We are facing an undeclared situation of war on our border with Pakistan. The situation has escalated in the last three months from the occasional but serious ceasefire violations by Pakistan, to more intensified and widespread violations, to a daily shelling from across the border, not only in the cover of the night but in broad daylight and on civilian populations, with heavy casualties.How have relations that began with such bonhomie in the invitation extended to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to attend the swearing-in ceremony of our Prime Minister, reached such a pass in such a short period of time?
To a great extent the answer to this question lies in internal developments in both countries. In India, there has been a visible policy flip-flop that has emboldened the hard line elements in Pakistan. First, we invited Mr Sharif without adequate preparations on the strategic brief that would follow such an initiative; then we alienated Mr Sharif while he was on our soil by attacking him and his policy on Kashmir even when he did not raise these issues keeping in mind the nature of the occasion which was the inauguration of a new government; this act, prompted almost every spectrum of opinion in Pakistan to attack
Mr Sharif for his “capitulation to India”, and strengthened the hardliners.
Subsequently, when in spite of the “bonhomie” shown by our government, ceasefire violations by Pakistan not only continued but intensified, we did not react firmly enough. We issued a statement on June 13 that peace on the border is a necessary precondition for normalisation of relations, but, inexplicably, even when Pakistan took no note of this warning, we announced the resumption of foreign secretary level talks, though these had been suspended in 2013 precisely because of such ceasefire violations. Emboldened by such an unexpected conciliatory move at the wrong time and without due application of mind, the High Commissioner of Pakistan in Delhi invited the Hurriyat leaders for consultations. We had, I think inappropriately, allowed for such interactions to take place in the past, but even then they took place only when talks were at the level of foreign ministers, or prior to summit meetings. Our intervention to disallow such a meeting this time came too late, but at least it succeeded in cancelling the ill-timed and unwise decision to hold these talks at this juncture.
What was the net result of this flip-flop policy? Narendra Modi’s vituperative attacks during the election campaign on the “soft” policy of the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government towards Pakistan, and his threat that should he come to power he would teach such enemies a lesson, had already strengthened the hand of the hardline elements in Pakistan. Following his electoral victory, his inexplicable turnaround, and hand of friendship towards Mr Sharif, for lack of strategic planning and proper follow-up, strengthened such hardliners further.
Internal developments in Pakistan have also played a role. The position of Mr Sharif in the power hierarchy of Pakistan, while already weak, had weakened further due to the rallies besieging Islamabad led by Imran Khan and Tahir-ul-Qadri. This was no secret, and should have been factored in by our government. In corresponding measure, that of the Army and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) had strengthened. Was our eye on the ball in terms of strategically assessing what was going on in Pakistan internally? What was the purpose served by the opening to Mr Sharif at a time when his writ counted for very little?
Did we rigorously analyse why ceasefire violations were increasing in spite of our initial hand of friendship? If so, why did we not take a more resolute stand in giving a firmer military response that could act as a deterrent? Did we give too long a rope to Pakistan to desist from its aggressive attacks? Were our warnings sporadic, weak, and only reactive? Was our offer to resume official level talks misread by Pakistan as weakness in spite of the blatant provocation on its part?
There is another dimension to the current crisis. The epicentre of this dimension lies in Afghanistan where the political situation is in complete flux following the uneasy results of the presidential elections, and the looming reality of the imminent withdrawal of US and Nato troops. In the ensuing politico-military void, Pakistan is hoping to mobilise the Taliban faction led by Mullah Omar, and other terrorist-fundamentalist factions, to expand its area of political influence in the region. With this aim, it cannot be seen to be “soft” on its eastern front with India, since the status of Kashmir and Pakistan’s role in its “liberation” is an article of faith, for Islamic fundamentalists of all hues, including the Taliban, and the fanatical jihadis nurtured by the ISI in the terrorist training camps. These jihadis, now also motivated by a resurgent Talibani faction that has the backing of Pakistan, are seeking to infiltrate the Kashmir Valley under the cover of the unprovoked firing from across our borders.
It goes without saying that when the nation’s security is concerned the entire country must unite and provide the fullest support to our brave armed forces. But, this being said, Mr Modi must ponder over some issues. Was he not the first to aggressively politicise foreign policy even as Pakistan was beheading our soldiers?
If he could criticise then, why should he have immunity from criticism now? Secondly, while keeping our political differences in abeyance if circumstances so require, should politically motivated calls to patriotism, such as the ones he is now making in his election speeches in Maharashtra, be used to deflect constructive criticism on the handling of foreign policy? Perhaps, he should read Atal Behari Vajpayee’s brilliant speech in Parliament criticising Nehru’s handling of the 1962 Chinese war if he has any doubts in this matter. He may be even more surprised that Nehru took the criticism constructively.
Author-diplomat Pavan K. Varma has been recently elected to the Rajya Sabha
