Karachi: Do militants possess a vision or do they act as mere proxies available to anyone who wants to hire them? Why does the common man find it difficult to accept them as sovereign actors? The perception that terrorists are mere proxies is prevalent even among official circles.
It is somehow understandable when ordinary folks see militants as internal or external proxies. Due to their trust in the state and its security apparatus, they are not willing to believe that non-state actors are strong enough to challenge the state. But when Maulana Fazlur Rehman says that US forces are behind the assassination attempts made on him, one cannot term his statement political rhetoric — because it also reflects his view that the militants are merely stooges.
When India and Afghanistan see Pakistan behind every militant group they certainly deny that non-state actors can have independent objectives. Similarly, when Pakistan sees an Indian or some other foreign hand behind anti-Pakistan militant groups, it indicates that the security institutions are not ready to expand their threat perception to a point where it would require treating the militants as independent entities.
When militants are perceived as proxies, it becomes difficult to treat them as rational actors, which they are. Apparently, the security apparatus may not project this, but in complicated terrorist attacks, they mostly take a simplistic view of the militants — as happened in the case of the tragic incident at Wagah in Lahore, where the police, the religious and political leadership and the media were largely of the view that India was behind the attack.
No doubt, states nurture or support militant movements as their strategic assets. The most recent example is of Syria, where the US, Western powers and the Arab states tried to topple the Bashar al-Assad regime. Though their actions proved counterproductive as they did in Libya, some of Syria’s neighbours believe that the militants will topple the government.
At a certain point, their dependence on militants increases to such an extent that even when the latter are no more willing to serve as proxies, the former continue to treat them as if they are. The common phrase of “good vs bad militants” or “the moderate/secular vs hardline extremist” is also derived from such perceptions. States might share some strategic interests with non-state actors but can these be an alternative to interstate relations where the states have multiple diplomatic and political options to overcome their differences and manage crises?
It surprised many when the Afghan Taliban tried to initiate their own separate talk channels with the US. It is not only the Afghan Taliban, but also the Haqqani Network that is depicted as a strategic asset of Pakistan; both have also remained reluctant to use their influence over Pakistani militants to stop terrorist attacks inside Pakistan. Now the worst-case scenario worries many experts. If the Afghan Taliban capture Kabul, it would be a nightmare for Islamabad.
Perceptions do not fade easily. Though Pakistan’s achievements in military operations in its tribal areas are quite significant, it has not received the recognition it deserves. One of the main reasons could be that it does not have a significant impact on the security situation in Afghanistan. Even inside Pakistan, terrorist attacks are gaining momentum. Many people were of the view that the military operation would resolve all security issues. The government was quite enthusiastic when it had announced an ambitious internal security policy, but nothing concrete has been achieved thus far. It suggests that the problem is far more complex.
Three counter-terrorism theorists — Assaf Moghadam, Ronit Berger and Polina Beliakova — have discussed this dilemma in their recent joint research paper. They argue that looking at them as “insurgent groups” can shift the analytical focus away from an enemy-centric to a condition-centric approach. This has happened in the case of the fight against militants in Pakistan’s tribal areas, where the state remained confused over the exact status of the enemy and where it has tried to pursue the “talks and fight” approach, which did not prove effective.
Such approaches have an impact on policymakers’ assessments. However, militants’ strategies continue to evolve, and their overall strategy combines both violent and political means. To remove ambiguities from the countering frameworks, the authors recommend that governments avoid the labelling of militant groups. Only by removing false perceptions regarding terrorists can we see them as independent actors. They keep changing, adjusting their strategies and tactics according to their need, even when some of their interests converge with those of the state.
Will this change in viewing the militants as rational actors have an impact on counter-terrorism frameworks? At least it can help understand the nature of proxies.
By arrangement with Dawn
