Afghanistan’s national security adviser Hanif Atmar and deputy foreign minister Hekmat Khalil Karzai, turning to India to revive its 2012 request for military aid, may have been prompted by the worsening security this last year.
The bombshell by Mahmoud Saikal, Afghanistan’s permanent representative to the UN this Tuesday, when he hit out at Pakistan for using terrorists as “violent proxies”, and openly blamed Islamabad’s “unnecessary anxiety” over its ties with India for a sharp spike in civilian and military casualties that made 2015 the bloodiest year since 2001, clearly shows that there was more to this November visit than a simple quest for better security.
The unspoken agenda is the revival of Afghanistan-India ties, after a relatively bumpy year when Afghanistan under its new President Ashraf Ghani turned towards three countries with considerable clout over the Taliban — Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and China — in a bid to end Pakistan’s decades long “undeclared war” on Afghanistan, and failed. In fact, befriending Pakistan set off a storm at home.
Mr Ghani had hoped that roping in Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif for a joint effort to combat terror would bring regional stability, economic prosperity and trade. The first fallout was the alienation of key regional ally India, which until then had been steadfast in its support of Afghanistan, boosting education, healthcare, energy, food and telecommunications.
Former President Hamid Karzai and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh signed an “Agreement on Strategic Partnership between Afghanistan and India” in 2011 which with an eye on the post-2015 scenario when the US and Nato forces were set to exit, was a bold and far-sighted move to strengthen not just political, commercial, economic and cultural cooperation but train and equip Afghan security forces.
Mr Ghani’s Pakistan’s policy was a gross miscalculation. Islamabad’s strategic calculus vis-à-vis Afghanistan has not altered. Terror continued to be Pakistan’s weapon of choice against the Afghan people. The farcical Murree talks reinforced Kabul’s misgivings. It gave Mr Ghani no reason to believe Pakistan was sincere about ensuring peace on our shared borders. Despite claims to the contrary by the Pakistan military, the Taliban representative in Murree was authorised neither by the Quetta Shura nor by Taliban’s political office in Qatar to hold talks with Kabul.
Afraid of being caught in a lie, Islamabad may have even sabotaged the process by announcing Mullah Omar’s death. Afghanistan is unlikely to ask Pakistan to host another round of talks with Taliban, although Mr Sharif sent representatives from Khyber-Pakthunkhwa to plead his case, and will use the Paris climate summit to reach out to Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Mr Ghani. Islamabad, under pressure from Washington, has invited India for the “Heart of Asia ministerial meeting on Afghanistan” in Pakistan. But distrust over Pakistan’s motives were underscored by Islamabad’s doublespeak when it simultaneously warned that any revival of Indo-Afghan military cooperation will have “perilous consequences” for Afghanistan.
After one of the bloodiest years since the Taliban’s exit, and the shocking fall of Kunduz to Taliban hands when residents faced unprecedented brutality — albeit briefly — there is now consensus among Afghan officials that Pakistan is unlikely to stop its sponsorship of the Taliban insurgency. Any interaction between the Afghan and Pakistani leaders will hit a wall at Le Bourget as Mr Ghani has come to realise that even if Mr Sharif reiterates the promise that Pakistani soil will not be used as a sanctuary by terrorists, Taliban sanctuaries flourish without impediment even as an emboldened Islamic State of Iraq and Syria steps up its presence in eastern Afghanistan.
In the light of Pakistan’s unchanged Afghan policy, the best way forward for Afghanistan is to strengthen itself on all fronts, particularly militarily. Nato’s offer of continuing support post-2015, the unannounced visit of Gen. John Campbell, commander of US and Nato forces in Afghanistan to India last month and Hanif Atmar and Khalil Karzai’s visit soon after, points to an United States nod, to intensifying Indo-Afghan cooperation beyond military aid.
Delhi’s support of the Afghan government, irrespective of the results of any peace talks with Taliban or how Pakistan-Afghanistan affairs play out, must be unwavering. Afghanistan too must cash in on the fact that it is strategically placed on the crossroads of Asia with links to Central Asia, West Asia and South Asia. Despite its diverse and often warring ethnic groups, the Afghan nation has held together.
The changing regional dynamics and the growing threat of extremism to Central Asia, Russia and China has increased the chances of regional cooperation over combating terror and sustained durable economic development. But India’s backing is integral towards this effort. While Mr Ghani’s clear message to Pakistan may have been “Take Tajikistan, but give Afghanistan to India,” epitomising his long-term view of India-Afghanistan economic ties, there can be no illusions over the significant security challenges that come with such an arrangement.
Indian investment and citizens in Afghanistan would clearly face the heat from Pakistan sponsored Haqqani network and Lashkar-e-Tayyaba. But to retreat in the face of these security threats is to hand a moral victory to the terror outfits. Instead, India and Afghanistan must boost security cooperation and set up mechanisms that safeguard Indian investment. Equally, India must commit to staying the course, whatever the provocation.
For Kabul, the military hardware comes with a price. A price that Delhi must be willing to pay.
The writer served as an adviser in Afghanistan’s Independent Directorate of Local Governance
