The antics of Gujarat 2007 are adorning India 2014. If you care for some entertainment via FM radio, you know telephone calls are being made by “development” to “Indians”, announcing its plan to arrive in the country after 10 years, now that Narendra Modi’s win is inevitable.
Sobbing corruption, meanwhile, is getting ready to pack its bags and leave. Through cunning strategy, eloquent design and rigorous implementation, Mr Modi has over the years, leading to the climax of 2014, created an allure around the Gujarat model (managing a shift in focus from 2002 to development), bashed UPA openly for its inability to make India like Gujarat, and come to occupy hearts of many “disappointed” people by promising them the world. He has also been consistently widening his appeal — from corporates to the impatient young generation, and the middle class.
Interestingly, Mr Modi’s campaigns aren’t just about flaunting achievements and promising develop-ment. There’s an attempt to affect our subconscious with other sentiments, and seek consensus. Mr Modi romanticises development as a virtue belonging to patriots. He is presented as a true Indian, ready to respond to the call of his motherland. The promise of development is not enough, anybody can make it. So a twinkle is added to that claim, that “Bharat jitega” only with Mr Modi at the helm of affairs — note Mr Modi’s impassioned chime “Main desh nahi jhukne doonga”. Towards this end, we are urged to pledge to vote for Mr Modi and, therefore, India’s victory. This reminds one of cries of “Jitega Gujarat” in 2007, where Mr Modi’s win was touted as Gujarat’s win.
Hindutva may appear subdued in these campaigns, but it occupies an insidious place. When Mr Modi calls Rahul Gandhi shehzada, he not only alludes to the dynastic politics of the Congress, he deliberately creates comparisons between the UPA and the Mughal reign. The Congress is targeted as a Muslim appeaser, while emphasising that India is being controlled by outsiders the way Delhi Sultanate was under the Mughals. Even if Mr Modi is not espousing Hindutva directly yet, his core team players are giving open calls for protecting Jat, i.e. Hindu izzat, by taking badla for Muzaffarnagar, or exhorting Hindu areas in Bhavnagar to evict Muslims from their localities.
Such clever packaging of development, economic nationalism and Hindutva together around Mr Modi interconnects their respective values. The end implication then — development = patriotism = Hindutva = Modi — can be termed “Moditva”. Moditva also defines the opposition sharply: “You are unpatriotic if you criticise Modi’s development… if you choose Muslim Congress… if you oppose Modi.”
This ploy was first used during Gujarat elections 2007, when Mr Modi was not in a position to place all his bets on Hindutva — five years had passed since 2002, communal passions had cooled down, and the RSS was miffed with him for snubbing its members. Mr Modi generated approval for his government through overlap of the rhetoric of development and Hindutva with Gujarati asmita. Riots had lost immediate relevance, but Mr Modi knew Gujaratis were extremely polarised after 2002.
So he spoke for Gujarat’s development while goading people to approve killing of terrorists like Sohrabbudin during campaigning. He made both issues of Gujarati asmita, linked them to his own image, and conveyed — “Gujarat is Modi, Modi is Gujarat.” He also unleashed a new prop — Modi masks. Wearing masks lets wearers assume different identity. And people were only too happy to be a Modi — as if they would come to possess “his qualities”. Mr Modi was everywhere. Today, the masks are on again, with college students of Delhi University wearing his stoic expression in classrooms.
The success of Moditva in Gujarat has to be also attributed to the state’s socio-economic and political history. Gujarat, which can be explained through Atul Kohli’s idea of the “capitalist cohesive state”, has always been in alliance with the capitalists to enhance the state’s economic status.
The loss of Bombay to Maharashtra during bifurcation of Bombay state in 1960 materialised into unanimous support of Gujaratis for state-directed industrialisation. By 1970s, economic nationalism also found legitimacy amongst newly turned entrepreneurs from lower Kshatriya castes and artisan classes. 1980s Gujarat saw arrival of Hindutva forces that coalesced brahmins, banias and patidars into “Savarna: bloc against Congress’ electoral tactic of redistribution of their economic and political clout amongst disadvantaged Khastriya-Harijan-Adivasi-Muslim. Hindutva became a prominent theme for consensus-building amongst the upper caste Hindus and, surprisingly, dalits and adivasis, who were promised membership into Hindu fold.
Today, Mr Modi utilises both rhetorics — economic nationalism and Hindutva (together, inter-changeably and separately) in pursuing development in Gujarat. Importantly, emphasis on growth also benefits Hindutva.
This heady mix is on display in “Vibrant Gujarat” where Mr Modi strengthens Gujarat’s coalition with corporates. Tourism is promoted through exhibition of Hindu heritage.
Mr Modi has depoliticised Gujaratis from questioning both capitalism and Hindutva in the name of development. Mr Modi’s supporters in Gujarat see his development model to be apolitical and are always up in arms against his critics. Development projects like Samaras — a village assimilation scheme — require people to choose between political freedom or prosperity, with financial assistance offered to those villages that debunk elections in favour of unanimously panchayats. Social cohesion between Hindu castes who would otherwise seek reserved posts, also gets encouraged.
The omnipresence of Mr Modi that he has crafted for himself in 2014 is being criticised for making BJP subservient to an individual. Amidst commentaries that this does not speak well for the health of India’s democracy, memories of “Indira is India, India is Indira” during 1971 elections come knocking. Indira proclaimed in Newsweek then, “There are no issues, I am the issue.” Mr Modi, too, has pushed his candidature in the prevailing leadership vacuum. On both occasions, supporters justified authoritarian leadership as the only recourse.
Today, the neo-middle class seem unruffled by “Hindutvaisation” of society as long as economic gains are in sight. Increased consumption, resulting from prosperity, is also making it more god-fearing, as is the anxiety to hold tight to roots in global societies. Hinduism is different from Hindutva. However, growing religiosity in Hindus gives Hindutva forces opportunity to seep into state structures, dilute boundaries between religion and state in public imagination, and persuade people to identify as Hindu.
Discontent with UPA, escalating in the presence of the exaggerated track-record of Gujarat, renewed emphasis on “Hindu” identity, and awe for determined leadership are legitimising Mr Modi’s nexus with corporates and Hindutva beyond Gujarat today.
If the humiliating defeat of Indira Gandhi in 1977 is any indication, the present note of urgency that legitimises such leadership may not last.
However, till how long people wish to, not just endorse Mr Modi, but also “be a Modi” will depend on how well Mr Modi keeps evolving his Moditva.
The writer is an assistant professor in Motilal Nehru College (Evening), University of Delhi
