At midnight of August 22-23, like the Cinderella fairy tale, Act II of the Prime Minister Narendra Modi-scripted India-Pakistan play ended by turning warming ties into fresh acrimony. Unlike a five-act play, this was a repeat of Act I, which commenced on the Prime Minister’s inauguration in May 2014 with visible bonhomie similarly altered in August a year ago, on the eve of foreign secretary-level talks over the Pakistani induction of Hurriyat into bilateral engagement, into identical bickering.
Just like in last year’s passion play, this time also the denouement was preceded by developments that undercut the promise emanating from the prime ministerial summit. Even before the Pakistani delegation returned home, controversy began on why Kashmir found no mention in the Ufa joint statement when reference to “all outstanding issues” clearly included that. At Ufa, the aim was to address the two elements that are traditional spoilers in India-Pakistan relations: the Pakistan Army and the jihadis.
Thus, the directors-general of military operations of the two armies and the heads of paramilitary forces were nominated to ensure the sanctity of the ceasefire along the Line of Control and the International Border. The national security advisers of the two nations were asked to meet in Delhi to “discuss all issues connected to terrorism”.
However, escalation of firing by the Pakistani Army was a message to their own government, as indeed India, that Ufa, with implicit de-linking of resumption of the composite dialogue from discussion of concerns on terror was unacceptable to them. Pakistan’s “Jihad Inc.” joined in with a terror attack in Gurdaspur to further undermine nascent goodwill. The arrest, in a subsequent attack in Udhampur, of Naved, a terrorist trained and inducted in Pakistan, followed by the usual denials from across the border, as in the case of 26/11, merely added to the impression that the game was slipping out of the hands of Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.
The Government of India, on the contrary, had ratcheted up the rhetoric preceding Ufa with, first Mr Modi, during an official visit to Bangladesh, in breach of normal courtesy not to embarrass the host nation, proclaiming on June 7 that Pakistan periodically disturbs India and gives “terrorism ko badhawa”, i.e., abets terror. Union minister of state for information and broadcasting Rajyavardhan Singh Rathore separately extrapolated from the Indian Army’s counter-terror operation in Myanmar to warn other neighbours of similar retribution, boldly pointing to India’s western neighbour, Pakistan. Pakistan remons-trated strongly, even passing a resolution in their National Assembly condemning India’s “hegemonic mindset”.
Mr Modi seems to have decided to re-write the terms of engagement with Pakistan to break the cycle since 2001 of talks being periodically undermined by terrorism supported and abetted from Pakistan. Firstly, this may be pragmatism laced with hyper-nationalism. In other words, he is looking at Pakistan primarily through a security perspective, which his core constituency applauds. This would be a mirror image of how the Pakistan Army looks at India.
Alternatively, Mr Modi may be trying to adopt what Henry Kissinger in his book, On China, describes as Mao Zedong’s negotiating method. Mao believed in sudden use of force, not “so much to defeat the enemy as to alter his calculation of risks”. In effect, a stronger posture’s aim is to change the psychological balance, which in this case would be to force the Pakistani Army to abandon its traditional anti-India orientation and give up its stranglehold over the civilian government’s India policy. Historically, Mao’s gambits were not always successful.
Finally, Mr Modi may actually be seeking engagement as necessary to integrate South Asia economically, but the cycle of engagement followed by derailment at the last moment is simply poor assessment of Pakistan. By the time the handlers of the Pakistan file figure out that their pre-conceived notion of the Pakistani reaction to a tough line has gone awry, it is too late for a diplomatic fix, resulting in a train wreck.
Clearly, if the strategic choice had been made by Mr Modi that two red lines were non-negotiable, i.e. no Hurriyat, as insisted since last year, to interpose between India and Pakistan, and, secondly, post Ufa, a standalone NSAs’ meeting to address only terror-related issues, then it raises the question whether the diplomatic follow-up was appropriate.
Firstly, the Ufa joint statement itself is open to diverse interpretations. If the intention was, as explained by Sushma Swaraj, minister for external affairs, on the penultimate day, to first have talks only on terror, then the paragraph after that — “they are prepared to discuss all outstanding issues” — should have begun with “To facilitate that…” before talking of agreeing “to cooperate with each other to eliminate” the menace of terror. Ms Swaraj’s clear articulation came a month too late. It also demonstrates why Mr Modi needs to take his minister with him to important summits.
Secondly, the flip-flop on Hurriyat made fractures in the Bharatiya Janata Party-Peoples’ Democratic Party alliance rise to the surface. It also, so soon after a high voter turnout in the Jammu and Kashmir election, gave unnecessary legitimacy and international attention to a group that has largely been marginalised in the political life of the Valley. The BJP red line will now be a perennial hitch in engaging Pakistan. It seems henceforth even bilateral political conduct, like cricket matches, would have to be shifted offshore.
With the United Nations General Assembly’s high-level segment commencing next month we can expect Pakistan to play the victim, take their charges of India abetting terror in Pakistan to the UN Secretary-General or even the counter-terrorism committee of the UN Security Council. Alongside, it would raise the temperature over the Kashmir issue. India will weather that, but then it needs to recalibrate its tactics to suit its Pakistan strategy rather than hurtling to Act III of what the world will see as an avoidable South Asian melodrama.
— The writer is a former secretary in the external affairs ministry. He tweets at @ambkcsingh
