K.C. Singh | Iran War Crisis Point: Quick Truce, Or Grave Escalation?

The assassination of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on February 28 was effectively the first shot in the ongoing US-Israeli war against Iran. No one had really expected the conflict to linger unresolved for this long.

Many elements are now becoming clearer. US vice-president J.D. Vance had a “difficult” phone conversation last week with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. He apparently conveyed America’s frustration over the conflict diverging from Israel’s expectations, as conveyed to the US. After the Iranian Supreme Leader’s assassination and the killings of top military commanders, a public uprising was expected in Tehran, causing the regime to split and collapse. Thus, “regime change” was the primary motive. Without that happening, Iran bore the massive aerial bombardment stoically. It had clearly prepared for all eventualities, having faced a similar but shorter onslaught in June 2025. It built tunnels in its vast mountain-chains to safely store its huge arsenal.

For Iran, meanwhile, mere survival, while counter-attacking, earned it an edge. The disruption of energy supplies had raised costs globally but also in the United States. This impacted the domestic approval ratings of President Donald Trump. With the US midterm elections due in November this year, Iran knew the American constraints. Dissonance between the US and Israel began to surface. While President Trump extended the bar on attacking Iranian infrastructure (such as the Strait of Hormuz) till April 6, Israel has defied it. On March 27, two Iranian steel plants were targeted, inviting immediate Iranian retaliation.

Iran had already “regionalised” the war by attacking American military bases in the Gulf Coordination Council (GCC) countries as well as the infrastructure used to target it.

Iran then blocked the transit through the Strait of Hormuz of oil and gas-carrying ships. Consequently, global oil and gas prices rose. It also impacted the global stock markets. The value of S&P 500, currently at its lowest in 232 days, dropped by $4.8 trillion. Iran indicated unwillingness to discuss a ceasefire with Jared Kushner, President Trump’s son-in-law, and Steve Witkoff, his Middle East special envoy. The reason being that Iran was attacked while talks were still on with the two American emissaries.

Egypt, Pakistan and Turkey are, meanwhile, emerging as mediators. External affairs minister S. Jaishankar dubbed Pakistan as a “dalal nation”, or mere broker. The Pakistani defence minister in turn called it the Indian minister’s “personal frustration”.

Pakistan is both earning American goodwill and trying to avoid getting drawn into a regional conflict, due to its mutual defence treaty with Saudi Arabia. However, Pakistan’s diplomatic space expanded once India was seen as abandoning its traditional neutrality, when Prime Minister Narendra Modi made his ill-timed visit to Israel. The colourful phrase “dalal”, or broker, was not used for a leader repeatedly claiming to have mediated after Operation Sindoor. When, if at all, a ceasefire is likely is not yet clear. The US has adopted a dual strategy. While it is moving US troops, including 3,000 men of the 82nd Airborne Division, to the war zone, the mediators are passing ceasefire proposals between the US and Iran. A 15-point American plan includes a 30-day ceasefire and dismantling of Iranian nuclear facilities at Natanz, Isfahan, and Fordow. It also seeks a permanent commitment to never develop nuclear weapons and the transfer of the enriched uranium stockpile to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The range and number of Iranian missiles needs limiting and the Iranian support for regional proxies ended. It also proposes the removal of all sanctions imposed on Iran.

The US supports electricity generation at Iran’s Bushehr civil nuclear plant. Most importantly, the Strait of Hormuz is required to be open to international shipping.

The Iranian ceasefire terms were spelt out by President Masoud Pezeshkian in a March 11 interview. Besides the recognition of Iran’s legitimate rights, he demanded reparations for damage by bombings. He also sought international guarantees against future aggression. The lifting of sanctions on Iran and the closure of America’s regional bases was also required. Iran also seeks control over transit via the Strait of Hormuz as well as the peaceful use of nuclear technology, minus production of nuclear weapons.

There is a noticeable gap between the two negotiating positions, both being based on maximalist agendas. However, noticeably, a “regime change” in Iran is not demanded. President Trump, earlier, wanted a say in who ran Iran. Most of the other demands are old, with some variations. However, the Strait of Hormuz’s future status has serious international ramifications. Iran wants to levy tariffs as Egypt and Panama do on maritime traffic through Suez and Panama Canals respectively. But both those canals were artificially created through their territories. Iran only controls the Strait of Hormuz’s northern coast. The southern side is Omani territory, abutting the UAE. That makes it an international passageway. If the Iranian demand is conceded, then the Houthis or other nations around the Bab el-Mandab, connecting the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea, may also impose levies. China can similarly demand control of the South China Sea or others try controlling the Malacca Strait.

Iran’s attack on Saudi Arabia’s Prince Sultan airbase on March 27-28 damaged American refuelling and reconnaissance aircraft. Meanwhile, Hezbollah is also reportedly performing beyond expectations in countering Israel’s military intrusion into southern Lebanon. The GCC, meanwhile, is split. Kuwait, Qatar and Oman favour neutrality. Qatar’s options are limited as it shares the world’s largest gas field with Iran. Kuwait, with the Shias of Iraq and Iran surrounding it, can hardly confront Iran.

Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE are debating joining any US operation on Iranian soil. The last two anyway signed the Abraham Accords with Israel. Thus, the Iran war is at an inflection point. If by April 6, Israel is not restrained and the United States does not seriously engage Iran, then the region faces a widened conflict and disruption.

Unfortunately, Iran may be less flexible due to the enhanced role of Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). Ironically, the US and Israel having assassinated Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to beget a more flexible regime, now face a more aggressive one. If Iran’s Islamic regime survives, not just Israel but Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and UAE will all require strategic recalibration. India would have to manage reduced jobs in the GCC nations, dropping annual remittances and diminishing trade. There may be regime changes, but not necessarily in Iran alone. A new regional order is inevitable after such a massive political and military disruption.

The writer is a former secretary in the external affairs ministry. He tweets at @ambkcsingh.