Talks with Pak can’t be hostage to 26/11

The first anniversary of the Mumbai tragedy holds two lessons for the country. It reminds us about how a determined set of trained people can drive a coach and four through the security apparatus and the Indo-Pakistani equation remains a matter of constant concern. There has indeed been a burst of energy on the security front and the kind of turmoil Pakistan has been facing sends a clear signal of an unstable situation lasting well into the future. India must have a coherent longer term plan to cope with the consequences of these disturbing developments, rather than resort to knee-jerk reactions that feed into the traditional volatile mix of emotion and desire to teach Pakistan a lesson.

It must be said for the new home minister, Mr P. Chidambaram, that he has set in motion a long-neglected task of improving training and weapons for the police and paramilitary security forces. But the bane of any national endeavour has been lack of persistence and stamina. Mumbai and our other major cities must be made secure on a long-term basis with trained, well-equipped forces co-ordinating their actions flowing from a well thought out strategy. One can only hope that the nature and scale of the Mumbai outrage will serve as a constant warning about the dangers of complacency.

The second issue thrown up by Mumbai and the events in Pakistan that have followed 26/11 is an even harder nut to crack because it impinges upon an unravelling political equation, the American pressure on Islamabad in fighting the Taliban and Al Qaeda and the fixed mindset of the Pakistani establishment, particularly the Army, on the perceived threat from India. The fact that the terrorist elements nurtured by Pakistan’s spy Inter-Services Intelligence agency are biting the hand that fed it has served to muddy the waters further.

India’s objective must be to hold on to the central verity that there can be no alternative to seeking good relations with Pakistan in the larger scheme of things. Second, that one cannot choose one’s neighbours has become a cliche, but it is true. At the same time, New Delhi has no alternative but to work on a set of contingency plans depending upon the variables thrown up by the situation in Pakistan. These plans must take into account the stark fact that some of America’s moves to bolster Pakistan to fight the Al Qaeda have an inevitable fall-out, to India’s detriment. Even as Pakistan is bleeding by the various kinds of terrorists seeking revenge for Islamabad’s actions against the Taliban and Al Qaeda, it is acquiring more modern US weapons and aircraft while its faltering economy is being bolstered by a whopping American civil assistance programme.

At present India is in the unenviable position of facing another, larger neighbour that has chosen to keep New Delhi off balance by launching a series of strident statements and declarations. China’s moves, in fact, help Pakistan psychologically, if not materially, and has forced India to try to balance its stated position on Arunachal Pradesh with an attempt to temper the tone of the Dalai Lama’s visit to the state. And we witnessed the extraordinary phenomenon of analysts and some politicians asking that the Tibetan leader’s visit be scrapped or postponed.

Such panic reaction is totally uncalled for. There are ways of making India’s point while refraining from offering gratuitous provocation. But the fact remains that India’s problems with Pakistan have really become a three-way game, with China and the United States becoming part of the larger equation. While China is obviously safeguarding its close relations with Islamabad as a lever against India, having assisted it in the past in nuclear technology and missiles, the American interest is enhanced by its dependence on Islamabad for pursuing its AfPak strategy and it is willing to be strung along by Islamabad to achieve its minimal objectives in Afghanistan.

During Mr Barack Obama’s visit to China, he was the second US President after Bill Clinton to offer some kind of a supervisory role to Beijing in Indo-Pakistani relations, despite the stark fact that China’s policy towards Islamabad for decades has been to cement ties with it to exercise a check on India’s growing economic and geostrategic presence. The kindest interpretation that can be offered for American moves is that it considers placating Pakistan to the extent of disregarding India’s security interests as the lesser of two evils in pursuing its regional policies. In an earlier phase, Washington had chosen to turn a blind eye to Pakistan’s military nuclear programme because it was useful to remove the then Soviet military presence in Afghanistan.

The Manmohan Singh government has done a bad job in sensitising Indian public opinion on the stakes involved in pursuing sensible policies on Pakistan. Any sane Indian policy must have the following elements. Pakistan has an important place in India’s policy, given the nature of the subcontinent’s division but it should not be allowed to overshadow India’s larger worldview and interests. China’s major objective seems to be to relegate India to a subcontinental setting, to preclude it from playing a larger regional and world role. New Delhi must therefore place relations with Pakistan in perspective and try to convince Opposition parties that they are harming the national interest by indulging in extravagant rhetoric. To begin with, India has to be clear in its mind on its own strategy. Hesitation in pursuing a clear policy is likely to

prove expensive. Partly, Pakistan is not the master of all it surveys.

Belatedly, the Union government has realised that any dogmatic approach to negotiations with Pakistan is counter-productive. Any real investigation into Pakistani links to 26/11 is unlikely simply because it will lead to a web of conspiracies involving official agencies at various levels. While New Delhi is right to make its points to set the record straight, simply to continue insisting on Pakistan coming clean as a precondition to talks can only lead to an impasse. While New Delhi should continue to insist on receiving satisfaction on the horrendous terrorist attacks in Mumbai, it should not make it a precondition for holding talks. Rather, it should set out new markers for Islamabad.

If India has chinks in its armour, so does China. There is no cause for panic.