Time for India to wake up to China

On April 23, 2009, China held its first International Fleet Review (IFR) at Qingdao (Northern Fleet Headquarters of the People’s Liberation Army Navy). The Indian Navy sent two warships to participate in this event which was also attended by warships of 14 other nations. This Chinese IFR, coming shortly after the spectacular 2008 Beijing Olympics, was not better than the Indian IFR of 2002, which had a far greater international participation. The only difference was that the Chinese IFR showcased China’s totally indigenous maritime capability (including nuclear submarines) while the Indian IFR was a mixed bag of indigenous and foreign equipment used by the Indian Navy.Then on October 1, 2009, China held a huge military parade to celebrate the 60th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China. Watching this parade on television, I realised that it was not really in any way superior to our own Republic Day parades.
The only difference was that while China showcased some five dozen indigenous conventional and strategic systems, India’s military might is still reliant on massive military imports, while its strategic capability has to catch up with China for deterrence to work.
Yes, the Chinese are aware that while their military imports are restricted to only Russian equipment, India has the luxury of selecting the best from the United States, the European Union, Russia and Israel. The Indian military can have a qualitative edge, provided the government takes urgent decisions on long-delayed items like artillery, fighter jets, submarines et cetera.
These two events in China remind me of September 2000 when, as a two-star Eastern Fleet Commander, I led a formation of Indian Navy warships to Shanghai. The visit was to mark the 50th anniversary of Indo-Chinese diplomatic relations. Those days, the Indo-China border was peaceful, trade was growing and the Chinese went out of their way to make our visit truly memorable. China, in fact, took out a unique first-day cover to commemorate the event.
Now, of course, things have changed. China has become India’s number one trading partner, has built strategic infrastructure along the border while India slept, despite 1962, and has begun its “pinprick” border incursions even as it supplies Pakistan with conventional and strategic hardware at “friendship” prices.
Since China and India are the world’s two fastest-growing economies, it may be worthwhile to examine a few major strategic differences between the two Asian giants. Firstly, China has a strategic culture, long-term vision and a clearly defined national goal of meeting some milestones:
l by 2010, have military capability superior to its neighbours with whom it has territorial disputes;
l by 2030, have the military capability to fight limited modern wars against medium-sized opponents, and operate a blue water Navy;
l by 2050 achieve global superpower status, economic and military, on par with the US.

India has yet to declare its national objectives from which will flow its national and military strategies. Indeed, India has yet to realise that economic security is meaningless without military security. The era of dependence on the former USSR for security is history, and looking at America to “pull our chestnuts out of the fire” will not help. Even Pakistan has a national objective — of destabilising India.
Secondly, China, like many other nations, has a unified military command under a Chief of Defence Staff. Its military is truly integrated into government decision-making and strategic deterrence.
In India, the picture is completely opposite — a civilian bureaucracy is the sole adviser to the government on military affairs, while the Nuclear Command Authority and the policy of “recessed deterrence” (i.e. all warheads and missiles are kept separate, under different authorities) does not contribute to deterrence as has been witnessed by Pakistan’s continuing India-policy of “death by a thousand cuts” and China’s policy of “hundreds of border pinpricks”. In contrast, Pakistan has an unambiguous “first-use” nuclear policy, while China has a “no first-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states” policy.
China has traditionally put pressure only on one of its neighbours at any given time. Now that the present dispensation in Taiwan is seen as more “acceptable”, Beijing has shifted its focus from Taiwan to its disputed 4,000 km-long border with India, since talks over the last 29 years have not shown any results and India is moving towards a strategic relationship with the US, after the Indo-US nuclear deal of 2008.
China is aware that India’s long-neglected military may complete its modernisation only by 2015, and hence this may be a good time to pressurise the Indian government into “agreeing” to a boundary settlement on terms favourable to China.
The recent “stapling of Chinese visas” for residents of Jammu and Kashmir (similar to residents of Arunachal Pradesh) needs to be seen as another Chinese effort to ramp up pressure on the Indian government.
China certainly has major problems in Tibet and Xinjiang, not to mention the growing economic disparity between the rich eastern coastal provinces and the poor inland western provinces. In addition, China has major environmental problems of pollution and natural disasters. But these should be weighed against the political will of the Chinese leadership to achieve its national goals and objectives.
The challenges for India are clear. I doubt if any Indian government will have the political will power to change our stand on Tibet, or do a “tit for tat” by issuing “stapled Indian visas” to Chinese domiciles of Tibet or Xingjiang province.
Our present democratic system needs to inculcate some accountability and responsibility, while the political leadership needs to encourage a strategic culture and declare our national goals and objectives till the year 2050, so that our economic, energy and military security go hand in hand. It’s time to wake up as a nation.

* Vice-Admiral Arun Kumar Singh retired as Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Eastern Naval Command, Visakhapatnam