Rarely have analysts applied the theory of conflict management in the 25-year long ex-ternally sponsored internal conflict in Jammu and Kashmir. This is because there is lack of clarity among strategic thinkers on how to apply such a theory to a typical situation of irregular warfare. The complete application of the theory would need a dissertation, but simply placed on the matrix of J&K’s sponsored internal conflict, we can presume that the conflict initiation stage lasted from 1989 to 1991, the conflict progression from 1992 (entry of foreign terrorists in sizeable numbers) to 2007 (actualisation of the effects of the Line of Control fence resulting in extensive control over infiltration), while the first stage of conflict stabilisation lasted from 2008 to 2010, the agitation phase being a manifestation of stabilisation. The necessity of placing the prefix “sponsored” before all mention of internal conflict is a necessity because this is not just a festering internal issue, but a carefully crafted proxy war the planning of which is entirely managed from within Pakistan; that aspect has special applicability in conflict management.
The period 2011 to 2014, marked by absence of agitation and weak attempts at resurgence of the internal conflict, can be explained as the second phase of the conflict stabilisation stage. Even though both phases witnessed sporadic acts of violence, the reducing terrorist footprint gave sufficient opening for initiatives towards transforming the sponsored internal conflict and reducing Pakistan’s capacity to calibrate even while it continues its support from across the LoC. The successful conduct of Assembly elections irrespective of political outcome, failure of Pakistan’s attempts to upset the equilibrium and the deep interest witnessed in the post flood recovery and development agenda appear to mark the beginning of the next stage — conflict resolution.
Transcending from stabilisation to the resolution stage is always fraught with danger as there are no clear “way points”; the adversary continues adopting methods to upset progress; the security forces are unsure of the concept they should follow to ensure security and eliminate residual terrorist strength; the last-mile effort in counter-militancy is always dangerous for the inevitable mistakes and the possibility of over-confidence and over kill; the political leadership in such situations flounders at the altar of uncertainty, struggling to regain political space which appears to be slipping away from the hold of ideologues; and lastly, the populace remains torn between a perceived betrayal of the cause and its need for “hygiene factors” — the everyday needs of people. (In J&K it translates into “roti, kapda, makaan”.)
That is the situation in J&K as we move towards the 15th year of the millennium and 25th year of the conflict situation — a fairly long period for any such a conflict. Application of the theory of conflict management is never done in strict calendar years and ambiguity is actually strength while formulating counter narratives. Yet, in J&K’s extremely ambiguous scenario, some definitive does help in evolving clarity towards establishing a policy for conflict resolution, a stage which may itself take a couple of years to travel through.
The last phase of conflict stabilisation needed political direction which, unfortunately, was missing and bogged in wrangles over such issues as AFSPA, the continued role of the Army in the counter-terror grid and alleged human rights violations. Political transition at the Centre did not allow sufficient time for clarity in policy. As could be expected, Pakistan made strident efforts to treat the LoC and the Jammu international border sector as symbols to remind the world of the fast fading hyphenation of India with Pakistan, post the arrival of Prime Minister Narendra Modi on the national scene.
India’s more-than-adequate military response, however, remained shrouded in its inability to generate any fresh options to send a stronger message. This is a phenomenon that will continue to affect our military responses in the coming year and beyond; the conventional military space being acutely limited. Pakistan’s last desperate act of the year, the Uri fidayeen attack, was designed to send a message of its ability to continue calibrating the conflict, in spite of an extremely reduced footprint.
In the first calendar year of the inevitably long conflict resolution stage what should be the policy and what factors will contribute to enhanced effectiveness?
The first constant that will prevail is Pakistan’s continued intent to intervene, maintain its ability to calibrate the alienation and violence and project its status as a stakeholder. Which ever political dispensation the state has, there can be no going away from a more avowed development agenda which must be the cornerstone of governance. The political dispensation will decide the degree of strength between the Central and state governments, but as the Prime Minister stated, it should be national interest which prevails.
National interest demands that there be much closer coordination between the Centre and the state on all economic issues. It additionally demands that on the security front, the Centre must have a clear vision and an unambiguous policy, including directions to the Army and full resistance to any dilution of the Army’s presence; the situation is too tenuous yet to experiment with any major changes. It, in fact, calls for greater energy in the intelligence agencies and the will to execute action against trends, which are well established. This would translate into action to curb radical trends and protect Kashmiri youth from extraneous influence while, simultaneously, zealously enabling their freedom to study and work anywhere in India.
The inherent dangers from the trends within Pakistan are likely to remain. The security establishment must understand that the nexus within Pakistan will try hard to tip the situation back to conflict through irrational acts, including fidayeen-type operations as seen at Uri. These operations had, in 1999-2002, tied down the security forces by forcing a higher level of defen-sive measures. The relevance of the Pakistan Punjab based radical groups, Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, so assiduously promoted by Pakistan as a strategic asset, is an issue which will remain in contention through 2015.
Pakistan’s announced intent of not differentiating between good and bad terrorists is unlikely to translate into effect. Carefully nurtured negatives to provide a strategic advantage do not get diluted by single acts of horror such as the Peshawar massacre; it will take much more for Pakistan to change any of its policies towards India, particularly its involvement in J&K. Lastly, there can be no better symbol to force the hyphenation of Pakistan with India than the LoC and the Jammu international border. We have not seen the last of acts of violence and irrationality on the part of Pakistan; if anything, more of these are likely as Pakistan struggles on in a state of uncertainty.
The writer is a former General Officer Commanding of the Srinagar based 15 Corps and is a fellow with both Vivekanand International Foundation and
Delhi Policy Group
