With his invitation to the heads of state of the SAARC countries, Prime Minister-designate Narendra Modi has taken the first, symbolic step in the foreign policy arena.
This is obviously a thoughtful and appropriate gesture. The significance of this move notwithstanding it still remains to be seen if he chooses to follow up on this initial sign with further actions. There are at least five areas where he may wish to devote some of his energies. Neglecting them could have significant consequences for his ambitious domestic agenda.
What might these be? At the outset, he needs to formulate a viable policy towards Pakistan that goes beyond holding interminable discussions. Despite the presence of a legitimately elected civilian government in Islamabad he and his advisers are no doubt cognisant that the military still wields disproportionate power in the country. Accordingly, when attempting to forge any agreement with his counterpart, Nawaz Sharif, he would be wise to ascertain how the security establishment views attempts at fashioning an accord. One useful place to start might be to pick up discussions on a settlement of the Siachen Glacier dispute. However, the matter is fraught but subject to divisibility unlike the central Kashmir question.
In discussions with Pakistan,
Mr Modi may also segue into the future of Afghanistan. Pakistani interlocutors have virtually made it a fetish to argue that they find India’s involvement in Afghanistan to be inimical to their interests. The veracity of their claims aside Mr Modi could deftly make some suitably reassuring statements about India’s willingness to discuss and address any legitimate concerns that Pakistan might have about the latter’s involvement in the country. That said, he should also make clear to his Afghan counterparts that he is not about to grant Pakistan a unit veto on what India needs to do to guarantee its own concerns in the country.
He would also be wise to start a conversation with Mahinda Rajapakse in Sri Lanka. Fears of driving the country into the hands of China appeared to inhibit the previous regime from adopting a more forthright position on the plight of Sri Lanka’s beleaguered Tamil citizenry. Mostly pressures from Tamil Nadu nudged the government in New Delhi to pay heed to the situation of Sri Lanka’s Tamils. Unfortunately, matters have not improved significantly for them and are arguably, getting worse. Quite apart from pleasing the mercurial Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu, Mr Modi should adopt a forthright position on the matter for other compelling reasons. If India is to emerge as a regional leader and aspires to play a wider role in global politics it cannot, despite Mr Modi’s own uncertain record from Gujarat, shy away from raising the issue of the flagrant maltreatment of ethnic minorities in the region.
Another critical set of regional foreign policy issues involves India’s ties with Bangladesh. A number of issues, ranging from illegal immigration to the sharing of river waters remains on the agenda. The pursuit of better relations with Dhaka, of course, passes through Kolkata. Unless Mr Modi is prepared to carefully consult and work with Mamata Banerjee. The previous government had engaged in the most perfunctory discussions with her and inevitably had come to grief when trying to reach an agreement on water sharing with Bangladesh. There is little reason to believe that her stance on the issue has changed within the last year or so.
Relations with India’s smaller neighbours alone are not the only foreign policy matters that Mr Modi will confront. On the campaign trail he had addressed the China’s increasingly aggressive behaviour along the disputed Himalayan border. Obviously, Beijing is waiting and watching to see if he is capable and willing to match actions with his tough rhetoric. The UPA regime while slowly building up India’s military capabilities had sought to avoid picking any quarrels with the northern behemoth. Mr Modi may well choose to follow the same path.
However, he may wish to expedite India’s defence modernisation and also convey to Beijing that endless palaver on the border question is not on his agenda. Such a posture may actually force China to concentrate on finding a resolution to the trying border dispute.
Finally, while he may have little desire to grasp this particular nettle, it is in the country’s interest to move forward with the US-India strategic partnership. The substantial trade and investment relationship, the growing possibilities (and desirability) of military to military cooperation, weapon sales and coordination on multilateral issues necessitate a robust relationship with the US. He may, quite understandably, harbour some resentment of the denial of his visa in 2005. However, even prior to his assumption of high office the US had made suitable overtures toward him. In the aftermath of his election he has received a formal invitation from US President Barack Obama to visit the United States. Under the circumstances he should set aside his personal pique and focus on what is demonstrably in India’s national interest.
These five concerns do not exhaust a demanding foreign policy agenda. However, they do constitute a useful starting point as his government takes on the reins of authority in New Delhi.
The writer holds the Rabindranath Tagore Chair in Indian Cultures and
Civilisations at Indiana University, Bloomington
