclusively, removing harsh restrictions imposed upon women, especially girls’ education and eschewing support to terror organisations that specifically target India.

The protest by female journalists after they were excluded from Mr Muttaqi’s first press conference at the Embassy of Afghanistan is symptomatic of the wide gulf between Indian and Taliban-controlled Afghanistan’s ideas.

Hosting the Taliban chief diplomat without these preconditions being fulfilled represents a shift that seems to be actuated by a short-term view of the regional imperatives, subterfuged in the somewhat-enigmatic nom de guerre called realpolitik, rather than a long-term principled position.

The Pakistan Factor: Most significantly, the visit from Mr Muttaqi coincides with deteriorating Taliban-Pakistan relations, which have surfaced mainly over Islamabad’s demands for action against the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). A consequence of this deterioration enables India to pursue a potentially unprecedented opportunity to leverage Pakistan’s traditional monopoly in Afghan affairs and assert direct engagement with Kabul by different means.

Moreover, it is ironic that India and Pakistan post the kinetic actions of May 7-10, 2025, ended up aligning in the Moscow Format consensus. India must, however, engage with Afghanistan in a manner that effectively proscribes Pakistan’s quest for that “metaphorical strategic depth” in Afghanistan that it has been seeking from the time of the ill-considered Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.

This duality and both inherent contradiction and contradistinction in approach, illustrates an attempt by India to operationalise a hedging strategy, i.e., collaborating with adversaries on select issues while competing against them with regard to other affairs.

For Pakistan, India’s face-to-face diplomatic outreach to the Taliban is the stuff that geopolitical nightmares are made of.

Counter-Hegemonic Alignment: The Moscow joint statement and Mr Muttaqi’s visit must be understood within the broader transformation of international relations that began to take shape with the China-Russia “no limits” partnership declaration on February 4, 2022. This primary partnership sets in motion the ideological basis for systematic opposition to Western dominance and suggests that “friendship between the two states has no limits; there are no ‘forbidden’ areas of cooperation”. This proximity conversely is India’s strategic trauma.

Recent developments, including the emergence of the China-Russia-North Korea axis, with its operational military collaboration, Chinese overt military support to Pakistan during the recent standoff with India and the successful moderation of the Iran-Saudi Arabia peace agreement by China, comprise an “axis of upheaval”, which while challenging the Western primacy in numerous domains is also not really in India’s short- to long-term strategic interests.

India’s invitation to Mr Muttaqi coupled with its participation in the Moscow Format, therefore, demonstrates a willingness to engage with this counter-hegemonic bloc whenever it perceives it is in its interests to do so, even as it pursues strategic partnerships with various Western powers in the Quad and other such frameworks.

Pragmatism over Ideology: India’s assessment that the Taliban’s control of Afghanistan is a strategic reality that needs to be managed rather than ignored is reflected in its decision to host Mr Muttaqi. Surmounting legitimate human rights concerns shared by the world and even an enlightened civil society in India about the Taliban’s style of governance, India has strong practical reasons to get involved in Afghanistan since the Taliban control its borders, airspace and internal security apparatus.

Counter-terrorism collaboration has emerged as the principal catalyst of the engagement. The Taliban’s ostensible commitment to proscribe anti-India terrorist groups from operating on Afghan soil aligns with India’s security interests and, thus, opens up space for cooperation, even while the larger divergences on governance and human rights persist.

This cooperation is especially necessary in light of the number of terrorist groups operating in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region. Economic interests are another motivation for this diplomatic opening. Afghanistan’s geographical position could allow India direct access to Central Asian energy resources and markets without having to rely on the route through Pakistan, and for this, India should not only further energise the Chabahar port dynamic but also attempt to develop new pathways through Iran into Afghanistan.

Direct interaction with the de facto government of Afghanistan is also necessary to safeguard India’s significant development investments in the country, such as roads, dams, and telecommunications infrastructure.

Instead of being strong-armed into roles that revolve around US-China and greater-power competition, India is once again rediscovering the virtues of non-alignment or what certain government wonks today describe as “multi-alignment”. As in the decades from the 1950s to the 1990s it once again entails working closely with different great power states on specific issues and avoiding the totalising demands of formal alliances.

This method has both benefits and risks. The main advantage is reinvigorated strategic autonomy once again and the capability to extract concessions from a variety of partners competing for India’s allegiance.

India will be able to play off its security partnerships with Western partners against a willingness to engage with actors who oppose the United States and thus maximise its bargaining leverage in multiple relationships. The risks are serious as well.

Strategic hedging is a complex exercise that requires masterful diplomacy and can erode trust with all parties if not managed in a competent fashion. India’s decision to host Mr Muttaqi in New Delhi while opposing US positions in multilateral platforms could damage the US-India ties even further, already complicated as they are by President Trump’s repeated assertions that it was he who had prevailed upon India and Pakistan to cease fire and desist from further escalation in May 2025, the unprecedented feasting and feting of Field Marshal Asim Munir post that kinetic exchange, the imposition of unreasonable trade tariffs on India and the exorbitant fee imposed on future H1B visas.

India’s ability to manage intricate relationships between competing power blocs and accomplish its regional objectives will be severely tested in the years ahead. India faces unprecedented challenges as well as unique opportunities as a result of the world being bereft of any order. India’s diplomatic skills, military preparedness and political will to make tough decisions would become the sine qua non defining its role in global affairs.