The ‘IS’ factor

There has been a great deal of agitation in the latter half of 2014 over a succession of developments with regard to the threat of Islamist terrorism in India.

These, most prominently, include the expanding shadow of the Islamic State (IS; formerly the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham, ISIS), its disturbing declaration of a new Caliphate, its publication of a map of projected Islamic “dominance,” including a Khorasan region enveloping India, and reports of a trickle of Indian recruits travelling, or attempting to travel, to Iraq and Syria to join this virulent terrorist formation.

Further, Ayman al-Zawahiri, amir of Al Qaeda, announced the creation of Al Qaeda in the Indian subcontinent (AQIS) in September, with the identification of Assam, Jammu and Kashmir and Gujarat as intended targets of immediate mobilisation.

Abruptly, with the suicide bombing on November 2, on the Pakistan side of the Wagah border, which killed 62, there was a sense of approaching siege, the growing fear that “global Islamist terrorism” is now massing at India’s gates.

For nearly 25 years, all Islamist terrorist formations operating on Indian soil were proxies of, or graduated to terrorism with the support of, the Pakistani state.

These groups served the nationalist strategic calculus of Pakistani state agencies, and received aid and prominence in proportion to the loyalty and obedience they demonstrated.

Pakistan’s calculus was relatively predictable, limited, and susceptible to strategic counter-measures. The threat of Pakistan-backed groups has diminished substantially since 2001, even as Indian networks of support and subversion have been degraded after 2008.

Of course, Pakistan-backed groups retain residual capacities sufficient to mount multiple soft target attacks as well as 26/11-type catastrophic attacks, backed by Pakistani state agencies.

Al Qaeda first altered the strategic calculus of terrorism in the region, replacing Pakistan’s opportunistic harnessing of Islamism for the pursuit of limited state objectives, with a millenarian religious ideology of jihad that sought global domination, offered rewards in the afterlife and found its justification in a puritan religious ideology.

Al Qaeda has pursued a strategy of catastrophic terrorist acts to propagate its ideology, unleashing a new scale of terrorism on the world, and accepting no limits to its violence, even as it sought nuclear and chemical weapon capabilities.

The IS, itself a breakaway faction of Al Qaeda in Iraq, has brought new levels of virulence and barbarity to terrorism, and projected these across the world through the extraordinary exploitation of the Internet and other media.

These are grave risks, but there are mitigating circumstances. Al Qaeda, for instance, has been consistently unsuccessful in securing a base in India, despite efforts that date back at least to 1996, when Osama bin Laden referred to the country as one of the regions in which Muslims were “oppressed,” and that it was a legitimate target of jihad.

A June 2014 Al Qaeda document and video, “Why is there no Storm in your Ocean?”, concedes this failure. The creation of AQIS is unlikely to result in any disproportionate escalation in the foreseeable future.

The IS, of course, with its military successes, demonstrative brutality and sophisticated exploitation of the media, has appealed to many across the world, and fighters from 82 countries have joined it in the Iraq-Syria theatre.

The response in India has, however, been lukewarm, with tiny numbers just seven confirmed cases, and possibly up to 20 having gone and joined the IS.

Significantly, one of these “volunteers” has already returned, presumably disillusioned, to India, while some others are believed to be eager to return as well.

The IS is also reaching the limits of its military expansion in Iraq-Syria, and the success and survival of the group over an extended period of time is unlikely, as it engages increasingly in conventional warfare and is confronted by an growing global force.

There is, however, little scope for complacency. Existing capacities of Islamist extremist groups are sufficient to engage in catastrophic strikes against India, and these may expand.

There is also the possibility of the transmutation of these threats into new forms and organisations, particularly under the influence of global developments, prominently including the further destabilisation of Afghanistan and West Asia. “Black swan” phenomena have repeatedly caught security agencies across the world by surprise.

Crucially, India’s internal security capabilities are severely limited, little better today than they at the time of the devastating 26/11 attacks in Mumbai.

If a generational shift in terrorism occurs say, with the acquisition of WMD capabilities by some terrorist group, an unprecedented tactical innovation, or mass mobilisation consequent upon some accident of history India, on its current profile, would be utterly exposed and helpless.

If this is to change, it will require a massive upgradation of domestic and external intelligence capabilities, as well as general policing capabilities across the country, and not just in a handful of high-profile potential target cities.

Dr Ajai Sahni is executive director, Institute for Conflict Management & South Asia Terrorism Portal