Governments, whether of the United Progressive Alliance or the National Democratic Alliance, have been desperately trying to bring their unique identification scheme (UID) under the Aadhaar umbrella an air of legal legitimacy. Unfortunately for the government, the Supreme Court has not obliged. Last week, in a major setback for the government, the Supreme Court did not modify its interim order of August 11 restricting the use of the Aadhaar unique identity number for subsidies on kerosene and LPG.
The court laid down three conditions for the continuance of the UID scheme. One, that the government shall widely publicise, in the electronic and print media, including radio and television networks, that it is not mandatory for a citizen to obtain an Aadhaar card. Two, the production of an Aadhaar card will not be a condition for obtaining any benefits otherwise due to a citizen. Three, the UID number or Aadhaar card may be used in the public distribution system (PDS), “in particular for the purpose of distribution of foodgrains, etc., and cooking fuel, such as kerosene” and in LPG distribution.
On September 23, 2013, the Supreme Court issued an interim order saying that “no person should suffer for not getting Aadhaar” as it is voluntary, not mandatory. In another interim order on August 11, 2015, the Supreme Court ruled that “UID/Aadhaar will not be used for any other purposes except PDS, kerosene and LPG distribution system” and made it clear that even for availing these facilities Aadhaar card will not be mandatory. Importantly, the UID number will not be used for school admissions, scholarships for students, passport verification, banks, registration of marriage, wills, property sales or rentals, vehicle registration, mobile phones, etc. All this will be illegal after this order.
This happened despite several petitioners, including the Reserve Bank of India, Securities and Exchange Board of India (Sebi) and the Income-Tax Department pleaded for a relaxation of the interim order to allow the voluntary use of Aadhaar as a form of e-identity. With such a strong backing for Aadhaar and over 900 million (or three fourths of the Indian population) numbers having been issued already, it might seem perverse to oppose what is claimed to be an essential modernising step forward.
The argument for Aadhaar mainly rests on the direct benefit transfer scheme for LPG where the money is directly sent to an Aadhaar-linked bank account. This was “very encouraging” with a reported savings of '12,700 crores to the public. Union finance minister Arun Jaitley maintained that it was central to the government’s JAM — Jan Dhan Yojana Aadhaar, Mobile — vision that could ensure “money goes directly and more quickly into the pockets of the poor”.
The government also experimented with an Aadhaar-based system to check late arrival and absenteeism in government offices, but this did not work. The ministry of external affairs was testing the linking of passports to the Aadhaar database, checking whether the applicant had any criminal records. The Department of Telecom as part of the “Digital India” project asked all telecom operators to collect Aadhaar from all new applicants for SIM cards. In July 2014, the Employees’ Provident Fund Organisation (EPFO) began linking provident fund accounts with Aadhaar numbers. In August 2014, Prime Minister Narendra Modi directed the Planning Commission to enrol all prisoners in India under Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI).
In December 2014, it was proposed by minister for women and child development Maneka Gandhi that Aadhaar should be made mandatory for men to create a profile on matrimonial websites to prevent fake profiles. In March 2015, the Election Commission of India started a programme to link the elector’s photo identity card with the Aadhaar number of the registered voter. Clearly, the Aadhaar number was being put to various inventive uses, all beyond what the Supreme Court allowed. Its benefits are limited but the dangers are immense. The technology is untested. Having a database of over a billion people with even a small error in identifying fingerprints could lead to wrong confinement or identification. All countries fingerprint only criminals among their citizens, which amount to a few million at the most. Here the problems of retaining biometric efficiency for more than one billion has not been sufficiently studied or known. There could be serious errors in the registration process.
There is a further question of who is collecting this data. For the speed with which the biometric details of people are being collected, private foreign entrepreneurs have been recruited. They manage and hold the data and have uncomfortably close relationships with American and French intelligence agencies instead of known public sector ones. Then there is the risk of the information being sold to a bidder and being misused. Apart from that, there is the question of privacy. The Unique Identification Authority of India collects a person’s fingerprints and retinal scan, which can then be used by government agencies against critics.
There is a danger of “data creep” in which data collected by UIDAI and the external contractors being linked to other intelligence databases, or used for commercial purposes, without the knowledge or permission of the individual concerned. Apart from privacy, the Aadhaar database can be used for surveillance and gives immense power to the government or, more likely, foreign contractors and governments. There is a deliberate flouting of court orders. Another matter of grave concern is the introduction of the number into every database. Once this happens, it makes convergence of personal information remarkably simple. So, if the number is in the gas agency, bank, ticket, ration card, voter ID, medical records, etc., the state, as also others who learn to use what is called the “ID platform”, can see every activity of the citizen. Is this the first step in the control of his life?
The writer is a Mumbai-based freelance journalist
