Given the hyperbole surrounding the jealously guarded Henderson Brooks Report (HBR), its disclosure, far from being a “grand denouement”, has turned out to be somewhat anti-climactic. The main reason is that over the past half-century we have come to recognise the weaknesses of our archaic national security edifice, and cognitively realised that the roots of the 1962 Himalayan military debacle lay in our deeply flawed political system. Symptomatic of India’s post-Independence fantasy-world was Nehru’s rebuke to Army Chief General K.M. Cariappa: “It is not the business of the C-in-C to tell the Prime Minister who is going to attack us where. In fact, the Chinese will defend our Eastern frontier. You mind only Kashmir and Pakistan.”
Complex cartographic nuances of the Sino-Indian border and the ineptness of India’s political and military leadership in 1962, brought out by HBR, will provide material for endless academic discussion and analysis. However, there are other lessons to be learnt from this episode, especially since not much seems to have changed in the half-century that has elapsed.
For example, an April 2013 issue of the Economist identified three impediments which, according to the magazine, had thwarted “India’s ambition of becoming a 21st century power”. These were: the absence of a strategic culture, the distrust between a civilian ministry of defence (MoD) and the armed forces, and a dysfunctional defence procurement system. This shrewd observation by a foreign journal is close to the mark and all three factors deserve attention.
While “strategic culture” may be a vast and arcane subject, the manifestations of its absence are as pedantic as they are damaging. For example, nothing illustrates the complete indifference of India’s political establishment towards crucial national security issues better than its failure to appoint a new Naval chief for over a month — clearly an egregious dereliction of responsibility!
Another significant pointer is the politician’s profound disinterest in, and ignorance about defence, security and strategic affairs, as well as the military ethos. The latter has led to the emergence of a thorny and, often, mutually suspicious relationship with the senior military leadership. This uncomfortable politico-military equation has been exploited by certain agencies to plant suspicion — through a pliant media — about the loyalty of India’s armed forces, their pristine apolitical record notwithstanding.
While distrust between civilians in the MoD and uniformed personnel is not unique to India, what makes this phenomenon distinctive is the reality that a fully cognisant political establishment has allowed it to persist for six decades.
The resistance of the Indian Administrative Service to national security reforms, for fear of losing their influence and authority, is well-known. What bears questioning is the role of successive governments in deliberately sustaining and reinforcing a system that places a 100 per cent civilian bureaucracy — with dubious expertise in defence and security domains — in complete control of the nation’s armed forces. Having been anointed with this onerous role, it is astounding to see how the bureaucracy has wriggled out of all accountability for national security lapses and shortcomings, leaving Service Chiefs to carry the can.
In the context of defence procurement, the culpability for India’s shameful distinction, of being the world’s largest importer of arms, rests on two departments of MoD — defence production and defence research (or DRDO). Such is the laissez faire spirit of MoD that the DRDO considers itself free to pursue R&D projects without adequate consultation with the military. The head of this organisation is virtually an “R&D Czar” empowered to raise, scrutinise and approve his own proposals. He is not accountable either to the military or to MoD for overstated claims, time/cost overruns and performance-shortfalls that have perpetually bedevilled DRDO projects and left the armed forces at the mercy of foreign military-industrial complexes.
Finally, note needs to be taken of the state of internal health of our armed forces. Certain events, of the recent past, that include misdemeanours at senior ranks, episodes of mass indiscipline and occurrence of serial mishaps, have created misgivings in the public mind about the institutional integrity of the armed forces. The spectrum of concern extends from quality and quantity of officer-intake, to ethical and professional standards of the officer-corps, and from the material state of systems and hardware to the standard of maintenance and safety practices being followed.
Admission of shortcomings goes against the grain of human nature, and men in uniform are no exception. However, the country’s security situation, external and internal, is grim and reminiscent, in many ways, of 1962. It is, therefore, imperative that a wide-ranging, critical review of the state of our armed forces be undertaken lest we validate George Santayana’s imprecation that “those who forget history are condemned to re-live the past”. Since there is total unconcern in the political establishment, the military must conduct urgent introspection and initiate in-house remedial measures.
Although the pre-election political rhetoric contains hardly any serious reference to security issues, one is tempted to draw attention to Prussian strategist Carl von Clausewitz’s prescription for a good Minister of War: “What is needed in the post is intellect and strength of character; the minister can always get the necessary military information and advice.” He adds, for good measure, “…a certain grasp of military affairs is vital for those in charge of policy”.
One hopes this advice may come in handy, post election 2014.
