Four years ago, powerful winds of change battered the autocracies of the Arab world, knocking down the rulers of Tunisia and Egypt and threatening to transform Bahrain into a constitutional monarchy. Saudi Arabia, sensing a threat, abandoned its traditional quiescent, moderate and accommodative stance in foreign affairs and shaped a robust anti-Iran approach, mobilising support on the plea that Shia aggrandisement threatened Sunnis.
Saudi demonisation of Iran went awry when the US, in late 2013, decided to actively engage with Iran on the nuclear issue, and over the next 18 months made remarkable progress in the negotiations that the P5+1 powers had with the Islamic republic. Saudi Arabia and some other GCC countries distanced themselves from the US, conveying deep dissatisfaction at this “betrayal”. The principal concern of the GCC was that the US’ engagement with Iran would go beyond nuclear matters and involve a “grand bargain” in which Iran would obtain a pre-eminent position in regional affairs. These concerns peaked with the announcement of the “framework agreement” with Iran at Lausanne, on April 2, 2015. On this day, President Obama invited the leaders of the GCC for a summit meeting in Washington and Camp David on May 14-15.
Before the Washington conclave, the divide between the GCC and the US on major regional issues was deep. The US felt the nuclear agreement with Iran would enhance regional and global security; the GCC believed it would give Iran a free hand to expand its influence at Arab expense. In Syria and Yemen, the US wanted the main assault to be on jihadi forces, while GCC priorities were regime change in Syria and the defeat of the Houthis in Yemen, even if this entailed using jihadis as allies. In Iraq, the US wants the GCC to strengthen the Haider al-Abadi government so that it can confront the Islamic State more effectively, while the principal concern of the GCC is the dilution of Iranian influence in the country.
Perhaps due to these differences, only two rulers attended the summit, the 85-year-old ruler of Kuwait, Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah and, the youngest GCC monarch, the Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani. All the other countries were represented by princes.
The joint statement that emerged from the two-day discussions has enough positives for both sides to claim success. While the Americans obtained GCC endorsement for the nuclear agreement with Iran, the GCC got the US support “to counter Iran’s destabilising activities in the region”. The US has strongly reaffirmed its commitment to the security of the GCC countries.
The GCC also obtained US affirmation that “Al Assad has lost all legitimacy and has no role in Syria’s future”. The US priorities relating to the fight against jihadis and its conviction that “there is no military solution to the region’s conflicts” find mention in the document. The two sides have also agreed to meet in a year’s time to build on their partnership.
First reactions have been enthusiastic: the GCC spokesman has asserted that the discussions “exceeded expectations”, and noted in this regard the US commitment to GCC security and its affirmation that the dialogue with Iran did not indicate a “pivot” to Tehran. GCC commentators have also celebrated the enhanced defence ties with the US, including a missile defence system.
For those in the GCC who may have wanted much more, such as an active US role in reversing Iranian influence in West Asia, there was disappointment: while Mr Obama said that Iran should play a “responsible role” in the region, he also stressed that the US would not countenance “any long-term confrontation with Iran or even (seek) to marginalise Iran”. Mr Obama, in fact, pointed out that the purpose of the US security engagement with the GCC was to enhance its confidence in interacting with Iran.
The last few months have shown that, whatever concerns GCC leaders may articulate about Iran, they are not lacking in self-confidence: in the three arenas of immediate concern to them — Iraq, Syria and Yemen — they have adopted aggressive postures, often in the teeth of US opposition. In Iraq, the GCC has taken air action against the Islamic State and have simultaneously reached out to Prime Minister al-Abadi, while expressing their deep concerns about the expanding role of the Shia militia. The GCC has also criticised the US decision to arm the Kurds directly, bypassing the Baghdad regime, seeing in this an attempt to dismember Iraq.
In Syria, the GCC had gone directly against the US by arming jihadi militia, including, it is believed, the Al Qaeda-affiliated Jabhat al-Nusra, not allowing any space for the US to consider options that include the continuation of the Assad regime. In Yemen, the Saudi-led GCC forces continue to pound Houthi positions, affirming that their priority is the destruction of Iranian influence at their border, even if it means allowing Al Qaeda to increase its territories, resources and firepower.
There is little doubt that the GCC approach to regional challenges has changed: the Gulf monarchs no longer seek the US sanction or military support to defend what they see as serious threats to their political order, whether it comes from domestic aspirations for reform or from Shia Iran. Accordingly, what they have gained from the summit is the US commitment to defend the political status quo, even as it tacitly accepts the GCC countries’ independence of action and, with its weapons and training, will ensure that they become self-reliant in pursuing their own interests. A new security era is emerging in West Asia.
The writer is a former diplomat
