Syria has been in the throes of civil conflict for nearly five years. In this period, a quarter of a million people have lost their lives and over four million have been rendered homeless, with several thousand of them now streaming as refugees into Europe.
Almost all the major cities have been destroyed, and historical monuments, representing the country’s rich and eclectic culture, have been systematically levelled to the ground. The Syrian conflict has severely damaged the nation’s multicultural tapestry and replaced it with bleeding fault lines that have revived ancient grievances and hardened religious and sectarian divides into uncompromising fratricidal confrontations.
The Syrian conflict is now mainly conducted by militia with different identities and loyalties, with different sponsors in the region who provide them with weaponry, training and logistical support as part of a region-wide proxy war between the Islamic giants — Saudi Arabia and Iran — centred on continuing or removing the Assad regime. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is the unaffiliated third party whose vision is to consolidate its “Caliphate” across the Levant; in the process, it attacks Shia targets across the region, confronts Sunni militia in Syria, and competes robustly with Al Qaeda for control of all jihadi groups in the region.
The entry of Russian military forces into Syria has brought a new player in this battleground. The Russians’ old Soviet-era naval base at Tartous on the Mediterranean has just been augmented by an Army and air base near Latakia, the heart of Mr Assad’s Alawi support base. This new base occupies a part of the Bassel al-Assad International Airport and has a camp to house pilots and special forces personnel. This base will be the hub of massive Russian military supplies to Syria, including air and ground attack aircraft, combat and transport helicopters and battle tanks.
The Russian entry into Syria seems to have caused consternation in the US. Most US commentators have in recent months been criticising the American role in West Asia as being directionless and marked by “confusion and indecision”, while Arab writers have almost universally described the US as an “unreliable ally” with no credibility.
Against this background, the emerging view in the US administration seems to be that the Russian role in Syria is to be welcomed since it is directed at the common enemy, the ISIS. The US and Russian defence ministers met recently, signalling a more accommodative American approach to Syria and more importantly to Russia itself after the freeze due to Ukraine. This interaction suggests that Mr Assad’s continuation as President over the short-term might be acceptable to the US.
Most observers tend to agree that Russia has real concerns relating to the proliferation of the ISIS and other jihadi groups in West Asia, fearing their influence on its own Muslim-majority in the north Caucasus region. At least 2,000 Russian-speaking jihadis are already said to be in Syria. Again, Russia is not just opposed to externally-sponsored regime change, it also believes that those wanting Mr Assad to go have no clarity about the political scenario on the day after. Russia itself is convinced that Mr Assad’s ouster will see continued civil conflict and the possible ascendancy of jihadi groups in Syria.
Some commentators have also suggested that the Russians might wish to consolidate control over the populated coastal area of Syria, with Lattakia at its centre.
The Russian military entry in Syria has implications for the strategic scenario in West Asia. It has brought Russia and Iran on the same side, both with regard to the preservation of the Assad regime, key to Iranian outreach to the Mediterranean and its links with the Hezbollah, and in the battle against the ISIS.
Again, a larger Russian military role in Syria will suit Iran, which will now be able to use its resources more effectively in Iraq. This is, of course, to the disadvantage of Saudi Arabia, which has invested heavily in regime change in Damascus, its position being further compromised by the tacit US acquiescence with the Russian gameplan. In fact, Saudi Arabia’s “Sunni front” itself is in jeopardy. Egypt has made it clear that it is opposed to regime change, wants the Syrian Army and state institutions to remain in place, and prioritises the putting together of a “regional coalition against terrorism”.
Egyptian commentators are particularly pleased by indications that Russia and Iran would support a lead role by Egypt in putting a political process in place in Syria. The Kingdom’s Gulf Cooperation Council partner, the United Arab Emirates, favours the Russian initiative to combat the ISIS over regime change in Damascus; its media has called for a “decisive battle against terrorism” which, they believe, will pave the way for a revival of the political process in Syria under Egyptian sponsorship.
Turkey too seems like an unreliable partner in the regime-change project. It is increasingly concerned about the re-emergence of the challenge to its national integrity from the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and its nexus with the Syria-based People’s Democratic Union (PYD), which has control over large tracts of Kurdish territory along the Syria-Turkey border. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s principal effort now is to obtain US support for a buffer zone in an enclave at the border that would disrupt the contiguity of the Kurdish territories in Syria and Iraq.
As of now, Saudi Arabia seems isolated, with a fresh lease of life being given to its nemesis in Damascus and its US ally once again out of tune with the Kingdom’s priorities. Its media continue to spout sectarian venom on Iran for its “coup against the Sunni role” in West Asia, and for working with Moscow (and Tel Aviv!) to divide West Asia into their own spheres of influence, so that the “Sunni human reservoir” is left floundering between the ISIS and Iran. It, however, takes comfort in the expectation that the Russian foray heralds “the birth of a new Afghanistan on Syrian soil”.
The author is a former diplomat
