Abhijit Bhattacharyya | Monopoly In Skies Sets Off Flight Trauma For Indians

Each and every airline flying in India’s skies, and those who run them, on both domestic and international routes, must know that their highest priority is to ensure the safety of their passengers, and not to make money and profits for their shareholders. Therefore, both IndiGo (with a domestic market share of 63-64 per cent) and Air India (with 28 per cent), who have turned the domestic aviation sector into a duopoly market (one in which there are only two sellers), must ensure that the Flight Duty Time Limitation (FDTL) rules for pilots are treated as an article of faith. If that is not done, then just one air disaster, killing hundreds of passengers, is waiting to happen to inflict irreparable damage to their credibility, reputation and the trust of millions of Indian passengers.

The present crisis created by the management of IndiGo isn’t just extremely despicable, but the issue deserves to be dealt with strictly by the Government of India at the highest level. The crisis has overwhelmed the ministry civil aviation and the DGCA. Both have a lot to answer for, notwithstanding putting up a brave face with a belated show-cause notice to the IndiGo CEO and COO, resulting in a virtual unapologetic defence of the indefensible by the latter.

The harsh truth is that ever since India opened up civil aviation to private operators in 1991-1992, the collective end result has been deplorable and disastrous, due mainly to uncontrolled greed and conspicuous lack of intent. Let facts and figures of the previous bunch of private carriers’ deliberate mischief be recalled while dealing with the nasty reality of today’s IndiGo-stimulated civil aviation mayhem, showing utter contempt for the Government of India’s aviation regulations.

Contextually, the CEOs of both IndiGo and Air India operate the nation’s two biggest carriers with no experience of a vast domestic aviation market of a continent-size country. IndiGo boss Pieter Elbers was earlier CEO of KLM in Holland, which simply doesn’t have any domestic air traffic. And Air India’s boss Campbell Wilson was CEO of low-cost airline Scoot in Singapore, a city-state where all flights are international, operating out of Changi Airport, and no domestic traffic. Obviously, for both of them, India’s vast domestic sector would be too lucrative a prospect.

No wonder both Air India and IndiGo are more into money, cash and profits, buying new aircraft, flexing muscles and yet afflicted with frequent flight ops glitches. The current IndiGo-created crisis in Indian aviation should be an eye-opener to the Indian government. Shortly after Operation Sindoor over six months ago, when the government asked for termination of lease of Turkish Boeing-777s and rethink on using Istanbul as a hub, IndiGo’s CEO, controlling a fleet of 434 aircraft, showed unprecedented arrogance, and virtually refused. He told the media: “We will continue flying to Istanbul and also got a lease extension for Turkish Boeing-777s for six months.” One wonders why this was tolerated by the DGCA and civil aviation ministry. What gives these foreign CEOs this kind of hidden power? Will an Indian CEO of KLM or a Singapore airline dare defy the governments of those countries on operating from Amsterdam or Singapore?

While around three dozen so-called aviation operators damaged India since the 1990s, only one (the former KLM CEO) has delivered a lasting blow. Did the Dutchman come to India to oversee the demise of our civil aviation system?

Let us now examine the track record of private players in Indian skies. Air Carnival (2016-2017); Air Costa (2013-2017); Air Dravida (2004-2008); Air Mantra (2012-2013); Air Odisha (2011-2019); Air Pegasus (2007-2016); Sahara Airlines (2000-2007); Archana Airways (1991-1999); City Link Airways (1992-1993); Cosmos Airways (1994-1997); Damania Airways (1993-1997); Deccan Cargo (2009-2011); Dove Airlines (2007-2015); East-West Airlines (1992-1995); Easy Air (2015-2015); Elbee Airlines (1994-1998); Goa Way Aviation (1992-1993); Gujarat Airways (1995-2001); Go Air (2005-2021); Go First (2021-2023); Hinduja Cargo Services (1996-2000); Indus Air (2006-2007); Jagson Airlines (2005-2010); Jet Airways (1993-2019); Jet Konnect (2009-2014); Jet Lite (2007-2012); Kairali Airlines (2013-2017); Kingfisher Airlines (2003-2012); Kingfisher Red (2008-2012); MDLR Airlines (2007-2009); ModiLuft (1994-1996); NEPC Airlines (1993-1997); Paramount Airways (2005-2010); Raj Air (1993-1994); Supreme Airlines (2016-2018); TruJet (2015-2022); UP Air (1995-1998); VIF Airways (1995-1996).

Do we Indians have any idea what we have been doing in civil aviation? Do we realise how bad we are at running airlines? Is an aviation company like a shopping mall, that it can be run with a trader’s instinct. Unfortunately, civil aviation is a public transport-cum-service industry and can’t be run with the mentality of traders. It is highly capital-intensive and skilled labour-intensive, and those in charge should have the ability to withstand unexpected, unforeseen and unanticipated situations which might lead to hundreds of crores in cash outflow.

Therefore, no private operator should be permitted to start or run an air transport company just to show off his “financial wizardry, technological capability and socio-political connectivity”. It is time for the Government of India to seriously consider taking over one of the two duopoly giants because air transport, especially for a continent-like nation, is a strategic asset. A good first step has been taken with the directive to IndiGo to cut 10 per cent of its flights, but more must be done.

IndiGo CEO Pieter Elbers’ former employer KLM has a major stake held by both the French and Dutch governments. Air India CEO’s former outfit Singapore Airlines is a publicly listed company, with a majority holding by the Singapore government through investment arm Temaesk Holdings. China’s three big state-owned airline groups -- Air China, China Eastern and China Southern Airlines -- give the government wide flexibility of choice, strategy and mobility during emergency situations. Today, India’s air travellers are at the mercy of IndiGo and Air India. No private company should be allowed to take over either Air India or IndiGo.

Today Air India (and all Indians) sorely miss J.R.D. Tata and Ratan Tata, stalwarts of exemplary probity who understood high-tech aviation. Both understood the supreme importance of passenger flight safety and comfort. They ran Air India in the spirit of public service and not to fleece people. They were “uber capitalists”, while the Tata bosses of today have miles to go.

Amid today’s crisis, IndiGo should face the harshest possible punishment for its attempts to break every rule and system, like FDTL and CAR, seeking exemptions from all mandatory stipulations. The airline’s reckless route expansion, frequency, capacity with no manpower was nothing but exploitation of staff, passengers and the country. Such unbridled greed for profits can’t make the nation’s skies safe for travellers.

The writer is a life member of the Aeronautical Society of India and an alumnus of the National Defence College, New Delhi. The views expressed here are personal.