Karachi: Some years ago, when asked about China’s relaxed response to India’s security challenge, a senior Chinese diplomat observed that “when the wolf (the US) is at the front door, (China) cannot worry about the fox (India) at the back door”. Now, that the wolf and the fox have agreed to join forces to counter China’s rise, Beijing will no doubt be less sanguine in its response.
However, as signalled during US President Obama’s recent visit to India, under Modi, India is no longer reluctant to align itself with the US against China. Beyond the fanfare and the ritualistic rhetoric about the “oldest” and the “largest” democracies, the visit witnessed substantive movement towards a strategic alliance between the two countries. India is now America’s largest arms customer; has access to the most advanced weapons and technology; will be able to acquire US nuclear reactors; while US companies are provided official incentives by the administration to invest in India.
Apart from responding sharply to the South China Sea reference in the joint communiqué and throwing cold water on India’s proposed membership of the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group, China’s reaction to the Obama visit has been disingenuously dismissive. A Xinhua commentary opined that the Indo-US rapprochement was “superficial” and that the differences between them on trade and climate change could not be overcome in three days. But these differences are secondary to the reported shift in India’s strategic mindset, gleefully revealed by US officials.
While professing that they do not wish to confront or contain China, the US and India have already made several moves to do so. The US is busy in building alliances around China’s periphery. Apart from activating military collaboration with Japan, Australia and India, the US has revived its military relationship with the Philippines; supported Vietnamese defiance of China; prised away Burma from China. And it has exerted pressure on Pakistan to normalise ties with India on India’s terms.
Encouraged by the US “strategic umbrella”, India has adopted a more robust posture towards China. Nepal’s opening to China was blocked by India’s covert intervention and threats of trade and economic restrictions. The nationalist Rajapaksa, who ruthlessly put down the Tamil insurgency in Sri Lanka, was defeated in recent elections.
It is safe to assume that China will respond, cautiously but concretely, to the Indo-US strategic partnership. Beijing’s best weapons are its huge trade and economic relationships with its Asian neighbours and even those aligned against it, including India, Japan, Australia and the US itself. Containing China will entail an economic cost.
China will further reinforce its ties with a Russia now locked in open confrontation with the West. It will intensify its strategic cooperation with Pakistan and Iran which distance themselves from the American alliance.
Pakistan too is required to review its strategic circumstances. It cannot afford hostility with the US. While resisting US pressure to make unilateral concessions to India, or accept discriminatory treatment, Islamabad can cooperate with Washing-ton to eliminate terrorism, advance Afghan stability, and expand trade. Yet, Islamabad must not be drawn into any scheme that is aimed at containing or neutralising the rise of China.
With America’s eventual total exit from Afghanistan virtually certain, Pakistan can promote long-term stability on its western borders by building a security consensus with China, Russia and Iran to preserve peace and stability in Afghanistan and exclude an Indian role there detrimental to Pakistan’s security and stability. While Sino-Pakistan relations are time tested, Indo-US relations are still young and fragile. The wolf and the fox, both predators, may well discover that they cannot trust each other.
The writer is a former Pakistan ambassador to the UN. By arrangement with Dawn
