Talking points

The outcome of the recently held high-level Track II dialogue with Pakistan suggests that dialogues do not yield anything because of the rigid attitude and closed minds of our Pakistani friends. Yet one wonders whether there is an alternative to a dialogue, given the fact that war or coercive action are no longer feasible options.

Combating terrorism is the priority on the India-Pakistan agenda at present. But the dialogue on this subject does not proceed an inch without entering into polemics. There is no meeting of the minds on any parameter. Pakistan’s stand is that terrorism is a common problem. No amount of assertion by the Indian side that while the problem is common its causes and sources in both countries are different convinces the Pakistanis. One distinguished participant went to the extent of saying that if 5,00,000 Indian troops in Kashmir have not been able to stop terrorism there, how can Pakistan be expected to succeed in stopping it. There cannot be a more absurd argument in a situation where Pakistani mujahideen have been more than half the source of terrorism in Kashmir. Besides, the argument reveals complete unwillingness to accept that Pakistan has anything to do with terrorist attacks in India, which is just the opposite of what India believes to be a fact. So how can you proceed further?

This brings us to the question of evidence. The stock argument from the Pakistani side is: give us evidence so that we can take action against, for instance, the 26/11 suspects. The evidence already provided by India is not enough. When questioned whether Pakistan has legally sustainable evidence against the Taliban militants who are destroying the Pakistani state and against whom Pakistan’s Army is taking action, there is no cogent answer.

For some reason, the Pakistani side keeps insisting that the Joint Anti-Terror Mechanism should be reactivated. The mechanism was tried out in a couple of meetings in 2007 in the wake of the agreement in Havana in September 2006. Pakistan demanded that terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir be kept out of the purview of this mechanism. While that knocked the bottom out of this mechanism, it is simply impossible to expect Pakistan to reveal in the joint mechanism what action it has taken or not taken against certain terrorists, given the politics of terrorism in Pakistan. The related Pakistani suggestion of intelligence sharing was shot down by Indian participants on the ground that information cannot be shared with the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), a sworn enemy of India. Nor is there much scope for dialogue on the Kashmir issue. The Pakistani side clearly stated that former President Pervez Musharraf’s four-point formula died with his exit. If the post-Musharraf government wants to revive it, it will have to redefine it in its own words and bring it to the table again. The four-point formula evolved by Mr Musharraf in 2006 comprised no change of boundaries but making the Line of Control irrelevant, staggered demilitarisation, autonomy or self-governance and joint control mechanisms. It is generally believed that in back channel diplomacy some progress was made on Mr Musharraf’s agenda although it is difficult to confirm. But all back channel agreements can also be said to have died with the exit of Mr Musharraf. And India’s current external affairs minister clearly rejected the revival of back channel approach by stating in New York in September that the back channel was not needed when the front channel was open.

For the rest, the Pakistani side had stale ideas like India should agree to talk to Kashmiri separatists too, without realising that New Delhi’s invitation had been spurned by the separatists on more than one occasion. And yet, some talks with them have been going on.

There was some discussion on mutual threat perceptions when the Pakistani side lamented the launch of a nuclear submarine by India and the Indian side referred to the expansion of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal and questioned the safety of its nuclear weapons. But there was no satisfactory answer from Pakistan to the question why it was diverting foreign military aid meant for fighting terrorism to buy weapons usable against India. Nor was there any recognition of the fact that Pakistan was resorting to terrorism as a state policy and was using non-state actors for this purpose.

India’s justifiable anger against Pakistan’s attitude and denial has led it to adopt the posture of no-dialogue whereas Pakistan has been desperate to resume some sort of a dialogue. This has been described by commentators as coercive diplomacy of India, even though there is no coercion in India’s behaviour. India’s refusal to talk is a mere expression of its frustration at the outcome of such talks. And yet relations between India and Pakistan are at a standstill. “No-dialogue” has helped neither India nor Pakistan. One has to understand why.

Pakistan will just not be able to take strong action against high-profile anti-India militant leaders for quite sometime even though it will keep up the facade of legal action against the second-rung leadership. Pakistan is under an ideological siege, an Islamic siege, which is its own creation. Militant leaders like Hafeez Saeed not only have a huge following of Islamic zealots in the Pakistani heartland but also a large capability to resort to organised violence. Besides, by virtue of their strong links with the Army-ISI combine, they are privy to important secrets. No Pakistani government can afford the risk of strong action against them. They are not threatening the Pakistani state, like the Taliban.

Talking to Pakistani friends, their helplessness becomes obvious, though not expressed in so many words. Is there a way by which India can help them out of this siege? No other country can, not the United States, not China. If at all, it is India, and that too only through dialogue.

The dialogue does not have to begin with Kashmir. It can begin with terrorism but not confined to specific incidents. It can address the question of how multi-sectoral exchanges can be expanded between the two countries with the aim of creating more tolerant and plural societies. It can include the consequences of Talibanisation of Pakistan for both countries. It can include Afghanistan at some stage, and later some bilateral issues.

Let the pace be slow and hesitant. But the two countries should keep talking. Pakistan has nowhere to go except turn to India if it needs to know how to create a tolerant society.

The writer is editor, India’s National Security Annual Review, and former professor of diplomacy at JNU, New Delhi