The Modi government’s decision to call off the foreign secretary-level talks have contributed to widespread speculation about its motives, generated the usual number of conspiracy theories and has led segments of India’s intelligentsia to widely condemn this decision. Some have suggested a covert BJP plan to scuttle Article 370 after winning a majority in Kashmir, others have attributed it to the pique of Mr Modi’s hawkish advisers, a handful have argued that it was related to the recent ceasefire violations along the LoC and a few have argued that his regime lacks the necessary diplomatic finesse. Lost in this cacophony is a simple, parsimonious and plausible explanation for the government’s decision to cancel the talks.
The reason, of course, was Pakistani high commissioner Abdul Basit’s decision to invite some Kashmiri separatists to meet with him prior to the talks despite an explicit injunction from the ministry of external affairs to refrain from doing so. But the government had reasons for calling off the talks.
At the outset, it may well be asked what exactly the much-vaunted “composite dialogue” had accomplished after three years of meetings. Based on what is available in the public domain, it had produced a road map for the eventual resolution of the Kashmir dispute. General Pervez Musharraf had ostensibly granted his imprimatur to this plan. However, no one in authority in either India or Pakistan can attest that the central features of this document were actually acceptable to the corps commanders in the Pakistan Army. In the absence thereof was this scheme really a politically viable document? Against this backdrop and the overwhelming circumstantial evidence of the ISI’s complicity in the terrorist attacks on Mumbai in 2008, it was virtually the definition of insanity to continue the dialogue with Pakistan. Nevertheless, the previous regime, convinced of its ability to arrive at a rapprochement with Pakistan, had persisted in that endeavour.
The Modi regime has now ended this Kabuki-like enterprise. Neither the Zardari regime nor the present one of Nawaz Sharif has taken a single concrete step to demonstrate willingness to reduce tensions with India. Even the much-promised “most favoured status”, which in the eyes of some would be the first step towards the putative trade-driven panacea to Indo-Pakistani discord, failed to materialise. Some people in both countries believe in the inherent value of these meetings. Ostensibly these talks were worthwhile as they provided a vital channel of communication. Yet this argument has little merit.
Apart from the obvious disutility of these talks in the absence of concrete results there was yet another reason to terminate them. Even if they were held, can any commentator reasonably assume that they would have miraculously moved the agenda forward to address any outstanding issue? Mr Sharif’s regime, thanks to ineptitude and the cravenness of both Imran Khan and Tahir-ul-Qadri, is now tottering.
Under the present circumstances, even if Pakistan’s interlocutors were to make any commitments could any government in India deem these to be binding? Worse still, were India to make suitable concessions at these discussions in the hope of obtaining appropriate reciprocity, would it still be bound by its commitments?
Given Mr Modi’s personal background, his closeness to the RSS and the political leanings of his national security advisor, it is easy to conjure up an image of his regime as one committed to hostility towards Pakistan. However, those who are prone to fashioning such a portrait need to explain their gushing enthusiasm when Mr Modi had invited Mr Sharif along with the other heads of state of the Saarc nations at the time of his inauguration as PM. Are they now going to argue that they were misled by his initial gesture and seeming bonhomie? There are, obviously, compelling reasons for pursuing a dialogue with Pakistan. However, such an interchange needs to take into account the conditions in the country. A willful obliviousness toward a range of forces that could render the discussions all but meaningless would amount to mistaking Kabuki for diplomacy.
The writer is a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia and the director of the Center on American and Global Security at Indiana University, Bloomington
