If it is Boeing I am not going

Passenger safety is supposed to be the topmost priority of modern aviation. Not so if you consider how one of the world’s great aircraft manufacturers has sent about 350 passengers hurtling to death recently. Boeing was still protective of its commercial interest in keeping the Boeing Max in the air long after it became clear that there were eerie similarities in the two crashes of the Lion Air and the Ethiopian Airlines and it would have been in the best interest of aviation safety around the world that the Max does not fly until the problems are sorted.

Behind the Boeing reluctance to accept accountability as a factor that goes far beyond the engineering is a tale of intrigue behind the scenes as a big corporate played its ties with politicians. You would expect an aviation giant like Boeing to have the power to call President Donald Trump and buy some time and keep their planes in the air. But the ploy worked only for a while as the evidence built up, particularly when eyes in the sky in the form of private tracking aviation satellites brought out the similarities of crashes caused by an internal fault in the aircraft.

As Boeing Max were made to stand in parking bays around the world, this was a crisis made solely by Boeing, whose 4,700 Max pending orders could be in jeopardy putting an unimaginable $600 billion at risk. Even so, what brought them down was the arrogance of their cocksure attitude regarding their plane, which in their eyes could not be faulted. This was an instance of shocking corporate behaviour of being blasé about putting lives at risk while they tried to salvage their prestige single-aisle workhorse aircraft of the present and the future. And then the inevitable FAA order to ground the planes came even as information started pouring out about the cause of the two crashes.

Indubitable evidence has been gathered that the automated system designed to use information from two sensors to help prevent dangerous aerodynamic stall was the cause of the two crashes, or rather the faulty sensors that sent the wrong information to the pilots about whether the plane is pointed up, down or level in relation to the direction of rushing air. It is an extraordinary instance of some kind of eerie artificial intelligence that the software on the Max can push the plane’s nose down if data from one of the sensors indicates the plane is tilted up so sharply that it could stall and fall from the sky.

In aviation parlance, the Max, with its gigantic twin engines, is a tail heavy plane. Not all pilots take off in the ideal flightpath of a smooth ascent, but sometimes the topography can also determine the degree of the climb. What does a pilot do when the software is pushing his plane’s nose down on the basis of a sensor reading even as  he is just trying to climb on taking off?  In the Lion Air crash in Indonesia the sensors malfunctioned and gave wildly conflicting information, and the plane crashed minutes after takeoff. A report also described a scary Hollywood “Airport” type of incident in which the pilots fought to control the plane as it pitched downward more than two dozen times.

The point is Boeing did not convey the full extent of what happened in the Lion Air crash, which was actually crucial information as to what pilots should do when faced with the prospect of the nose being pushed down. The world’s greatest aircraft manufacturing company did not show sufficient diligence in spreading the lessons of the Indonesian crash. This is the key to how big corporates fail because of sheer hubris.

The lesson to be learned is the big corporation does not care enough about the customer even when the very first principles of its business is threatened by incidents such as the first crash that exposed the frailties of even the most modern engineering. The planes should have been grounded while the reason for a second crash was established. But no, the corporation was too big to be halted for a small reason like 157 deaths coming on top of 187 fatalities, including the Indian commander of the Lion air flight who had no inkling of what he was up against as  he had not been made aware of the perils of software that flew the plane by wire.

The genesis of Boeing Max, which was fast-tracked when Boeing was being threatened by the rise of Airbus, is itself a dead giveaway. To get it certified quickly as earlier models, the Max was built in such a way as to get quick certification and also help limit the need for pilot training while cutting costs. The new software - “MCAS , which would automatically push the nose down - was supposed to work in the background and Boeing is said to have believed that it didn’t need to brief pilots on it,” and pilots were not required to train in simulators, according to NYT.

Remember the old jingle - If it’s not Being, I’m not going.” Well, it’s time to adapt it to the new Boeing with the line - If it’s Boeing (Max)  I’m not going.