In American football, a famous coach once said: “don’t throw the ball to the receiver, throw where he’s going to be”. The quarterback, or field general, has to do this for a successful play or touchdown. The ball is like the tip of a spear, as it rotates towards the running receiver, it has the potential for a touchdown only if grabbed well in time. The Kashmir problem at this point doesn’t have a quarterback, or a receiver for that matter, but as South Kashmir explodes in our faces, with a fatigued Army trying to get a handle on the situation, Union home minister Rajnath Singh has said the government is ready with a “permanent solution” for Kashmir. “The initiative has begun. We are moving forward,” he said, and added: “We have never said no to talks. I went there (Kashmir) last year and stayed for three days for talks with all stakeholders. Those who wanted to talk came forward.” He noted that chief minister Mehbooba Mufti had even written to the separatists, and while ruling out talks with the Hurriyat, said whoever wanted to talk “development and peace” was welcome.
What is this “permanent solution”? Is it a process to scrap Article 370 which enables mobility of people by doing away with the singular impediment whereby only a “state subject” can buy property in J&K? Does it mean the sub-national identity of Kashmiris in the Valley will finally be overrun, subsumed by the larger pan-Indian identity? This is something that should have been thought of earlier as it has prevented J&K’s actual integration with the rest of India for 70 years. If that’s the case, so be it. Scrapping Article 370 is a complex matter, which requires legislation at both the state and Central levels. One other alternative is to look at the pre-1953 autonomy of J&K, but this goes against the grain and is what Jan Sangh founder Syama Prasad Mookerjee, an iconic BJP ideologue, had vehemently opposed. He had strongly opposed Article 370, seeing it as a threat to the nation’s unity, and fought against it inside and outside Parliament. The state was granted its own constitution, its own flag and a “prime minister”, whose permission was needed for anyone to enter the state. While opposing this, Mookerjee had famously said: “Ek desh mein do vidhan, do pradhan aur do nishan nahi chalega” (One country can’t have two constitutions, two Prime Ministers and two national emblems).
At the kernel of the Instrument of Accession signed by Maharaja Hari Singh on October 26, 1947 was: “Safeguard autonomy; cooperate with the Union”. The July 1952 Delhi Agreement was supposedly an agreement between two individuals — Sheikh Abdullah and Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. After being signed, the Delhi Agreement was debated in the Lok Sabha on July 24, 1952. It was then adopted. The Rajya Sabha discussed it on August 5, 1952 and approved it. On August 11, 1952, the Sher-i-Kashmir (Sheikh Abdullah) presented it before the state’s constituent assembly, which also gave its approval. It was clearly backed and authorised by the legislatures of both India and Kashmir, giving it a stamp of finality. The salient points of the Delhi Agreement need to be reiterated:
The decision to abolish the hereditary Dogra dynasty was accepted by New Delhi.
The Indian Citizenship Act was made applicable to the state, but the state legislature was empowered to regulate the rights and privileges of permanent residents, specially over acquisition of immovable property and appointment to services.
The right of state nationals who had gone to Pakistan or Pakistan-occupied Kashmir in 1947 or earlier, to return to their homes, was acknowledged.
The President of India was empowered to declare a state of emergency in case of external danger, but in case of internal disturbance the power could be exercised only at the request, or the concurrence of, the state government.
The President of India was empowered to grant reprieve and commute death sentences.
India’s agreement to the confiscation of jagirs without compensation shall permanently stand.
The state was allowed its own flag, which was the flag of the National Conference Party.
The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court was extended to certain matters; and
It was agreed that Jammu and Ladakh should have cultural and regional autonomy. What is “greater autonomy”, or the pre-1953 position? The J&K legislature debate expanded on this theme:
Congress leaders, specially Nehru, created an impression that it was essential to grant “special status” to J&K due to its peculiar position.
The term “peculiar position” led communal elements to interpret it that the Congress had accepted in principle that the Muslim-majority character of the state shall be maintained at all costs.
The state was accorded “special status” under Article 370 of the Indian Constitution with hardly any discussion.
The 1952 Delhi Agreement between Nehru and Sheikh Abdullah gave practical shape to this “special status”.
Under the agreement, the state was given a separate constitution and its own flag. The head of the state and the government were given the nomenclature of Sadar-i-Riyasat and Wazir-i-Azam respectively.
Those who wished to enter the state of J&K or go out were required to seek a permit from the state authorities.
The accession of J&K with the Indian Union was accepted only in three subjects — defence, foreign affairs and communications.
The Jammu and Kashmir Praja Parishad launched a movement seeking “Ek Pradhan, Ek Vidhan, Ek Nishan”. Over a dozen of its workers sacrificed their lives at Hiranagar, Jourian, Sunderbani and Ramban, and thousands more were arrested.
Syama Prasad Mookerjee launched a nationwide satyagraha in support of the movement. Mookerjee entered the state on May 8, 1953 without a permit, was arrested and sent to jail in Srinagar, where he died on June 23, 1953 under mysterious circumstances.
Sheikh Abdullah, who had succeeded in achieving the maximum possible autonomy for the state, was accused of conspiring with American and Pakistani agents to separate J&K from the Indian Union, and was arrested on August 9, 1953. Thus ended one phase of the separatist movement in J&K.
An erosion in the state’s autonomy set in between 1953 and 1975 as pliant governments in Kashmir did the Centre’s bidding. In this period, 13 steps were taken systematically, and sometimes surreptitiously, to extend various provisions of the Indian Constitution to J&K. Some of them are as follows:
By a 1954 presidential order, the operations of Customs, Central Excise, Civil Aviation, Post and Telegraphs were extended.
In 1958, the all-India services like the IAS and IPS were introduced and the functions of the Comptroller and Auditor-General were extended to the state.
In 1959, the legislative entry relating to the census was applied, making way for the conduct of the 1961 census under the Central law.
In 1960, J&K was brought under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. The Election Commission’s jurisdiction was also extended.
In 1964, Articles 356 and 357 of the Constitution were applied, making way for the introduction of President’s Rule in emergencies.
In 1965, a number of legislative entries relating to labour welfare, trade unions, social security and insurance were applied.
In 1966, provisions on direct Lok Sabha elections were applied.
Since 1953, about 337 laws were extended to J&K, such as Coinage Act, Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggler Activities, Contempt of Courts, Customs Act, Copyright Act, Dangerous Drugs Act and delimitation.
The visa-type permit system was abolished.
A general sense of ennui drifted into the Valley, with people getting the sense that they had got weaker, as Delhi continued to push the envelope and enfeeble Article 370 and even the Delhi Agreement, that itself was the first attempt to pave the way for full integration rather than limited autonomy. The bottom line was that Sheikh Abdullah signed off on the Delhi Agreement, and then realised his idea of an autonomous, even semi-independent Kashmir, was merely a delusion, an unreachable pie in the sky.
