The Narendra Modi government approaching the 100 day mark demands an assessment of its performance. A national television channel even arranged, more a boxing match than a debate, a programme on whether Mr Modi’s foreign policy is continuity or radical change. Finally, a shift emerged on August 18 when foreign secretary level talks with Pakistan were cancelled over the Pakistani high commissioner meeting leaders of the All Parties Hurriyat Conference, a gaggle of over two dozen Kashmiri political, social and religious organisations.
This occurred against the backdrop of diverse diplomatic moves by the Modi government. Based on Prime Minister Modi’s election rhetoric and his background as a Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh functionary it was expected that his government would take a harder line on recalcitrant neighbours, particularly Pakistan and China. At the same time his experience as a successful chief minister and his stated vision of growth, development and empowerment of youth, women and backwards meant that he needed, and sought, a peaceful and stable external environment.
Prime Minister Modi inherited a complicated international environment. Power was shifting from the West to Asia and diffusing to non-state actors, like Al Qaeda earlier and ISIS now seizing territory and dominating the discourse within a major religion. China’s rise presents an opportunity for closer economic engagement, including Chinese investment in Indian infrastructure development. It is also a major national security challenge due to an unsettled border and burgeoning Chinese influence along the Indian periphery, often with destabilising consequences like the unbridled growth of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.
George W. Bush, when he was US President, saw India as a necessary bulwark against a rising China’s dominance of Asia. The India-US nuclear deal was to unshackle India from the technology control regimes that had blocked the transfer of cutting-edge technologies. With the US’ strategic shift many other nations, like Japan, began their own pivots towards India. Unfortunately, the United Progressive Alliance-2’s five years were a term lost to policy indecision, corruption grid-lock, legislative over-reach and strategic hesitation as the world, distracted by the banking and then eurozone crises, lost interest in India either as an economic or a strategic partner.
PM Modi’s rise and unprecedented mandate rekindled global interest in India as an investment destination and international player. The Indian policy response has to bridge multiple divides. India-China relations will simultaneously involve cooperation, competition, and even friction. Engagement with Russia must factor in their rising confrontation with the West over Ukraine, Russian intervention being interference within the territory of another sovereign nation a principle that India repeatedly faults Pakistan for. India-US relations continue to be buffeted by periodic jolts despite their qualitative change because the US is unused to a close friendship that is not an alliance — a large but not total convergence of views and interests.
The PM’s plan to first visit Japan, in view of the mutual admiration between Prime Ministers Modi and Shinzo Abe, ran into scheduling problems. However, the Chinese foreign minister’s arrival in Delhi and PM Modi meeting Chinese President Xi Jinping in Brazil, on the sidelines of the Brics Summit, left the Japanese mystified. The PM now heads to Japan end-August, receives the Chinese President in India mid-September and travels to the United Nations and Washington thereafter. Meanwhile, Chinese troops are again camping in Burtse area of Leh, near the spot of the Daulat Beg Oldi incursion of 2013. Balancing engagement between India and these three nations and tying economic and strategic threads seamlessly despite varied levels of distrust will test the unfolding foreign policy. Meanwhile, the world seeks coherence between India’s domestic policies and its international obligations.
The handling of Pakistan raises similar questions. Hurriyat leaders have been meeting the Pakistani envoy or visiting Pakistani political leaders periodically. High commissioner Abdul Basit met them on April 2, 2014 on the eve of Indian elections. It hardly raised a storm. When PM Nawaz Sharif came for Mr Modi’s swearing-in ceremony on May 26-27, 2014, he skipped meeting them, perhaps to avoid a controversy in view of the context. The two PMs exuded bonhomie and announced that the foreign secretaries would follow up on their useful talks. It was assumed that all pre-conditions had been thrashed out. PM Sharif was already facing domestic headwinds which are today a raging storm with Imran Khan and Dr Tahir-ul-Qadri laying siege to the national capital, making PM Sharif dependent on the Pakistani Army. The persistent breaches of the ceasefire at the Line of Control over the last few weeks were symptoms that the India file was now in uniformed hands and an attempt was underway to keep the focus on Kashmir.
Meanwhile, India was sending mixed signals. While Prime Minister Modi on August 11 at Leh lambasted Pakistan’s “proxy war”, taunting them that they had “lost the strength” for conventional combat, on August 15, from the Red Fort’s ramparts, he talked of poverty alleviation and development as the panacea for the neighbourhood. Making the Pakistani envoy’s meeting with the Hurriyat a red line is a serious strategic shift. India in the past had merely protested but not issued ultimatums over them. For Pakistan to abandon the Hurriyat would be a major strategic compromise. It is possible, though unlikely, that the issue was discussed in the PM’s meeting. Most likely the fracas is due to misread signals or simply wrong expectations. The lesson is that summitry must follow due preparation, otherwise it complicates the issues further. The PM has good instincts; there is poor translation by aides into tactics. Some say India showed willingness to reach out and Pakistan fell short. Regardless, the new red line creates a major hurdle for resumption of dialogue. Irish poet Seamus Heaney articulates the dilemma: “But then, once in a lifetime hope and history rhyme.”
The writer is a former secretary in the external affairs ministry. He tweets at @ambkcsingh
