The missed handshake

For centuries, India’s defence policy was managed exclusively by her rulers and Indians were nowhere in the loop. There was no tradition of strategic thinking in our country. For a year-and-a-half after Independence we had British army chiefs, first General Lockhart and then General Bucher. The Navy and the Air Force had British service chiefs for much longer. Lord Mountbatten was the head of state.

The first priority for these top military officers was to serve British national interests. There were not more than one per cent Indian officers in the Army and hardly any in the Navy and the Air Force who had risen above the rank of major or equivalent. The first Indian to be promoted major general was Brig. Cariappa on August 15, 1947. Our political leader-ship of that time failed to take full cognisance of developments on our bor-ders. The popular slogan during Partition was “Hanske lia Pakistan, Larke lenge Hindustan”. The origin and history of Pakistan has been of relentless hostility towards India. The ISI frequently unleashes terrorist attacks against India.

Pakistanis have misread history. They fancy themselves to be the descendants of Central Asian conquerors who repeatedly defeated Indian forces during invasions of India in the medieval period. They have a notion that they have inherited their martial superiority. Pakistan’s foreign policy has always been India-centric. It joined the Western bloc and obtains modern military hardware from the US for use against India.

The US’ generous aid and military weapons to promote jihadi terrorism in Afghanistan was intended for use against the Soviet Union. The Taliban were organised for operations in Afghanistan. The US aid for operations against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan has been largely utilised to promote terrorism against India. The US also turned a Nelson’s eye to Pakistan becoming a nuclear weapons power for the sole purpose of using or threat-ening to use nuclear wea-pons against India.

After the 1971 war, Pakistan realised that it was in no position to defeat India in conventional war-fare. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who had threatened a thousand-year war with India, and his chosen Army Chief, Zia-ul-Haq, chose a new strategy for Pakistan against India. This was to develop a very close relationship with China, an all-weather friendship said to be “higher than the mountains and deeper than the oceans”, to neutralise India. This conformed to Chanakya’s Mandala theory of befriending the enemy’s enemy. Even the US during Henry Kissinger’s secret mission to Beijing adopted this policy to neutralise the Soviet threat. It is a pity that India totally neglected to adopt this policy.

I recall that at the time of Independence we had no strategy of our own to counter Pakistan. Our thinking was based on trying to defend our territory when Pakistan invaded. Napoleon had said that a war cannot be won only by defence, it has to be won by offensive action. Our military thinking in 1947 was based on what happened to the British at the beginning of the Second World War. They traded space for time till sufficient military strength was built up with US aid and a decisive victory won at El Alamein in North Africa. We thought of withdrawing to prepared positions on the Beas river before launching a counter-offensive.

In 1947, I was a junior major on the operations staff of a Command Headquarters with British superiors that was responsible for military operations in both Kashmir and Punjab. I had a hand in preparing our first plans for the defence of Punjab. I recall that I had advocated that in accordance with Napoleon’s dictum our plan should be based on offensive action into Pakistan. Also, as per Chanakya’s Mandala theory, we should force a two-front war on Pakistan. Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan was alive, staying at Jalalabad.

The Durand Line forced by the British was unacceptable to Pashtuns. We should have developed a close relationship with the Pashtuns and supported their claim on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. At the same time our offensive, as per Napoleonic doctrine, should have been directed towards Sukkur, about 60 miles across the desert. Sukkur bridge was a bottleneck for both rail and road communication between Punjab and Sindh. There was also an ongoing Jiyo Sindh movement in Sindh wanting to break away from Punjab. Its loss would have made Pakistan a land-locked country. My seniors had a big laugh, saying that I must learn to command companies and battalions before thinking of commanding armies and planning national strategy.

In 1975, when I was Chief of Military Intelligence, on an official visit to Kabul the then Afghan Army Chief, jokingly told me that India and Afghanistan should have collaborated in 1971 and their two armies could have shaken hands across the Indus. Narasimha Rao initiated the Look East policy which was further developed by Atal Behari Vajpayee, and Manmohan Singh has been reaching out to Korea and Japan to deter Chinese military adventurism and break its string of pearls strategy. Lately the United Progressive Alliance government deserves credit for a Look West (Middle East) policy.

However, we must help in training of Afghan military personnel as also providing military hardware to the Afghanistan National Army, including funds to purchase war equipment from other countries like Russia. A consensus should be built on preventing another Taliban takeover of Kabul. A friendly secular government in Kabul is in India’s interest.As regards military preparedness, we should not lose our edge in military strength for conventional war with Pakistan and also maintain a credible multi-pronged nuclear deterrent. India must strive for peace with Pakistan from a position of strength, not weakness. Despite our giving Pakistan Most Favoured Nation, status, Islamabad has found one reason or another not to do so. Reciprocity must be the basis for Indo-Pak relations.

The writer, a retired lieutenant-general, was Vice-Chief of Army Staff and has served as governor of Assam and Jammu and Kashmir